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ABSTRACT
Explanations of the Political Behavior of
American Women: An Analysis and Critique
May, 1983
Shirley Ann Haslip, B
. A. State University of
New York, M.A., University of Massachusetts,
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Jean Bethke Elshtain
A major goal of behavioral political science is the
construction of a theory of political behavior. This study
examines attempts by behavioral political scientists to
develop a theory of women's political behavior. The con-
clusions are that such a theory does not exist and that
there have been no systematic attempts to create one. In-
stead, there are two major competing behavioral explanations,
the political socialization explanation and the situational
explanation. The underlying assumptions and supporting
evidence for each explanation are examined to determine
whether one appears to be the better explanation for women's
political behavior. The major finding is that neither explan-
ation has adequate supportive evidence to indicate that it
should be preferred.
A second finding is that there are no well documented
general laws regarding women's political behavior in these
vii
studies. In fact, the pattern of explanation which pre-
dominates is inadequate for the formulation of general laws.
Explanations proceed in an ad hoc fashion. When the authors
of behavioral studies discover a statistical relationship
between women and another variable, they form hypotheses
to explain this relationship. Hypotheses often include
common but empirically unproven assumptions about the relation-
ship between women and politics. Yet these hypothetical ex-
planations are repeated in further studies as if they were
well verified.
While the studies evaluated rarely address strategies
for increasing women's political participation, this issue
is a focus of this study. The explanatory frameworks
suggest a limited range of policy alternatives to increase
women's political participation. The two competing explan-
ations highlight the need for policies to be established
either in childhood or adulthood, but no study directly
asserts policy recommendations to improve women's political
participation
.
The final assertion is that there is a need for addition-
al studies of women's political behavior from a policy per-
spective with the stated goal of discovering necessary con-
ditions for increasing women's political participation.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the late 1970' s a number of works appeared that
challenged the existing knowledge in political science with
regard to women's political behavior and the image of women
that was prevalent in political science.
New political behavior studies suggested that on almost
all measures of voting participation, efficacy, activism and
political ideology, that is, traditional indices of political
behavior, differences between men and women, if present at
all, were small."*" Persistent inequalities between men and
women seemed to be eradicated unless the researcher looked
at who held political party offices and high elective offices
in the state and national levels; here women continued to be
underrepresented in proportion to their numbers.
This emerging interpretation of women's political parti-
cipation represented a challenge to the image of apolitical
women that was widely held in political science and to the
empirical data which lent support to this image because the
results of the studies of the 1970 's contrast with the results
of the studies conducted in the 1950' s, published in the
1950 's and 1960's. The major conclusions of these studies
have been summarized in a number of articles that review
voting behavior literature. Bonnie Freeman, whose review
essay is entitled "Power, Patriarchy and 'Political Primi-
tives '" summarized the conclusions about women and politics
that are found in this literature: that women vote less than
men; that women express less interest in politics than men,
that women indicate less information about issues, campaigns
and government than men; that women participate less often
in political campaigns, run for and hold office less often
o
than men
.
Constantini and Craik summarize an additional set of
ideas about women that are found in the voting behavior liter-
ature :
. . .women voters are more provincial (in the sense
of focusing upon local issues) , more conservative
in their stance on policy issues, more responsive
to issues with moral overtones, more likely to
personalize politics and to be more sensitive to
the personality of politicians, less sophisticated
in the level of concept formation and less comfor-
table with political conflict and contention.
3
All of these studies seem to present a view of women as
an apolitical being or at least a lesser political being when
compared to men.
But, the findings of the 1970' s, where woman emerges as
a political being similar to men calls into question previous
observations and conclusions about women's political behavior.
Either women changed significantly in ten years, an explana-
tion which many researchers accept, or the initial set of
data misrepresented women's political behavior.
I am most interested in the studies that have been critical
of the original observations and explanations regarding women's
political behavior. Two of these studies seem particularly
significant because of the extent of their review of this
literature. These studies are "Politics as Unnatural
Practice" (1974) by Susan Bourque and Jean Grossholtz and
Women and Voting Studies
: Mindless Matrons or Sexist Scien -
tism (1975), a monograph by Murray Goot and Elizabeth Reid.
Both of these studies review a number of the voting behavior
studies and political socialization studies that were widely
accepted in political science.
Ultimately, the conclusions reached by Bourque and Gross
holtz as well as by Goot and Reid are very similar. Both see
the image of woman portrayed in the literature as apolitical
and, more importantly, both believe that this view is at
least in part, a product of the unexamined assumptions the
researchers hold with regard to women, men and politics. The
most fundamental assumption uncovered here is the notion that
men are more political than women. As Goot and Reid state
this :
Men are people who involve themselves in
politics, and political judgments are
masculine ones. 4-
Bourque and Grossholtz lodge a serious charge against
political science with regard to this assumption when they
state that the political science discipline is contributing
to the perpetuation of a sexual definition of politics in
which men are deemed political beings and women are not.^
Furthermore, they suggest that "women could never be full par
ticipants in politics as presently defined by political scien
tists given the assumptions made about the nature of politics
and the necessity for sex role differentiation in society." 6
The definition of politics as a characteristic male
activity and an uncharacteristic female activity is borne out
by evidence that Bourque and Grossholtz cite from the voting
behavior and socialization studies that show that the male
political scientists engaged in these studies often distorted
both evidence and their interpretation of the evidence when
dealing with the explanation of women's political behavior.
Bourque and Grossholtz cite four types of distortion that
regularly appeared in this literature: 1. Fudging the Foot-
notes; 2. the Assumption of Male Dominance; 3. the Acceptance
of Masculinity as Ideal Political Behavior; 4. A Commitment to
the Eternal Feminine.^
Fudging the Footnotes, as Bourque and Grossholtz define
it, might be interpreted as sloppy research. It refers to
situations where political scientists make statements about
female political characteristics, attitudes or behaviors which
are misrepresentations of the original data they cite as
g
source material. Often what the researchers do in this situa
tion is make a claim about the interpretation of the original
data which was not claimed by the original research.
The assumption of male dominance, the acceptance of mascu
linity as ideal political behavior, and a commitment to the
eternal feminine all seem to be distortions related to a simi-
lar view of politics as a social role that is male rather than
female
.
5When Bourque and Grossholtz point out that male dominance
is assumed by political scientists, they note that it is
assumed that men will occupy dominant political roles and
control political decisions in society. 9 Bourque and Gross-
holtz are not suggesting that observation of reality will
offer us any other conclusion; males do dominate politics.
But, they are insisting that political scientists should make
a serious attempt to question why this should be the case;
political scientists should be asking why male dominance
occurs or why it should occur, not just contributing to its
occurrence by assuming that is the usual state of affairs.
Bourque and Grossholtz are questioning the unjustified assump-
tion of male dominance in politics
.
Bourque and Grossholtz also assert that the researchers
assume that masculinity is the ideal for political behavior.
The ideal they refer to is a set of stereotyped assumptions
about masculinity: assumptions that males are more aggress-
ive, competitive and pragmatic, for example. These mascu-
line characteristics are said to be more suitable for the
understanding and pursuing politics, more congruent with
a political role.
On the other hand, not only do women not share in the
characteristics of the masculine ideal but they are further
hampered from the pursuit of politics by the constraints of
their dominant social roles as wives and mothers. Bourque
and Grossholtz maintain that the researchers in the voting
behavior and political socialization studies are committed
to the Eternal Feminine in the sense that they believe that
women's roles as wives and mothers are more important to the
continuation of society than women being able to participate
more fully in politics. 11
Goot and Reid, covering much of the same ground as
Bourque and Grossholtz, arrive at similar conclusions, that
the assumptions about women and their relationship to politics
are more important to the explanations that are advanced for
women's political behavior than the empirical evidence con-
tained in the studies. According to their account, it is the
assumptions that political scientists hold about women rather
than the evidence that they present that contributes to the
continuation of an image of apolitical woman:
How is this image maintained? by the play of
prejudice, whereby the special and contingent
are transformed to the general and necessary,
by the reluctance to pursue conflicting evi-
dence, or to consider alternative points of
view (especially those of women themselves)
and by linguistic fiat whereby parent means
father, worker entails male . 12
Additionally, however, Goot and Reid also seem to suggest
that some of the difficulties with the voting behavior and
political socialization research may lie in the theory and
the methodology employed by the behavioralis ts engaged in this
research. While their critique is not well-developed, the
authors reject both the theory and methodology of these
studies: theory is seen as socialization; methodology is
7seen as the utilization of survey questionnaires:
In terms of theory, we reject 'internalization'
socialization', and so on as the only possible
ways to account for the political consciousness
of women. In terms of methods we argue against
the adequacy of questionnaires which are
structured on the principle that they 'speak
for themselves .' 13
Furthermore, Goot and Reid suggest that the methodology
of using surveys makes sense to behavioralists because of
the view of human beings that is portrayed in the theory.
And theory and method are intimately related.
For it is on the view that a person can do
nought but take over, unmodified, the reasoning
of clearly identified dominant others that it
makes sense to think of surveys as means by
which such reasoning is 'tapped' or 'indexed.' 1^
The survey questionnaire methodology is further criti-
cized because it is replete with the values of the male re-
searchers that set it up:
Like most 'value-neutral' research, much of
the work we have reviewed simply assumes the
dominant values of the dominant groups of
society. The values taken for granted here
are the values of the (male) researchers
operating in a male dominated society in
which they too are numbered among the bene-
ficiaries . 15
As Bourque and Grossholtz noted, political responses are,
by definition, in most surveys the male responses. Conversely,
1
6
women's responses are seldom judged as political.
Goot and Reid even suggest that survey methodology hides
from view the real explanations for political behavior, pro-
tecting the privileged theory:
The pre-coded, superficially quantitative
questionnaire items commonly employed merely
3reflect the weakness of the theory while en-
suring that such data as might expose the theory
cannot emerge. 1/ y
Ultimately the major criticism of Goot and Reid deals
with the inadequacy of the theory's ability to explain women's
political behavior, to get at the roots of why women are less
political as they are assumed to be in these studies. Here,
again, they are most critical of the assumptions of the ex-
planatory format, the most fundamental of these being a non-
interactionist view of the social-psychological; opinions in
this explanation are seen to originate by being absorbed from
I o
one person to another.
The end result of this format of explanation is a theory
that tends to attribute women's non-participation to the per-
sonal attributes of women. That Goot and Reid disagree with
this interpretation of women's political behavior is evident
in the following quotation they borrow from Schattschneider
:
It is profoundly characteristic of the behavior
of the more fortunate state of the community
that responsibility for widespread nonpartici-
pation is attributed wholly to the ignorance, in-
difference, and shiftlessness of the people...
there is a better explanation. Abstention re-
flects the suppression of the options and al-
ternatives that reflect the needs of the nonpar-
ticipants. It is not necessarily true that the
people with the greatest needs participate in
politics more actively. Whoever decides what
the game is about also decides who gets into
the game . T9"
Goot and Reid thus seem to lean toward an explanation of wo-
men's political behavior that focuses on structural or poli-
tical causes rather than personal causes , even though this is
not well-elaborated.
The studies I have cited made some important criticisms
of the political behavior literature, that is, the voting
behavior and socialization studies. However, they only
skirt what I consider to be a central issue in these stud-
ies, what connections exist between behavioral methodology,
behavioral explanation and the understanding of women's poli-
tical behavior.
The introduction of behavioral methodology and the be-
havioral form of explanation to the study of politics promised
the development of a scientific theory of politics, a theory
that would be objective and neutral, freed from the values of
the researcher. As part of this promise of a general theory,
there were attempts to construct a theory of political behav-
ior, one aspect of which might have attended to the explana-
tion of women's political behavior.
But, as both the Bourque and Grossholtz study and the
Goot and Reid study noted, women's political behavior was
often incidental in the voting behavior and political social-
20ization studies. Nonetheless, in most of these studies
explanations are advanced for why women are less political
than men and the purpose of this dissertation is to examine
these explanations.
The first task of this dissertation, therefore, is to
outline the general principles of behavioral explanation
with respect to their application to the study of women and
10
politics. This is the task undertaken in Chapter II. It
will be argued that behavioralism embraces a particular
methodology which emphasizes the collection of empirical data
to test hypotheses which are constructed by the researcher
and more significantly, that behavioralism embraces a partic-
ular form of explanation, the deductive-nomological model of
explanation, at least in principle. But, with respect to the
explanations which are advanced for women's political behavior,
it will be argued that the format of explanation is more in-
formal than the deductive model, more speculative, and open
to substantial criticisms with regard to correctness, accuracy
and usefulness. And yet, the explanations are often accepted
as facts or general laws although there is little substantia-
tion for this claim.
The behavioral explanations found in four sets of studies
are analyzed in detail. The focus here is to ascertain
exactly how the process of explanation is set out in each of
these studies. Another concern is to evaluate the data that
are said to support the explanations in each set of studies.
A further concern is to ask what are the policy implications
of each of these studies. By this, I mean, if women are found
to be less political than men in all of the studies, what
policies would be indicated by the researcher's explanations.
I should point out here that most researchers do not offer
policy recommendations to increase women's political parti-
cipation but I argue that contained in their explanations are
11
no tions about what changes would be necessary if one had
a policy goal of increasing women's political participation.
Thus, this will be a question constantly addressed in my
analysis of the explanations.
The first set of explanations examined are those found
in the voting behavior studies. This analysis is justified
on three counts: 1. those who have criticized these studies
in the past have not focused on the explanatory process; 2.
the results of these studies are frequently quoted by later
studies and thus, their explanations need re-examination; 3.
these studies essentially provided the groundwork for two dif-
ferent explanations of women's political behavior, explanations
that 1 label the socialization explanation and the situational
explanation
.
Two chapters (III and IV) concentrate on the socializa-
tion explanation. In general, theories of political sociali-
zation purport to provide an explanation for participation or
lack of participation in the political system. The common
assertion is that the person who has been well socialized
into the political system will share the values promoted by
that system and legitimize those values through participa-
21
tion. The well socialized individual will also be instru-
mental in transmitting the values of the political system to
22
the next generation. The poorly socialized individual is
seen as less likely to participate in the political system
through legitimate political actions; in fact, if too few
12
citizens internalize the appropriate political values, the
stability of the political regime may be endangered.
Chapter III focuses on the explantions of women's
political behavior that are a product of what I call the
early political socialization studies, studies in which
there is no well-developed theory of political socialization.
Rather, these studies shift survey methodology from the study
of adult political behavior to children's political behavior.
Thus, these studies advance political socialization as an
explanation of the differential political behaviors they
observe for boys and girls.
Chapter IV critiques the explanations contained in the
socialization studies which adapted the psychological theory
entitled social learning theory to the study of politics.
The political scientists who adopt this model maintain that
individuals arrive in this world as tabula rosa. The indiv-
idual learns through imitation of socializing agents who act
as models for behavior. The socializing agents encourage the
individual when she exhibits appropriate behavior, from the
agent's perspective, and discourage the individual when she
exhibits appropriate behavior. In this model, the early
years are seen as the most crucial in the formation of adult
personality and adult behavior patterns.
Political socialization, for the political scientists
who adopt social learning theory, involves the learning of
political values or, at the least, political predispositions.
13
This process is also usually seen to be part of early child-
hood learning, and the parents of the child are seen as the
principle agents of political socialization. Since the mother
is seen as the primary role model for the daughter in this
learning process, the daughter is expected to mirror the
political values of the mother. Thus, the expectation is
that mothers who are not interested in politics or do not
participate fully in politics will rear their daughters in
a similar manner. Usually, the researchers infer that the
mothers are disinterested in politics when their evidence
shows lack of interest by the daughter. The method for
changing this process so that more women would be politically
involved would seem to require changing the mothers who are
the major agents in the socialization process. How this could
be achieved is seldom clearly delineated. I will suggest that
most of these researchers are not concerned with the question
of changing the extent to which women are politically invol-
ved, but that, nonetheless, if their theory is correct, it
would have implications for the kinds of policies that would
be needed if women were to become more political.
Finally, there is an additional behavioral explanation
which has been more popular in the research of the 1970' s and
1980
' s even though it was suggested by the early voting be-
havior studies. This is the situational explanation. The
general dimensions of this argument were suggested in 1960 by
Seymour Martin Lipset when he suggested the following explana-
14
tion for women's lower involvement in the political realm:
"The position of the married woman illustratesthe problem of available time or dispensability
as a determinant of political activity The
sheer demands on a housewife and mother meanthat she has little opportunity or need togain politically relevant experiences Wo-
men might then be expected to have less con-
cern with politics, and in almost every coun-try they do vote less than men."23
Orum and associates cited Lipset's earlier observations
as a possible explanation for the results obtained in their
study of Illinois school children in 1974. 24 Their study
indicated that there were no significant differences between
boys and girls on a number of political dimensions'-. Orum et.
al. believed that these results indicated that early childhood
political socialization was less important than was previously
accepted. They concluded that a better explanation might be
constructed from observation of the adult role differences
which Lipset had referred to.
The research conducted by situational theorists differs
in a couple of other ways from the research examined up to
this point. First, the research often focuses on the study
of women political leaders and trys to explain why there
aren't more women in political leadership roles. These re-
searchers believe that while women's political participation
is now substantially equal to that of men, there is one area
of participation where this is not true: women are still
underrepresented as political leaders. Second, situational
theorists have a heavier concentration of women as researchers
15
than the voting behavior studies and socialization studies
we have examined. The core of the situational explanation
is that women's adult roles as wives and mothers serve as
constraints to their political participation or political
action. These constraints become most clear when she assumes
the adult roles of wife and mother. The care of husband and
children is portrayed as an activity which is carried out in
the individual households leaving little, if any, time for
the woman to pursue any outside activity, particularly poli-
tical activity. While situational theorists share the behav-
ioral commitment to a particular form of methodology and ex-
planation, the focus of their explanation suggests that the
policies that will flow from their explanatory framework differ
in significant ways from that of the socialization theorists.
The end result of this dissertation is a chronological
overview of how behavioral explanation has dealt with the
question women's political behavior and what policy recommen-
dations might follow from these explanations. Since the 1980
election, questions about women's political behavior have
become a central focus in the popular media and among the
technicians of electoral- politics who plot campaign strat-
egies. A new term has been coined to refer to the divergent
electoral behavior and issue positions that have reflected
in women's and men's political responses since the 1980
election. In the epilogue, Chapter VII, I will look at this
newly discovered "gender gap" and suggest that the reasons
16
advanced to explain the gender gap resemble arguments we see
presented earlier in this dissertation. The implicit assump-
tions of gender gap explanations rely on the notion that
politics is, more naturally, man's domain, that women's
political behavior should always be compared to that of men,
who provide the standard for political behavior and that if
there are divergences between men's and women's political be-
havior, it is the political behavior of women that needs ex-
planation.
Finally, I will address the question of why women must
continue to grapple with the meaning of politics and with
the meaning of their participation within politics bringing
out the critical issue of whether studies of women's political
behavior have focused on gathering the necessary information
to understand women's relationship to politics and to expand
it
.
CHAPTER II
THE NATURE AND REALITY OF BEHAVIORAL EXPLANATION
The stated goal of the behavioral revolution in poli-
tical science was the development of a systematic theory of
political behavior. While no general theory of political
behavior is universally accepted within the political sci-
ence discipline, those researchers who identify with the be-
havioral tradition share the commitment to develop a theory
that will explain and predict political behavior.
All of the studies examined in this dissertation can
be situated in the behavioral tradition and, in various
ways, the enterprises they engage in can be evaluated in
terms of their contribution(s) toward the development of a
general theory of political behavior.
In work(s) intended to move toward a theory of political
behavior, it makes sense that questions about women's poli-
tical behavior should be raised. If it can be shown that
women's political behavior is substantively different from
the behavior of other groups in the American political sys-
tem, perhaps even a middle-range theory''" which would explain
women's political behavior might be anticipated. But, there
is no widely accepted middle-range theory of this type in
existence either.
The question then becomes what knowledge have the poli-
tical behavior studies, including voting behavior studies,
17
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socialization studies and studies of women political lead-
ers, contributed to our understanding of women's relationship
to politics. In behavioral terms, what empirical observa-
tions have been confirmed and what explanations are advanced
to account for the empirical observations that are recorded.
I will state in advance that, for the most part, be-
havioral studies have focused on women's political behavior
only incidentally. In the voting behavior and socialization
studies, observations and explanations about women's poli-
tical behavior usually are concentrated in several paragraphs
or a few pages. Only in the studies of women political lead-
ers are women the central focus, although the statistical
observations and the explanations for these observations
contained in each of these studies has had a central place
in shaping the view of (a)political women held by political
scientists. Since the presentation and analysis of this
research is organized chronologically in relationship to its
appearance in political science, it should not be surprising
that many of the early observations and explanations are
reiterated by the later studies as factual statements about
women's relationship to politics.
Because I intend to evaluate the explanations that are
presented in each of these categories of behavioral studies,
and, at least, initially, I wish to make this evaluation with
respect to how these explanations are contributing to the be-
havioral goals of establishing general theory or, at a lower
19
level, general laws, it seems necessary to first explicate
the stated assumptions and objectives of behavioral research.
While there are distinctions among political behavior-
alists, most behavioralists would concur with David Eas ton's
assessment that the following list contains the major, assump-
tions and objectives of behavioral political science:
1. Regularities
.
These are discoverable uniformities
in political behavior. These can be expressed in
generalizations or theories with explanatory and
predictive value.
2. Verification
.
The validity of such generalizations
must be testable, in principle, by reference to
relevant behavior.
3. Techniques
. Means for acquiring and interpreting
data cannot be taken for granted. They are prob-
lematic and need to be examined self-consciously,
refined, and validated so that rigorous means can
be found for observing, recording, and analyzing
behavior
.
4. Quantification
. Precision in the recording of data
and the statement of findings requires measurement
and quantification, not for their own sake, but only
where possible, relevant, and meaningful in the light
of other objectives.
5- Values
.
Ethical evaluation and empirical explana-
tion involve two different kinds of propositions
that, for the sake of clarity, should be kept analy-
tically distinct. However, a student of political
behavior is not prohibited from asserting proposi-
tions of either kind separately or in combination as
long as he does not mistake one for the other.
6. Sys tematization
. Research ought to be systematic,
that is, theory and research are to be seen as closely
intertwined parts of a coherent and orderly body of
knowledge. Research untutored by theory may prove
trivial, and theory unsupportable by data, futile.
7. Pure science . The application of knowledge is as
much a part of the scientific enterprise as theore-
tical understanding. But the understanding and ex-
planation of political behavior logically precede
and provide the basis for efforts to utilize poli-
tical knowledge in the solution of urgent practical
problems of society.
8. Integration . Because the social sciences deal with
the whole human situation, political research can
20
8. (Continued)
ignore the findings of other disciplines only atthe peril of weakening the validity and under-
mining the generality of its own results. Recog-
nition of this interrelationship will help tobring political science back to its status of
earlier centuries and return it to the main fold
or the social sciences.^
In this account, there are several assumptions which have a
direct bearing on how behavioralists approach the study of
political behavior and how they proceed with explanations
that need further explication.
First, there is the assumption that there are uniform-
ities in human behavior in politics, that behavior is not
random; on the contrary, people behave in a regularized or
recurring fashion when engaged in political acts. Furthermore,
it is assumed that the political scientist can observe and
identify this recurrent behavior pattern. 3 To put this gen-
eral assumption to the specific case of women's political be-
havior, the behavioralist assumes that women's political be-
havior has a recurrent, observable pattern.
The emphasis that behavioral research places on the ex-
planation of behavior that has occurred, actions that have
taken place, has an important consequence for the understand-
ing of women's political behavior. For if women do not act
in political ways, do not vote, do not run for office, these
inactions are usually not interpreted as observable behavior
in this tradition, and, thus, there is little justification for
focusing on these so-called inactions.
No doubt behavioralists could reconceptualize some non-
21
actions, for example, non-voting, as a form of action. While
the failure of the tradition to do so may in part be a result
of the social and historical circumstances in which its
proponents operated, part of the problem has to be ascribed
to the behavioral tradition itself. A tradition that re-
quires that all evidence be subject to external observation
encourages researchers to examine those phenomena which are
most readily observable. Thus, it is not surprising that in
a study in which one of the objectives is to suggest policy
recommendations for increasing women's political participa-
tion, this presents some difficulties, since the precise rea-
sons for women's non-participation are seldom investigated.
However, explanations of women's non-participation are
often advanced in behavioral studies indirectly. Since wo-
men's political behavior is usually contrasted with men's
political behavior, the researchers do attempt to explain
the differences between these groups. In this process, the
researchers promulgate explanations that focus on women's
lesser participation offering reasons that can be applied
to both a lesser participation and non-participation.
Additional explanations which have bearing on women's
non-participation surface in these studies when the expected
(predicted) political differences between men and women, boys
and girls do not occur. In this situation, the researcher is
compelled to either reject his/her explanation or to give
some statement of reasons for why the predicted correlation
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wa s not upheld. In these statements, the researcher's under-
lying assumptions about why women don't participate as fully
in ordinary circumstances often emerge.
Thus, even by concentrating our attention on studies
where women's observable political behavior is the primary
focus, we can discern explanations that attempt to provide
reasons for women's lesser political behavior. If the rea-
sons are accurate, presumably it is plausible to argue that
policy recommendations that have the stated intention of
increasing women's political participation could be made on
the basis of these reasons. This argument will be picked
up again after a discussion of the structure of explanation
in the behavioral tradition, as Easton and others perceive it
Another fundamental assumption already alluded to is
that the political scientist can express these observed regu-
larities in generalizations or theories. These generaliza-
tions are assumed to approximate scientific laws or theories
found in the natural sciences.^ These generalizations are
to be established through principles of scientific investi-
gation, and the validity of the generalizations are to be
testable by reference to observable behavior. Note that
Easton states that these generalizations must only be test-
able in principle, that is, it is sufficient for one to be
able to formulate the conditions which might lead to a test
of the generalization. But there is also an implicit under-
standing that theory and general laws, if they are ever to be
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systematic and scientific, will be supported by empirical
evidence; that is, that some researchers will make the tests
that are there in principle, that scientific laws of be-
havior will be formulated and tested empirically to establish
their credibility.
At this point, at least one caveat must be lodged.
This is the idea that general laws in political science are
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. What most re-
searchers acknowledge is that political science, at its
best, will only have statistical laws, laws that assert a
high probability between two variables, but that a general
law of the type, if X, then A where X is invariable fol-
lowed by A, is impossible. Most researchers do not feel
hampered by the necessarily statistical nature of the laws
in political science. Usually, statistical laws are treated
as logically equivalent to general laws and are seen to play
the same logical function in the deductive-nomological model
of explanation.
For the purposes of this dissertation, I accept the
behavioralist assumption that statistical laws are logi-
cally equivalent to general laws, and I will use the state-
ment general law to include statistical laws in political
science
.
I am concerned about the lack of general or statisti-
cal laws in political behavior studies particularly with
regard to the lack of laws regarding women's political behavior
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And, here, my basic point is that while studies often use
general statements about women's political behavior as if.
they were general laws, the criterion that statements that
are utilized as general laws should be well supported by
empirical evidence is often glossed over. What occurs instead
is a situation where general statements with little empirical
support or questionable empirical support are utilized as if
they were general laws
.
To understand this claim more completely, it is useful
to look at the structure of explanation in the behavioral
ideal
.
Most behavioral scientists would contend that the ideal
of explanation is expressed in the deductive-nomological
model of explanation utilized in the natural sciences. This
framework of explanation, also known as the covering-law
model of explanation, makes the claim "that explanation is
achieved by subsuming what is to be explained under general
laws." 5
The structure of the deductive-nomological model of
explanation suggests that an explanation can be divided into
two segments: that which explains and that which is to be
explained. Hempel and Oppenheim term that which explains
"the explanans" and that which is explained "the explandum"
.
The explanans contains two kinds of statements: general laws
and sentences which state initial or antecedent conditions.
7
From these, it is possible to arrive at the explandum through
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nomo-
the process of deduction. To illustrate the deductive-i
logical method of explanation, I will utilize a statement
which some researchers might take to be a "general law" with
regard to political behavior, the statement that groups
who are exposed to social norms that disapprove of their
voting are less likely to vote. With regard to the partic-
ular case of explaining women's lesser turnout, this general
law would be utilized in the deductive-nomological mode of
explanation in the following way:
Step 1: Statement of General Law: Groups who are
exposed to social norms that disapprove of
voting are less likely to vote.
Step 2: Statement of Initial Conditions: Women are
a group exposed to social norms that dis-
approve of their voting.
Step 3: Explandum: Therefore, women are less likely
to vote.
Thus, in this model of explanation, if we know general
laws about political behavior and women's relationship to
those general laws, we should be able to deductively explain
women's political behavior.
Explanation in the deductive-nomological model is in-
timately related to prediction; perhaps explanation and pre-
diction are even conflated. At the very least, they have a
logical identity; both are deductively arrived at from the
statement of a general law and sets of initial conditions.
Thus, using our previous example, we can see that the same
general law can be utilized to generate predictions as well
as explanations
:
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Step Is Statement of General Law: Groups who are
exposed to social norms that disapprove of
voting are less likely to vote.
Step 2: Statement of Initial Conditions: Women are
a group exposed to social norms that dis-
approve of their voting.
Step 3: Prediction: Women will be less likely to
vote.
Thus, general laws about political behavior and initial
conditions which establish women's relationship to these
general laws, women's political behavior can also be pre-
dicted in this format.
Now, there are many problems with the use of the deduc-
tive-nomological model of explanation in the study of wo-
men's political behavior. Some of these problems seem to be
inherent in the explanatory format itself while others seem
to be a product of the difficulties of adapting the model to
political inquiry.
The major problem with the deductive-nomological model
of explanation seems to lie in what is meant by explanation.
While in ordinary language, "to explain" has a variety of
meanings, including "to describe", "to make intelligible",
"to reduce the familiar to the unfamiliar", "to understand
the motivations behind a particular action", the meaning of
explanation in the pure deductive-nomological model does not
encompass any of the ordinary language understandings. Rather
deductive-nomological explanation stresses that the signifi-
cance of explanation is the logical deductive process where
an event is explained by showing that it logically follows
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from the premises. 8 The power of these explanations is said
to lie in the logical connection between the evidence and
the fact to be explained. 9 This formal notion of what con-
stitutes an explanation seems to gloss over some of the
important aspects of explanation in social science as irrel-
evant. Social scientists may want to ask questions about
the accuracy of the explanation, whether or not it stresses
the most significant reasons why political behavior occurs;
merely checking the logical accuracy of the model does little
to convince us that the reasons advanced are more than plaus-
ible. The significance of this question should be evident'
with regard to making policy recommendations. Policy recom-
mendations based on fallacious general laws would have a high
failure rate; most policy scientists would want for their
recommendations to have a high probability of success rather
than a high rate of failure. Thus, I would argue that the
formal notion of explanation advanced here seems too narrow
to accommodate these goals
.
But, if prediction, as well as explanation, is an im-
portant process in the development of deductive theory, then
it would appear that behavioral scientists using this method-
ology have a concern with more than the logical validity of
explanation. Accurate prediction requires that there is a
high rate of probability that the projected relationships
are actually in existence. In fact, prediction treats gen-
eral laws as causes; this is the full implication of stating
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"if X, then A" even if this statement in political science
is modified to mean "if X, then there is a probability of
A."
However, earlier in this section, I stated that the
deductive-nomological model of explanation was the ideal of
explanation in political science. But political science is
not replete with general laws from which hypotheses can be
generated in a deductive manner. The primary task of re-
search and explanation in political science has been the de-
velopment of these general laws, the datum by datum con-
struction of a general theory that will explain political be-
havior. That is, most behavioral political scientists con-
centrate on gathering statistical data from which general
laws can ultimately be constructed. These researchers have
developed a pattern for explaining statistical regularities
that was outlined by Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton and Linz in
"The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis of Political Be-
havior" in 1954. 10
The following illustration is an example stated by
these authors
:
Step 1 : The researcher observes that a given social
classification, e.g., sex, is found to be
empirically correlated to a rate of behavior,
e.g., women have a lower rate of turnout than
men
.
Step 2: The researcher reinterprets the social cate-
gory as given indicating some general attrib-
ute, e.g., women are exposed to social norms
that disapprove of women voting.
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Step 3: The researcher relates this attribute to thebehavior in question by a more or less generalproposition, e.g., those groups who are ex-posed to social norms that disapprove of voting
are less likely to turn out to vote. 11
There are some doubts about whether this form of explanation
is logically equivalent to the covering law model of explan-
ation. Thus, it makes sense to more fully examine the
premises of this format.
What the authors are doing in this form of explanation
is moving from a statistically observed fact to the develop-
ment of a generalization. Merton calls these generalizations
post factum interpretations, "...the introduction of an in-
terpretation after the observations have been made rather than
the empirical testing of a predesignated hypothesis. The
implicit assumption is that a body of generalized proposi-
tions has been so fully established that it can be approxi-
mately applied to the data at hand." Thus, one could argue
that the statistical observation could, in theory, have been
hypothesized/predicted/explained from the generalization.
Thus, this set of steps could be restated in the deductive-
nomological framework, and, if this were done, it would look
like the example on page 28. Since the fact that this process
can occur only after observation occurred, there is a question
of whether this form of explanation is logically equivalent to
the deductive-nomological model. Furthermore, this question
becomes even more complicated if one understands, as Merton
does, that the implicit assumption, that a body of generalized
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propositions has been established, is seldom upheld. Rather,
post factum interpretations are more often ad hoc, that is,
they have a slight degree of prior confirmation. 13
In the deductive-nomological model, there is an assump-
tion that general laws have empirical substantiation, and
there is also an assumption that the initial conditions have
some empirical substantiation. Here the authors are moving
from an empirical finding to generalized statements, which
have the appearance of general laws although they frequently
have little or no empirical foundation.
This can be illustrated more completely if the steps in
this ad hoc or post factum form of explanation are spelled
out more clearly.
Step 1 in this explanatory pattern is merely the listing
of the observed statistical regularity; in the example Lipset
and associates use for illustration, women have a lower turn-
out than men, a statistical fact undisputed at the time this
research takes place.
Step 2, the statement which reinterprets the social
category as given indicating some general attribute for
that social category, is formulated like a factual statement
that could be statistically proven but is really, more often,
a hypothetical statement which posits an assumption about
that social category. In their example, Lipset, Lazarsfeld,
Barton and Linz are assuming that women are exposed to social
norms that disapprove of their voting. They haven't
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empirically shown that this is the case nor do they propose
to do so. They hypothesize that this is an accurate assess-
ment of women's relation to politics in American society.
Similarly, Step 3 is also a hypothetical statement re-
lating the reinterpretative statement to the behavior in
question by a general proposition. Our group of women voters
who were hypothesized to be exposed to social norms that dis-
approve of women's voting are now hypothesized to be less
likely to turn out to vote as a result of this. A general-
ization is then derived that any_ group exposed to social
norms that disapprove of voting is less likely to vote.
Each of these propositions, the reinterpretation of the
social category and the correctness of the proposition re-
lating the interpretative attributes to the behavior in ques-
tion are hypothetical statements which pose possible motiva-
tions for women's political actions. As hypothetical state-
ments, they contain assumptions that the researchers make
about women's connection or lack of connection to politics
in American society. The hypothetical statements are attempts
to explain women's political or apolitical behavior. Studies
which utilize this form of explanation will cite statistical
observations about women and then present the reader with an
explanation that will contain an assumption about a general
attribute of women and assumptions about how that attribute
relates to the behavior under observation.
As Merton"^ points out, the ad hoc hypotheses contained
sserva-
e
" e
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in this form of explanation may be plausible to the reader,
but this does not mean that they constitute compelling
evidence for acceptance. The hypothetical explanation
are plausible because they are consistent with the ob
tions, but other, equally plausible, explanations could b
advanced which are similarly consistent with the data. Whil
this method of formulating explanations may generate a number
of plausible explanations, choosing between plausible ex-
planations seems to be dependent on his/her underlying assump-
tions about women and politics
.
The validity of such an explanation, according to Lip-
set, Lazarsfeld, Barton and Linz
, rests on the correctness
of the reinterpretation of the original social category and
the correctness of the proposition relating the interpretative
attribute to the behavior in question. 15 In the example I
have given, validity would rest on whether women are exposed
to social norms that disapprove of their voting and whether
this has the predicted consequence of stifling their turnout.
How this validity is actually established is not a primary
concern. Lipset et. al. suggest that sometimes the rein-
terpretation of the original social category and the correct-
ness of the proposition relating the interpretative attribute
to the behavior in question appear obvious, i.e.
,
everyone
1
6
knows. In the example we have been using, the authors
assume that it is common knowledge that women are exposed to
social norms that disapprove of their voting and assume that
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s
an-
un-
these norms influence women not to vote. Validity of thi
explanation rests on sooial scientists accepting the expl
ation without challenge. Competing explanations would
fold in a similar fashion and, presumably, differences would
be resolved by appeal to which explanation appears most
obvious
.
The standard of validation as stated by Lipset, Lazars-
feld, Barton and Linz seems sufficiently at odds with the
standard of validation advocated by the covering law model
of explanation for me to state that strict behaviorists
would find this mode of explanation unacceptable. Merton
does warn against the use of post factum interpretations be-
cause of their tendency to postulate conditions and laws with
little empirical verification. 17 Hempel was also clear that
ad hoc explanations did not have the scientific status of
explanations which used the covering law model. 18 Some authors
maintain that ad hoc explanations are only another form of
the covering model of explanation because they can be reform-
ulated in the covering law framework and then can be tested
by the generation of hypotheses. 19 Using Lipset et. al.'s
example, the reinterpretation of the original social category
and the proposition relating the interpretative attitude to
the behavior in question could be used as hypotheses that
could be submitted for further testing.
My major criticisms of this form of explanation are that
the underlying assumptions are seldom if ever tested nor are
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the hypotheses that need testing and the conditions by which
they might be tested ever fully formulated. Yet these hypo-
th6tical explanations often take on the status of generally
accePted truths or general laws about why_ women behave poli-
tically as they, do. The fact that they are hypothetical and
not well substantiated is overlooked.
In fact, frequently subsequent studies pick up hypo-
thetical explanations and treat them as if they have been
statistically proven. This will become clearer as we examine
the various explanations contained in the behavioral studies
analyzed in this work and see that later studies utilize many
of them as statistical or general law statements. An example
of this from the study conducted by Lipset and his colleagues
involves women's voting when moral issues are perceived to be
at stake in an election. Lipset and his colleagues suggest
that if moral issues are involved in an election (initial con-
ditions)
,
women will be more likely to turn out to vote. The
general law that women are more interested in moral issues
is actually a hypothetical explanation that was advanced in
20
a previous study by Tingsten to account for women
turning out to vote in greater numbers than the authors ex-
pected, i.e., would have predicted. Lipset and colleagues
use this ad hoc explanation as if it were empirically well-
verified, as if the Tingsten study had established be-
yond any shadow of a doubt that this explanation was the
correct one. Yet, the fact remains that this statistical or
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general law was not well-confirmed but was a hypothetical
assertion, which, within the framework of behavior explan-
atory goals, should have needed further testing before it
was used as a general law.
One goal of this study then is to show that there are
few statements which qualify for the title of general law
in political science. Nonetheless, in every study there
are explanatory statements advanced by the researchers to
account for the particular political behaviors observed. It
is in these statements that the basic untested assumptions
that the researchers hold about individuals and their rela-
tionships to politics emerge.
The assumptions that are deemed most fundamental to
this inquiry are the assumptions that the researchers hold
about women in American society, particularly their assump-
tions about women's relationship to politics. I suspect that
researchers often began their studies with the assumption
that men and women had different relationships to politics
in American society. Such an assumption could be grounded
in traditional ideas about how women's lives were bound up
with the private, apolitical sphere and men's lives were
bound up with the public, political sphere. It is difficult
to prove the existence of these prior assumptions since one
of the promises of scientific behavioral research is to
expunge preconceptions from one's explanatory framework nor
can I establish that these notions necessarily predetermined
:er
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the direction or the results of this research. Yet, in the
process of providing explanations, i.e., reasons to account
for women's political behavior, these preconceptions re-ent.
the explanatory framework in the guise of generally accepted
truths about women and their relationship to politics.
In this investigation, the assumptions contained in
the proffered explanations, i.e., the statements which look
like general laws and initial conditions, must be spelled out
and subjected to close scrutiny. The empirical foundations
for these generalizations must also be fully examined if we
are to evaluate the explanations presented for women's dif-
ferential political behavior(s).
An additional reason for analyzing the proffered ex-
planations carefully is to ascertain the kinds of changes
each explanation implies would need to occur if American wo-
men were to be more fully integrated into the political system
One of the contentions of this study is that the signif-
icant differences in the explanations posited for women's
political behavior are linked to the differing assumptions
about women and their potential for political action that
emerge in the ad hoc explanations. While the explanations
may proceed in a similar manner, the ad hoc explanations do
provide differing understandings of women's political be-
havior and would lead policy in different directions.- The
question which emerges between different groups of researchers
in this study does not really hinge on their commitment to
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the ideal of deductive-nomological explanations and their
utilization (even if only temporary) of ad hoc explanation.
Rather, as we shall see, different researchers employ dif-
ferent assumptions about women and their relationship to
politics; the distinctions between these assumptions assume
significance because they would lead to policy recommendations
that focus on different periods of women's life. The
pivotal question here is at what point in a women's life does
she begin to behave in politically different ways. The
socialization studies argue that this occurs in childhood
while the situational studies argue this occurs in adulthood.
These explanations are competing behavioral explanations with
regard to women's political behavior. They are competing be-
cause by insisting that one factor is most significant, sub-
suming these explanations under a single general theory be-
comes implausible.
While the goal of using the empirical evidence that has
been collected in a number of behavioral studies to suggest
the kinds of changes that need to occur in American society
for women to be more fully engaged in the political arena
is a stated intent of this study, it should be noted that
the research being analyzed seldom presents recommendations
about how change might occur. There are several reasons for
this. First, as noted earlier, the primary tasks of behavioral
research focused on describing and predicting behavior. These
commitments are seen as different in kind from evaluation and
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the recommendation of certain policy changes. In order to
make the move from describing women's political behavior to
recommending changes that would lead to an increase, these
authors would maintain that I am moving from scientific ex-
planation to evaluation, from fact to value. By asserting
that women's participation ought to be increased, I am moving
to a statement of moral judgment, and while I am free to do
this, I should not confuse this enterprise with scientific
explanation
.
In the earlier statement of the objectives and assump-
tions of behavioral political science, Easton included the
notion that fact and value can be and ought to be separated
21m scientific explanation. Usually this is stated by be-
havioralists as the possibility of studying political happen-
ings and arriving at generalizations which are not influenced
or biased by the observer's personal values. Conway and
Feigert (in a scope and methods text) tell students of poli-
tical science:
A political scientist can both assert
value judgments and present empirical
explanations but it is possible and
equally necessary to keep the two dis-
tinct and separate. 22
Thus, while behavioral political scientists would not
necessarily discourage me from using their explanations for
the purpose of making evaluative statements, they would argue
that the explanations advanced should not affect the evalua-
tive judgments that I make.
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I am arguing here from a different point of view. As
a number of political scientists have pointed out, des-
cription is always from a point of view. 23 The explanations
that are advanced in each of the succeeding chapters have
implicit ideas about what social, political or personal
changes would be necessary for more women to participate in
politics, whether at the level of voting, forming political
parties or running for political office. In the example used
throughout this chapter women's lower participation is ascribed
to women being exposed to social norms that disapprove of their
voting. This is seen as an example of a presumed general law
that groups who are exposed to social norms that disapprove
of their voting will be less likely to vote. It makes sense
to suggest that policy recommendations based on this study
would need to suggest policy alternatives that make some logi-
cal connection to this explanation. While there may not be
a single policy direction that is indicated, the range of
alternatives appears limited. Policies that would attempt
to either modify the social norms or women's reaction to them
are strongly indicated. The crux of the argument is that
given the explanation they have presented, Lipset and his
colleagues would be justly criticized if they stated at the
end of their research that they believed that women's poli-
tical participation could be increased by declaring election
day a holiday. Those people who reviewed this statement as
a policy goal would justifiably ask the researchers what
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evidence in their study supported this conclusion. Since
none seems visible, if the researchers persisted in this
policy recommendation, we might well ask what other assump-
tions or explanations the researchers were implicitly holding
that made this policy goal a viable, corrective measure.
The major purpose in the succeeding chapters is to
demonstrate that the behavioral studies under examination
offer a variety of explanations for women's political be-
havior as it is observed. Usually, these explanations are
of the ad hoc variety rather than the covering law model vari
ety although the authors under consideration do not usually
distinguish between these types; neither are they explicit
about their purposes in explanation nor their commitments to
particular explanatory formats.
The explanations advanced in these studies are, however,
often accepted without examination of the process of explan-
ation. Since these explanations embrace certain assumptions
about women that do not have a sound empirical base, this
acceptance seems unwarranted.
Furthermore, the explanations have a bias to them which
lends support to the continuation of the set of conditions
which the explanations purport to account for and frequently
imply that the requirements necessary to overcome this set
of conditions would be difficult to surmount.
The end result of these studies is to present a pic-
ture of women as an apolitical being, a picture which is
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projected into the future as well as encompassing the time
period of the research.
The goal of this dissertation is to submit these ex-
planations to closer scrutiny with regard to their empirical
and assumptive foundations and to make explicit the implicit
policies that would need to be pursued if these explanations
are correct in their perception of the reasons why women par-
ticipate less than men.
CHAPTER III
VOTING BEHAVIOR STUDIES AND THE EXPLANATION
OF WOMEN'S POLITICAL BEHAVIOR
The major goals of the majority of the voting behavior
studies prior to 1960 were the collection of empirical data
on voting behavior and the subsequent use of these data to
construct a general theory of political behavior.
In the process of gathering data, political behavior-
alists advanced ad hoc explanations to account for the
recorded differences in voting behavior for social categories,
such as class and sex.
With regard to women, the major statistical observation
of these studies was that women's rate of turnout in elec-
tions was significantly lower than that of men. Thus, voting
studies usually proffered some explanation (s) for why this
difference occurred. From these explanations, a picture of
(a)political woman emerges; women are portrayed as less
interested in politics, less informed about politics, domin-
ated by men with regard to political decisions, only inter-
ested in politics when moral issues are present in elections
and more interested in the personality of the candidate than
in political issues.
This portrait of women as a political being is often
sketched from empirical evidence that does little more than
substantiate that, at the time these studies were conducted,
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women were not as likely to vote in elections as men. The
portrait emerges from post factum interpretations or ad hoc
explanations which are attached to the empirical findings.
These explanations are important both in understanding the
picture of women that has been accepted in political science
and also in evaluating what directions policy recommendations
would have to take if these explanations of women's lower par-
ticipation are the correct ones, that is, if the explanations
tap the real reasons behind women's lower voting participa-
tion.
While there are a large number of voting behavior stud-
ies, I have chosen to concentrate my attention on the follow-
ing works listed in order of publication: Lazarsfeld, Berel-
son and Gaudet
,
The People' s Choice (1948); Lipset, Lazars-
feld, Barton and Linz
, "The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis
of Political Behavior" (1954); Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee,
Voting (1954); Campbell, Guerin, and Miller, The Voter Decides
(1954); Robert Lane, Political Life (1959); and Campbell,
Converse, Miller and Stokes, The American Voter (1960). Each
of these studies presents some explantions for the observed
sex differences. Most of these studies present ad hoc ex-
planations which follow the general outline of the format
presented by Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton and Linz that was
discussed in the preceding chapter. Many of the authors,
however, are not explicit about using this framework. More
often, their ad hoc explanations are a series of statements
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following a set of data; how they move from a particular set
of data to a general statement about political behavior is
not specified. But, usually, the sequence of the ad hoc
model of explanation is observable.
In order to better understand their explanations for
women's voting behavior, it is useful to clarify the signif-
icance that behavioralists attach to the voting act. Essen-
tially, the authors included posit there are two reasons why
individuals vote: 1. People vote to influence the policies
of the government. 2. People vote in response to group pres-
sures whether they believe particular policies will affect
them or not. 1 Again, it should be noted that these are hypo-
thetical explanations for voting. The first reason advanced
contains at least two unstated assumptions, that people are
able to perceive that particular policies will affect their
interests and that people believe that voting is a method for
affecting policy choices and is, therefore, a method for pro-
2moting their individual interests.
The second reason advanced to explain why individuals
vote is intended to explain why a person would vote even if
3they weren't interested or didn't perceive that their
interests were at stake.
Non-voting, in this framework, is said to reflect the
absence of either of these two incentives for voting: the
absence of the belief that one's interests are involved or
4
the absence of pressures from a particular group to vote.
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A third possibility for explaining non-voting is also of-
fered, the idea that an individual may have conflicting rea-
sons for voting which make it difficult to reach a decision.
Rather than facing this conflict, voters may choose to with-
draw from the election process. 5
From this analysis of the voting act, Lipset, Lazars-
feld, Barton and Linz set out four statements which they
label "explanatory propositions" as summations of the specif-
ic explanations for group voting differences that have been
stated in voting behavior studies:
1. A group will have a higher rate of voting if itsinterests are more strongly affected by government
politics.
2. A group will have a higher rate of voting if it
has more access to information about the rele-
vance of government policies to its interests.
3. A group will have a higher rate of voting if it
is exposed to social pressures that demand voting.
4. A group will have a higher rate of voting if the
pressures to vote are not directed in different
directions so as to create conflict over which way
to vote.
6
Each of these statements is a generalization offering
an hypothetical explanation of why groups are more likely to
participate in political elections. If there is sufficient
empirical evidence, these statements would be statistical laws
in political science. In the ad hoc framework of explanation,
these generalizations are Step 3 statements, statements that
are hypothesized from the existence of particular data.
Since the social group of interest here is women who,
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in all the voting behavior studies examined here, exhibit a
lower rate of turnout than men, each of these generalizations
could be utilized in a deductive manner to predict and explain
a lower rate of turnout for women. Thus, explanations for
women's lower rate of turnout could lie in women's interests
being less strongly affected by government policies, in
women having less access to information about the relevance
of government policies to their interests, in women being
less exposed or not exposed to the social pressures that
demand voting and/or in women being cross pressured by con-
flicting demands and withdrawing from voting altogether.
In fact, the authors suggest that each of these explana-
tions may have a bearing on political participation for women.
As I review the unfolding of each of these possible explana-
tions by Lipset and his colleagues, I will situate explana-
tions offered by other researchers in terms of their agree-
ment or disagreement with this Columbia group.
Lipset and his colleagues never directly hypothesize
that women constitute a group whose interests are less strongly
affected by government policies. Yet, that they believe that
this is usually the case can be inferred from their explana-
tion of an anomalous situation, an election where women's
voting turnout is higher than they would have anticipated.^
Such an election took place in 1952 when women turned out in
higher percentages than they had since the 1940 election. The
explanation advanced to account for this anomaly proceeds from
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an evaluation that moral issues are at stake.
Utilizing the model of explanation the authors initially
present, we see that Lipset et al's explanation progresses
in the following manner:
1. They observed a statistical fact which appeared
to be an anomaly to the stated statistical regu-larity with regard to women's voting behavior-
Women's rate of turnout was higher than it hadbeen since 1940.
2. They reinterpret this by assuming that women have
a greater interest in moral issues.
3. Groups who have greater interest in moral issues
are assumed more likely to vote when moral issues
are involved in the election, as they were in
1952.8
Looking more closely at the reinterpretation Lipset and
his colleagues make, we see that their assumption that women
have a greater interest in moral issues is attributed to
conclusions recorded in an earlier study which observed that
women had a higher turnout in election (s) where prohibition
was an issue. The author of the previous study, Tingsten
defined prohibition as a moral issue and the findings were
generalized to assert that women were more interested in moral
9issues. As alluded to previously, what Lipset and his
fellow researchers are doing at this point is picking up this
hypothetical explanation of women's past political behavior as
if it were a statistically observed fact that women do have a
greater concern with moral issues.
Furthermore, they are making the assumption that moral
issues are present in the 1 Q 52 election; the issues that they
identify as moral issues are Communism and corruption. They
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are also assuming that these issues of Communism and corrup-
tion were the most salient issues for women voters in the
1952 election, a fact which is disputed by Campbell and his
associates who ascertained, through survey research that di-
rectly questioned voters about the important issues in the
1952 election. This research indicated that corruption was
an important issue to some voters whereas Communism was not.
Overall, Campbell and associates found that issues were not
very salient to voters in the 1952 elections; issues con-
tributed little understanding to why individuals voted in
particular ways.
Because Lipset and his associates assume that women have
a greater interest with moral issues, they predict that women
will be more likely to participate when moral issues are at
stake. Conversely, when they observe a higher participation
of women, they look for moral issues that might be present
to explain this greater explanation. 11
This line of reasoning also assumes that women constitute
a particular type of interest group when it comes to political
issues with moral content, that women in this situation will
be more likely to vote in a similar fashion and less likely
to vote as men do. Men may be split on moral issues but
women will solidify as a moral interest group.
Because women are viewed as constituting this moral
interest group which solidifies whenever moral issues appear
in elections, a counter image of women and politics is
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revealed when moral issues are not addressed in the politi-
cal arena. Fewer women would be expected to participate in
this situation because women as an interest group are de-
fined by their moral interests. The researchers do not have
to be concerned with the question of why more women don't
participate. They can shrug off women's lesser political par-
ticipation by suggesting that women will .participate more
fully when moral interests are at stake; otherwise, they pre-
dict that women will not be as likely to participate because
women's particular interests are not directly at stake.
Recalling the standard of validation that Lipset and
his colleagues outlined for the acceptance of a post factum
interpretation, we see that their explanation relies on the
notion that there is general acceptance in political science
that women are more concerned with moral issues. One has to
agree that this has been a commonly held assumption in both
political theory and political practice. In political his-
tory, this idea of women was prominent in the debates re-
garding the extension of suffrage to women where both women's
suffrage proponents and opponents accepted this assumption,
although they utilized it in different ways. The proponents
of women's suffrage argued that women would bring their greater
concern with morality to the political sphere and help to
purify a realm which was perceived as amoral. Opponents, on
the other hand, argued that women's greater morality might
be adversely affected by their entrance into the amoral sphere
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of politics.
Just as this assumption has been commonly held in
political science, so too do political behavioralists hold
the same belief. A similar view of women entering the poli-
tical sphere with well-developed moral views was advanced by
Robert Lane in a discussion of the fears that various poli-
tical interests had with regard to women entering politics
and the hopes that reformers held for women becoming voters:
Distilling and brewing interests were particular-
ly alarmed because of the association of women
with prohibition; corporate interests reared rad-
ical tendencies; and political bosses trembled
over the expected impact of female reformist zeal.
On the other hand, advocates of women's franchise,
men as well as women, claimed ... the unique quali-
ties of women would sweep corruption from the
scene . 12
What I am disputing is whether this study or any of the
behavioral studies have satisfactorily substantiated that
women have a greater interest in moral issues than men. What
Lipset and his colleagues have provided us with is a partic-
ular assumption held by political scientists about women as
voters, that they will be more concerned with moral issues,
but it is an ad hoc explanation rather than a statistically
verified fact. Yet, this explanation is repeated by other
studies as if it was a clear statistical observation rather
than a disputable ad hoc explanation.
Ad hoc explanations with regard to women's greater
morality do not end with the generalization that women will
be more likely to vote if moral issues are at stake. Rather,
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additional ad hoc statements are advanced for why women qua
women are more concerned with moral issues than men. Robert
Lane, for example, asserts that women's greater concern with
moral issues is a natural consequence of women's dominant
social role as mother:
A proper concern and responsibility for theyoung tends to focus attention upon engend-
ering in them a suitable morality. 13
Presumably, women's greater preoccupation with endangering
morality in her children leads to greater concern with moral
issues in both the private and the public sphere. That is,
Lane seems to infer that women's greater concern with moral
issues derives from their roles as inculcators of morality
in their children, one role of motherhood as he depicts it.
What must be questioned is whether this is a peculiar
feature natural to all women who are potential mothers or
whether it derives from the actual practice of motherhood,
and, in answer to this question, Lane is fuzzy to say the
least. On the one hand he asserts:
Women have special reasons to be interested
in problems of price control, housing, zoning,
education, playgrounds, prevention of war and
so forth - all of which may be issues in
national and local elections. 14
Again these particular interests seem to be generated by wo-
men' s roles as wives and mothers. The contast here is that
Lane is proposing that certain types of policies may have
greater intrinsic attachments for women than for men which
could lead women to turn out in larger numbers if these issues
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are at stake in an election.
At another point, Lane seems to imply that all women,
not just mothers, are different from men as voters when he
asserts that the public holds images of men and women as
voters that differentiate them by seeing women as reform
voters, detached from any personal gain, while men are seen
as individuals whose votes reflect only their individual
self-interest (s)
.
15
If we look more closely at the implica-
tions of this statement, it would appear that women are con-
strued as not having self-interests around which they might
form interest groups or assess public policies. Instead,
some public-regarding interest is exhibited when they vote.
Lane implies that these sex differences on issues will
always transcend class differences on issues where women are
concerned:
Women's political role is not only experienced
differently in different social groups, but is
experienced as properly concerned with sub-
stantively different problems within the same
social groups. 16
Again, the implication is that there are certain interests
that bind women to-gether as voters regardless of differences
in class, race, religion, etc., the social divisions which
are usually presented as significant for men. From what we
have seen, Lane seems to believe that women constitute a
group whose fundamental concerns are moral and will be more
active politically when moral issues are prominent in elec-
tions .
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There is no further ad hoc explanation presented in
Lane's account to hypothesize why women behave in this way,
so we do not know if the results he sees are somehow "nat-
ural" to women or a consequence of their social roles or
inculcated in their process of maturation, etc.
Lane's ad hoc explanations of women's voting behavior
and women's political interests may have been widely held but
there were some behavioralists who cautioned that women should
be viewed as a social category with explanatory relevance in
terms of voting behavior only on a short-term basis. In a
voting behavior study conducted by Berelson, Lazarsfeld and
McPhee, few statistical differences between men and women
were noted; the authors argued that such differences as were
apparent would disappear over time."^ The ad hoc explanation
they gave to account for this hypothesis was that there were
very few policy issues that would persist over time which
18
affect men and women differently. Social class, for these
authors, was a more meaningful differential social category
as a basis for explanation of political participation. What
they are really arguing here is that there are relatively few
issues, if any, that women have in common as women and will
organize or mobilize around. Instead, women are viewed as
more similar with regard to voting patterns , to other members
of their social classes, male or female, than they are to
other women of other social classes with regard to voting
patterns. In this ad hoc explanation, presumably motherhood
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as a common denominator for women in each social class would
still be experienced differently and, thus, lead to differ-
ent rather than similar sets of interests.
Women's roles as mothers are frequently. part of ad hoc
explanations of women's lower voting turnouts in other be-
havior studies as well. In the Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton
and Linz study, women's role of mother is postulated as an
ad hoc explanation for why women have insufficient time to
pursue information about political issues. 19
Looking at their presentation of this second explana-
tion, we can understand that if a group is presumed to vote
if its interests are more affected by government policies,
it is logical that the group will need access to relevant
information regarding policies and the various policy posi-
tions of the candidates and political parties and how these
policies will affect their interests. Lipset et. al. claim
that individuals must have sufficient leisure time to be able
to gain access to this relevant information.
With regard to women, the Columbia study assumes that
women have less information than men about how government
politics will affect them. Although they treat this as
observed statistical regularity, they do not document this
regularity with any data from either their study or previous
studies. Yet, they proceed with an ad hoc explanation as if
this statistical regularity were well observed. The explana-
tion they derive for women having less political information
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is based on the assumption that women have less leisure time
because their roles as wives and mother are so demanding.
Less leisure time leads to less access to information about
the relevance of government policies leads to less voting.
In persuading us to accept this post factum interpreta-
tion, the authors offer evidence of another observed correla-
tion, that as one goes down the income scale, the difference
between the turnout rate for women and turnout rate for men
20increases. The relevance of this correlation to the pre-
ceding explanation is again hypothetical; the authors contend
it lends support to the explanation that women are less like-
ly to vote than men because they have less leisure time. The
lower income woman is presented as having more children to
care for and fewer labor-saving devices that she can afford,
thus having less leisure time. While there is no doubt that
women's class position greatly affected the amount of house-
work and childcare they did, (and, in fact, we could point out
that working class women were also more likely to be employed
outside of the home as well which would further constrict
their "leisure" time) the authors have presented us once again
with an explanation that needs further investigation before it
is accepted.
The more general notion that motherhood is handicap to
being able to cast a ballot is postulated by other voting
studies. The statistical evidence is in dispute. For ex-
ample, Lane, citing a 1924 election study, stated that very
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few women cited motherhood as a factor in their not voting. 21
But, in 1960, Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes stated
that their data showed that mothers of young children were
consistently less likely to vote than were the fathers of
young children across all age levels and all educational
22levels. Campbell and his colleagues appear to be somewhat
surprised by their statistical finding because this same
group of mothers did not significantly differ from other women
or other men in their level of political interest in the elec-
tion. Since Campbell, Guerin and Miller hypothesize that poli-
tical interest is one of the explanations for voting, that
political interest is a motivation for voting, they are com-
pelled to give an ad hoc explanation for why these young moth-
ers, who exhibit political interest, are less likely to vote.
Here, an ad hoc explanation is used to account for a failure
in prediction.
The post factum interpretation presented by the authors
is that "the presence of young children requiring constant
23
attention serves as a barrier to the voting act." Further-
more, they suggest that "if primary responsibility for young
children leads to some reduction in turnout potential, this
effect is likely to leave a permanent discrepancy in partici-
2 A-pat ion between the sexes." (emphasis mine) If women's role
as mother could leave such a permanent scar on the simple and
not very time consuming act of voting, one imagines that its
influence on other forms of participation, such as running for
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office, would be even more perverse.
While the explanatory propositions that a group will
have a higher rate of voting if its interests are more
strongly affected by government policies and that a group
will have a higher rate of voting if it has more access to
information about the relevance of government policies to
its interests seem to be linked to Lipset et. al.'s first
concept of voting, that people vote to influence policies,
the third explanatory proposition is based on their second
concept of voting, that people will vote in response to group
pressures in absence of the belief that policies will affect
them. Far from being a group where social pressures are ex-
erted to encourage voting, Lipset et. al. assert that women
,
as a social category, are exposed to social norms that dis-
approve of them voting. While they note that these social
norms do not appear to be strong enough in the United States
to prevent women who are interested from voting, they do be-
lieve that women with little interest can feel free not to
vote and justify their inaction by reference to the idea that
political participation is not "women's place." Within this
framework, women do not experience group pressures to vote
that would overcome disinterest. Men with little interest are
still presumed to be called to the polls, apparently because
social norms mandate this as "men's place."
This particular assumption, that men are more likely to
vote even when not particularly interested in an election,
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seems to be derived from the Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet
study where researchers found that women expressed less inter-
est in the 1940 election campaign than men and that women who
expressed disinterest were less likely to vote than men who
expressed disinterest. 25 Interest here was ascertained by
asking, "Would you say that you have a great deal of interest
in the coming election, a moderate interest, a mild interest,
or no interest at all?" and then categorizing individuals in
terms of high, medium and low interest. 26 These data are
frequently presented as evidence that women are less interested
in politics and also as evidence that political interest is
a determinant of whether an individual votes.
Recalling that Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton and Linz assert
that a group will have a higher rate of voting if its inter-
ests are more strongly affected by government policies, we
might ask whether this question asking about people's interest
in a coming election is an operationalization of concept of
interest being used in Lipset and his associates study. At
least in ordinary language usage, it makes sense to distin-
guish between an individual expressing interest in following
an election campaign and an individual who follows an elec-
tion campaign because he/she perceives that his/her interests
may be affected by the outcome of the election. This distinc-
tion may account for the interest in the election campaign
acknowledged by the mothers in the Campbell study who turned
out in lower percentages than the authors would have predicted.
Interest, for these women, may not have encompassed the psy-
chological involvement based on the perception of one's
interests that Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet believe is
entailed in their question.
The ad hoc explanation that Lazarsfeld, Berelson and
Gaudet give for women who express disinterest in the election
not voting is also of concern in my analysis:
If a woman is not interested, she just feels
that there is no reason why she should vote.
A man, however, is under more social pressure
and will, therefore, go to the polls even if
he is not "interested" in the events of the
campaign. 11
The only additional explanation proffered for men's greater
willingness to participate in the absence of interest is that
they are better citizens, a statement that appears to imply
that they accept citizenship as part of the male norms.
Women, on the other hand, are quoted as justifying their
aloofness from voting by reference to its lack of appro-
priateness for women. Lazarsfeld and his colleagues use
the following comments made by women in their study to illus-
trate the fact that while the legal restrictions upon women's
participation in politics have been removed, the attitude of
women toward politics has not yet brought full equality with
men:
"I don't care to vote. Voting is for men."
"I think men should do the voting and the
women should stay home and take care of
their work.
"
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"I never have voted. I never will.
. .A wo-
trthe^^i in the ^eave politics
In this manner, responsibility for women's disinterest in
politics is primarily placed on her shoulders. Women must
overcome their "...general indifference to current affairs"
refuting the idea that public life is, by common consent,
the man's realm. 29 Women must, in this argument, create the
social pressure that will lead to their voting in the absence
of interest.
The conclusion that Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet have
reached with regard to women's lesser sense of citizenry and
men's greater sense of citizenry is directly contradicted by
the American Voter study where women were ascertained to
exhibit a slightly greater sense of citizen duty than men as
measured by their responses to four questions that are said
to comprise a citizen duty scale. Women were just as likely
as men to have accepted these ideals of citizenship as men;
in some cases, they even accepted them more fully. To
Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, this finding merely
negates the importance of citizen ideals as an explanatory
variable for participation. Since it doesn't serve the pur-
pose of explaining differences between social categories
such as men and women, it is insignificant.
But Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes also believe
that the existence of social norms that identify the political
realm as a critical concern for males and a lesser concern for
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females has hampered the full participation of females in the
political arena. Vestigial sex roles, in their analysis,
account for the differences between men and women's voting
behavior. They use sex role basically as a social norm. A
sex role for political behavior is the set of expectations
about behavior proper for a male or female that involve polit-
ical responses. 31 Political sex roles, the authors maintain,
were well-defined until the passage of the Nineteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution:
A man was supposed to be the political agent
for the family unit. A woman not only had no
need to concern herself with politics; to one
degree or another, political activity was un-
seemly for her. 32
Since the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, what might
be seen as the traditional political sex roles are breaking
down, according to Campbell et . al. , at least in voting par-
ticipation. But the process of obliterating these sex roles,
which are depicted as deeply ingrained and not easily up-
rooted, takes time. That this process is far from complete
at the time of their study is attested to, according to the
authors, by the fact that women interviewees still sometimes
referred interviewers to their husbands whom they identified
as the people in the family who paid attention to politics.
Nonetheless, Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes be-
lieved that there was also evidence of the waning of sex
roles in politics. Even though the observed differences in
turnout rate between men and women was 10% overall, this
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difference tended to decline or even disappear as women
attained higher education. In fact, the data showed that
among the young, the single and the married who had no child-
ren, there was "no average difference in turnout between men
and women across categories of education and age, outside
the South." 33 (In the South, the sex roles were seen as more
well-ingrained and more resistant to change than in other
regions of the country.) In this analysis, Campbell et . al.
paint a fairly optimistic picture of the future for women in
politics; with the lessening of traditional sex role ideals
and the increase in women's education, political sex differ-
ences will seemingly disappear.
Yet, one is led to question to what extent the authors
really believe that these sex roles are vestigial rather than
continuing. As previously noted, woman's adult sex role as
mother is viewed as a permanent handicap to women achieving
full participation; certainly there is nothing vestigial about
this. Perhaps the confusion arises because Campbell and
associates have not always specified the differences between
women's adult sex role and her adult political role. While
they seem to be somewhat interested in changes in women's
political role, their interest in changing aspects of her
adult sex role that might impinge on her having a full poli-
tical role does not seem to emerge. Thus, what started out
looking like vestiges of traditional roles suddenly begin to
look more like social norms we will have to live with. The
63
following example taken from the Campbell study serves as
an illustration. Campbell et
. al. discovered that women
were more likely to score lower than men on the political
efficacy scale that they constructed. First, they postulated
the following explanation for the observed statistical dif-
ference :
Men are more likely than women to feel that
they can cope with the complexities of
politics and to believe that their partici-
pation carries some weight in the political
process. We conclude then.
. .what has been
less adequately transmitted to the women is
a sense of some personal competence vis a
vis the political. 34
This explanation represents a tautology for, in fact, politi-
cal efficacy is defined as personal competence vis a vis the
political. But even more importantly, from our perspective,
men' s ability to develop this personal competence vis a vis
the political is linked to the differences in the male and
female sex roles operating in society:
The man is expected to be dominant in action
directed toward the world outside the family;
the woman is to accept his leadership passively.
She is not expected, therefore, to see herself
as an effective agent in politics. 35
Again one is forced to ask, are these vestiges of former roles
for women in American society or are they aspects of women's
current sex roles? Furthermore, are these aspects of women's
and men's adult sex roles or aspects of their adult political
roles; at least, we need to understand hoxv it is that Camp-
bell, Converse, Miller and Stokes distinguish between these
in order to be sure that there is consistency. We are left
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with the uncomfortable feeling that while certain aspects of
women's political role may be changing, according to the
authors, other elements of women's adult roles that may have
an effect on the extent to which they can participate in
politics are impervious to change.
In the preceding quotation by Campbell and associates,
we also notice the assumption of male dominance frequently
postulated in voting behavior studies. Again, Lazarsfeld,
Berelson and Gaudet were among the first researchers to sug-
gest that wives followed their husbands' dominance in voting.
This explanation was presented when they discovered that of
the 22 pairs of husband/wives in their study who had decided
to vote, only one pair disagreed. Male dominance was credited
with this agreement because of the results of a question asked
to elicit whom the husbands /wives had discussed politics with
in recent weeks. 45 of the women, randomly selected, cited
discussions with their husbands while only 4 husbands re-
ported discussing politics with their wives. The authors
stated that if women were equally influencing their husbands
,
there would have been approximately the same number of re-
ports from both sexes. Since only the women seem to be aware
of the political opinions of their husbands, the authors
conclude
:
Men do not feel they are discussing politics
with their wives; they feel they are telling
them. And the wives are willing to be told. J
While we can agree that women do seem to be more willing to
vice
are
ws
ir
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report listening to the opinion of their husbands than
versa, whether this can be extended to the idea that men
aware that they are influencing their wives' political vie
or that their wives actually vote on the basis of what the
husbands have told them is not verified.
The authors of the American Voter present a similar vi
of the woman depending on her husband for both information
and direction of vote:
The wife who votes but otherwise pays little
attention to politics tends to leave not only
the sifting of information up to her husbandbut abides by his ultimate decision about thedirection of vote as well. 37
The fact that women were so dependent on their husbands for
both information and their ultimate decision about voting
direction helped Campbell and associates explain why women's
entry into the electorate had produced little change in the
percentage of votes garnered by each party in elections:
The dependence of wife's vote upon her
husband's partisan predispositions appears
to be one reason why the entrance of women
into the electorate has tended to make little
visible difference in the partisan distribu-
tion of the national vote.^°
While both of the preceding quotations appear in the
American Voter
,
they come from data and an ad hoc explana-
tion from the 1954 study by Campbell, Guerin and Miller. In
this earlier survey, men and women were asked to indicate
primary group relationships that influenced their vote:
Of the married women who voted, 27% said
that their husbands' opinions helped them to
ew
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by only 6/G of the married men admitting in-fluence by their wives. 39 &
This evidence is said to support the commonly held assumptions
that political agreement is more a function of wives voting
the way their husbands vote than vice versa.
Looked at from a different perspective, the fact that
only 27% of the married women report political discussions
with their husbands might lead one to conclude that the
commonly held assumption that women are politically domin-
ated by their husbands is given insufficient support in this
study to merit much further attention. Even the authors admit
that the differences in percentages between men and women
could be partially a result of women finding it more socially
acceptable than men to report influence by their husbands,
although they don't believe this represents a serious restric-
tion on their research results.
Again, the evidence for the assumption of male domin-
ance that is presented in the voting studies leaves much to
be desired; its acceptance requires the existence of commonly
held assumptions about relationships between men and women.
These assumptions again relegate women to a political role
that will always be unequal to that of her husband.
One additional "explanatory proposition" was cited by
Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton and Linz as an explanation that
appeared in voting studies to account for differences in
political behavior between social categories. Lipset et. al.
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predicted that groups would have a higher rate of voting if
the pressures to vote were directed toward the same out-
comes so that cross pressures did not create conflict over
which way to vote. This explanation was applied to women
only in countries other than the United States and, thus,
is of little significance in this study. The example given
for women relates to conflicting demands being placed on
women in some countries by their social class and their re-
ligious participation. The hypothetical explanation here is
that while women's social class might lead them to vote for
leftist parties in some countries, their religious beliefs
and active support for the conservative parties by the church
might cause women to feel so conflicted that they would ab-
stain from political participation altogether. 40
The framework that Lipset et. al. set out provides us
with quite a clear understanding of the nature of the explan-
ations advanced for women's different political behavior with
regard to voting. The hard statistical fact that is noted
here is women's differential rate of turnout, an undisputed
fact of the time, although this statistical difference will
decline in the subsequent decades of the sixties and seven-
ties. But many researchers will report that these studies
also documented women's lesser interest in politics, women's
greater interest in moral issues, women's lesser information
regarding politics, men's dominance over women with regard
to politics and the existence of social norms that affect
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women's political participation in a negative way. As we
have seen, most of these observations cannot properly be
assigned the label of facts.
Rather, they are interpretations of why women behave
politically as they do, interpretations that are replete with
poorly examined and poorly documented assumptions about wo-
men and their relationship to politics. These explanations
will be picked up by other behavioral studies as if they were
well-substantiated by empirical evidence and they will con-
stitute the core of knowledge maintained by political science
with regard to politics. Not only will we see the explana-
tions presented as evidence in future studies, we will also
see the form of explanation outlined by Lipset, Lazarsfeld,
Barton and Linz being utilized in a less self-conscious man-
ner by some of the later researchers.
One result of the voting studies was that they pointed
subsequent researchers toward possible lines of inquiry with
regard to further understanding the roots of the differences
between males and females in political participation. In
1954, Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee posited that "A nec-
essary condition for the persistence of political differences
/
1
is their transmission to succeeding generations." A
similar suggestion of transmission was found in the American
42Voter in their discussion of political efficacy. The idea
that political concepts are transmitted to younger members
of the society will lead some researchers to the study of
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this transmission, which will receive the title of politi-
cal socialization. The direction and goals of this research
will be evaluated in the succeeding chapters.
Similarly, the discussion of women's adult sex roles
and the political role contained therein will provide the
beginning point for other explanations of women's political
behavior which will concentrate on the barriers to women's
political participation found in the adult years. This work
will be evaluated in Chapter VI.
Finally, it should be noted that none of the voting
studies were specifically interested in the particular voting
behavior of women except as it related to their general ex-
planations about voting behavior in general. This may con-
stitute one reason little attention was given to the question
of what necessary changes would have to be put into effect
in order to increase the participation in politics by women.
But, since one of the major goals of this dissertation
is to ask what policy recommendations are implied by the
explanations advanced by political scientists with regard to
political behavior, we must review the possible explanations
that have been discussed here.
Most of the authors included here seem to believe that
women are responsible for determining their own political
fate, that women need only show more interest in politics,
become more informed about politics, particularly with regard
to how policies affect their interests, and show more
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involvement with politics and they will change their politi-
cal behavior. Women seem to choose their apolitical be-
haviors and, thus, they should be able to reverse them by
choosing to act in political ways.
At other times, the explanations advanced seem to
suggest that there are constraints in women's lives that make
it difficult for them to be able to fully participate in the
political system. These constraints are usually posed by the
general notion of social roles or the more particular notion
that women's role as a mother precludes her full political
participation. The possibilities of changing these social
roles or woman's role as mother to allow women greater oppor-
tunity for political participation are unexplored. Since
we don't know how these social roles are maintained, we are
at a loss to state how policies might be instigated that
would attempt to change these constraints.
Similarly, we are left to wonder whether women have
genuine political interests since some of these studies tend
to equate women's political interests with policy decisions
that involve questions of morality. If moral interests are
the only political interests women have, there is little
reason for us to be concerned if women only enter the poli-
tical realm when these issues are of significance. But, if
women can have, do have, should have other political inter-
ests as well, then their lack of political participation is
a policy concern.
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If attempts had been made to construct recommendations
for increasing women's political participation, perhaps some
of the contradictory assumptions contained in these studies
would have surfaced more clearly and the difficulties with
ad hoc explanations would also have been discussed by the
practitioners of the behavioral method, not just the polit-
ical theorists.
What the explanations that have been presented thus far
do accomplish is to give us an understanding of the picture
of political woman as she is portrayed in political science.
Now, we must see how that picture develops more fully as
political scientists, who are also behavioral scientists,
take up the task of more fully explaining the development of
political behavior, the process by which people form their
regularized patterns of behavior.
CHAPTER IV
THE EARLY SOCIALIZATION STUDIES
The accumulation of statistical data from the voting
behavior studies and the general acceptance of these data
as empirical evidence of other regularities in political be-
havior helped to spawn a number of research projects in poli-
tical science. These concentrated on answering the question
why do the observed differences, e.g., that social groups do
not participate or take interest in politics to the same ex-
tent, persist over time. In psychology and sociology, be-
havioral social scientists posited an answer to this question
by hypothesizing that differences in behavior resulted from
a differential learning process; the process of learning dif-
ferent behavior as the individual matured was entitled social-
ization. Political scientists who adapted the idea of social-
ization to the study of politics were hypothesizing that if
different groups in society exhibited different political be-
haviors, this was because they had been socialized into
different patterns of behavior.
In theoretical terms we can say that these researchers
were attempting to subsume the explanation of political behav-
ior under a general theory which explained human behavior;
political behavior was seen as a subset of human behavior.
Women's political behavior, in this research as in the voting
behavior studies, was approached only incidentally, that is,
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as it was seen to have a bearing on the clarification of poli-
tical behavior in general. The answer to the question of why
men and women exhibit different political behaviors and why
these differences persist over time are answered by the ex-
planatory statement: they have learned to behave in politi-
cally different ways.
While the shorthand notion of political socialization
provided an explanation for the persistence of different poli-
tical behavior patterns, more than one theory of socialization
existed in the social sciences. There was no general agree-
ment on which theory of socialization was the more useful -
one or the correct one. Instead, political scientists have
made numerous attempts to attach general theories of social-
ization borrowed from psychology and sociology to the study
of politics, to develop a theory of political socialization
as a subset of socialization theory.
In this chapter and the succeeding one, I am evaluating
several attempts to construct a theory of political social-
ization; women's relationship to politics is explained as a
product of her socialization process. Chapter V looks at
the attempts of political scientists to adapt a specific
theory of learning, social learning theory, to the study of
politics. This chapter concentrates on the examination of
three early studies of political socialization, Herbert
Flyman' s Political Socialization : A Study in the Psychology
of Social Learning
,
1959; Fred Greenstein's Children and
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Politics, 1965; and David Easton's and Jack Dennis's Children
iS the Political System
, 1969.
The key purposes of this dissertation need to be kept
clearly in mind as we approach these studies. First, since
the one purpose of this work is to assess whether the stud-
ies examined develop a general explanatory theory for poli-
tical behavior and the polticial socialization studies had
a central objective to develop a general theory of political
socialization, I can assess how well this objective is achiev-
ed.
Furthermore, since we are most interested in the process
of political socialization with regard to women, we need to
evaluate how the general theory of political socialization
incorporates an understanding of women's political socializa-
tion. How is this process different than that of men? What
is the nature of the evidence provided for the explanation
that women and men exhibit different political behaviors be-
cause they are socialized into different political behaviors?
Finally, since a key purpose of this work is also to exam-
ine the logical implications of each explanation, to under-
stand what kinds of changes would be needed if women were to
become more political, each explanation is also evaluated in
terms of the policy recommendations that most logically flow
from its premises.
I state at the outset that none of the studies to be
examined has an explicit, well-developed theory of political
socialization that is made clear to the reader. Rather, the
major emphasis of each of those works seems to be the exam-
ination of the political knowledge, attitudes and interests
of boys and girls. The intent of this research is to demon-
strate that the roots of the observed adult differences were
embedded in pre-adult lives. As many of the voting behavior
studies had done with regard to observations about adult be-
havior, these studies often focused on recording the observed
statistical differences between girls and boys with regard to
politics without fully developing a theoretical framework for
how these differences arose. Thus, most of the initial obser-
vations about the political socialization of boys and girls
relied on post factum interpretations as explanations rather
than developing a clear theoretical statement about the poli-
tical learning process and how this process differs for males
and females. Again, because many of these post factum inter-
pretations have endured along with the statistical data re-
garding political differences between boys and girls, it
seems worthwhile to begin the examination of the political
socialization explanation by turning to these three early
studies of political socialization and their explanations
about the differences that occur between men and women in this
process
.
Herbert Hyman, whose work was the first full-length title
to use the phrase "political socialization", arrived at his
theoretical conclusion that political behavior is learned
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through his research with the Col^bia group. He credits
two observed patterns of adult political behavior with
directing him toward this conclusion: 1. the regularities
xn the political behavior of adult individuals over time
and 2. the stable political differences between groups of
adults over time. 1
Hyman recognizes that the observed differences in adult
political behavior might be explained in terms of contempor-
aneous features present in the adult lives of the particular
groups or individuals, but he believes that "the continuity
of such patterns over time and place suggest that the individ-
ual has been modified in the course of this development in
such a way that he is likely to exhibit certain persistent be-
havior apart from transient stimulation in his contemporary
environment." 2 (emphasis his) Persistence in particular poli-
tical behavior by adults constitutes evidence for Hyman that
learning has taken place. If the process of learning is
occurring, then researchers should direct their study to "the
socialization of the individual, his learning of social patterns
corresponding to his societal positions as mediated through
various agencies of society," 3 according to Hyman. Different
social groups, such as males and females, will exhibit dif-
ferent patterns of political behavior because they will have
learned different patterns from their socialization agents.
Women's lower rate of turnout, therefore, is a result of her
differential political socialization process in Hyman'
s
explanatory framework.
While the title of Hyman's work promises us an under-
standing of the psychology of the social learning process
with regard to politics, Hyman
, in fact, never fully expli-
cates a theory about how political learning takes place nor
how this theory of learning differs for males and females.
What Hyman does attempt is the documentation that political
behavior is learned. To prove this thesis, he turns to an
examination of political behavior in childhood already re-
corded in other studies. Hyman postulates that adult poli-
tical differences will be mirrored by political differences
between boys and girls.
Hyman is predicting there are observable political dif-
ferences between boys and girls. The empirical evidence of
these differences will be utilized as empirical substantiation
for socialization as the explanation for political behavior.
On the one hand, Hyman seems to recognize the limited standard
of validation that he has set up:
Studies at a single point in time which establish
variations in the behavior of children who differ
in group membership do not show directly the
learning or socialization process but do imply
that the totality of experiences in that child-
hood status has left its mark and is responsible
for adult patterns. 4 (italics mine)
Yet, Hyman seems content with inferential evidence as support
for his assertion that socialization explains the existence
of behavioral differences. Thus, Hyman sets out to establish
that political differences are already in existence for social
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categories such as males and females prior to adulthood.
Obviously, boys and girls do not directly participate
in the political process, even at the level of voting. But
Hyman proposes that precursors of adult political participa-
tion can be observed in certain aspects of boys' and girls'
lives. The process for identifying precursors and the link-
ages between precursors and adult political participation are
never clearly delineated. Yet, the existence of these pre-
cursors is assumed to be of critical importance to later
participation.
Hyman presents four indicators, all of which have been
observed in previous studies that he considers to be precur-
sors of adult participation. The four indicators cited are
choice of ego-ideal, media behavior, level of political knowl-
edge and responses to questions that directly ask about the
individual's political interest and political involvement. The
general hypotheses that underlie the selection of these indica-
tors, while not clearly stated, anticipate that boys will show
greater interest in reading and hearing about politics (media
behavior differences), that boys will have more political knowl-
edge than girls (level of political knowledge)
, and that boys
will respond to direct questions testing their political in-
volvement and political interest with answers that suggest
they are more politically involved and politically interested
than girls.
Each of these hypothetical statements seems to evolve from
explanations that voting behavior researchers posit for wo-
men's political behavior: women were seen to be less inter-
ested in politics, less knowledgeable about politics and less
involved with politics. Hyman, accepting each of these ex-
planations, is suggesting that girls, when compared to boys,
will exhibit similar disinterest, lesser knowledge and less
involvement
.
The assumptions behind the concept of ego-ideal are more
difficult to clarify and evaluate. The term ego-ideal is most
commonly associated with psychoanalytic theory, although Hy-
man does not credit his usage to any particular psychological
paradigm. That he may be following the psychoanalytic usage
is suggested by references he makes to the concept of identi-
fication, another concept primarily, although not exclusively,
associated with psychoanalytic theory. Identification and
ego- ideal are linked in psychoanalytic theory in the sense that
identification is defined as a learning process in which child-
ren unconsciously mold their own ego-ideal after that of the
parent or other significant adult model. 5 The studies that
Hyman classifies as measuring ego-ideal ask children to iden-
tify the figure they most admire or would most like to resem-
ble. The person identified in responses is then classified
in terms of their incorporation into politics. Hyman sees
this response choice as the child's political ego-ideal, a
model for his/her own conduct. The existence of such a model
is expected to motivate the child in directions that are
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6congruent with the ideal. The more political the ideal,
the more likely, Hyman asserts, that the child will be moved
toward adult political participation.
Without challenging the notion of whether ego-ideals are
formed by children and whether they serve as models for emula-
tion, let us examine what constitutes a political ego-ideal in
this study. m the list of works reviewed by Hyman, boys are
found to be more likely to pick public or historical male
figures as the persons they most admire or would most like to
resemble. Girls, on the other hand, tend to pick parents,
teachers and acquaintances for their "ideals." 7 The models
chosen by the boys are judged to be more political which
leads Hyman to the following conclusion:
We may regard the type of ego-ideal chosen asbeing a model for the child's conduct and there-fore, as motivating him in directions congruent
with the ideal. Thus
,
already at early agesbovs are directed toward~p^ritics and herTTie
the seeds of the adult different iation~everyr~
where found in the studies of political parti-
cipation
.
8 (italics mine)
Carrying Hyman' s explanation to its logical conclusion one
explanation for women's lower participation would be that
the ego-ideals they choose to emulate in childhood are in-
sufficiently political and, therefore, don't serve to direct
them toward politics.
Even if we accept Hyman' s operationalism that historical
and public figures are inherently more political than parents,
teachers and acquaintances, we must still point out some
difficulties that arise with respect to this explanation of
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women's lesser concern with politics. First, the cited stu-
dies were conducted between 1900 and 1930; the particular
studies cited for the United States were conducted in 1903
and 1930. Surely, in the study conducted prior to woman's
attainment of suffrage, there should have been little reason
to assume that girls would choose to emulate political fig-
ures that they had no hope of becoming as adults. After all,
political participation, defined as voting by Hyman
, wasn't
an option for most women and holding political office was
even less attainable. Thus, by questioning the validity of
applying cross-cultural data and historical data that pre-
ceded the 19th Amendment, the empirical evidence for this
hypothetical explanation is reduced to evidence obtained in
one study.
An additional problem arises with respect to the evidence.
First, it may be questioned whether a concept such as ego-ideal
which is stated to be unconsciously held can be evoked and
measured by a question which asks an individual to name the
person he/she most admires or would most like to resemble.
This criticism is more than a challenge to the usual difficul-
ties of operationalism; it is asking whether the unconscious
can be brought to the level of consciousness by merely asking
the right question.
Finally, there needs to be some attention to the question
of whether boys and girls should or could adopt ego-ideals of
the opposite sex. Hyman' s operationalism of political ego-ideal
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as primarily public, historical figures means that an over-
whelming majority of political ego-ideals would be male.
Girls then would have few political ego-ideals available to
them who were also female.
If the concept of ego-ideal is borrowed from the psycho-
analytic framework, the choice of an opposite sex-ideal would
be discouraged. since there would be potential psychological
conflict for the development of the girls' gender identity.
In order to become political, if Hyman' s analysis is correct,
girls may need to choose to emulate (male) political ego-
ideals who are more readily available or choose to emulate
female (apolitical) ego ideals who are also in great supply.
Unless more female political models emerge, there seems to
be little possibility for girls to develop as both female and
political persons. Thus, Hyman seems to have created a psy-
chological double bind for women with this explanation.
If ego-ideal is an indicator of women's political be-
havior that emerges in childhood is not well-documented, what
evidence is provided for the other indicators? Hyman hypoth-
esizes that the lesser political interest exhibited by adult
women, verified in the voting behavior studies, will be
mirrored by the existence of a lesser political interest on
the part of girls.
In the previous chapter, we noted the various usages of
the term interest and the assumption that political interest
is directly related to adult participation. Hyman is
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hypothesizing that adult political interest is fostered by
the development of political interest in childhood. The use
of political interest here seems most akin to ordinary
language usage of expressing curiosity about politics or
showing a desire to learn more about politics without any
necessary implication that the individual has particular
policy concerns that can be resolved in the political arena.
This seems especially clear when we consider that neither boys
nor girls can have a direct impact on the political system
as it is presently constituted. Again, whether a general-
ized interest in politics will increase as one grows older
and affect one's adult political behavior is not substantiated
nor are the conditions for testing this linkage laid out.
Political interest, in Hyman's analysis, is operational-
ized in terms of the type of reading children did and the
types of radio programs that they listened to in their leisure
time. Political interest in reading material is purportedly
exemplified by choosing history, biography and literature
relating to non-home areas such as science and general infor-
mation. These are the materials cited most frequently by boys.
Girls selected fiction and home-type literature as their
reading choices in this set of studies which range from 1898
9to 1927. J Studies conducted in 1936 and 1941, respectively,
found boys to be more interested in radio programs that con-
tained news and politics and more interested in reading poli-
tical articles in newspapers. 1 ^ But, again, how the development
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of political interest is linked to one's choice of childhood
reading materials and how this childhood political interest
is linked to adult political participation is not explicated.
Nonetheless, Hyman contends that he has proved that boys
have more political interest than girls.
Hyman also cites a number of studies as empirical evi-
dence for the hypothesis that girls are less knowledgeable
about politics than boys, another assumed precursor of poli-
tical participation. 11 Hyman points out that if we assume
that "opportunity and intellectual capacity are equal among
different groups of children, it is reasonable to regard dif-
ferential levels of knowledge as indicative of degrees of
involvement." 12 Here political knowledge seems two steps re-
moved from political participation; political knowledge is hy-
pothesized to increase political involvement which is hypothe-
sized to lead to an increase in adult political participation.
Two studies are cited to show that boys have greater political
knowledge than girls. One study, conducted in the 1920' s and
published in 1937, found that on knowledge of such concepts
as candidate, polling place, political party, ballot, plat-
form, primary election, etc.
,
boys in every grade level from
5th to 9th grade show consistent superiority in political
13knowledge. A 1942 sample of high school youth which included
an information test that contained political items also found
boys to be better informed than girls about politics. 1 ^
To this point, we have reviewed the empirical evidence
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presented for three indicators: ego-ideal nnHH ,c&u a i, political inter-
est, and political knowledge. Hyman maintains that there is
empirical substantiation for each of these that lends sup-
port to the theory of political socialization even though he
recognizes that the three indicators may appear "...somewhat
approximate to the reader." 15
His fourth indicator is the asking of direct questions
about political involvement or political interest. Here he
assumes everyone will see the responses as directly related
to future participation. Presumably, at this point, the
posited underlying differences between girls and boys will
emerge even more clearly. But after discovering that in
Remmers 1 study of 3000 high school students conducted in 1952,
sex differences were negligible when students were asked, "How
closely have you been following the political conventions this
year?", a question that Hyman believed directly tested poli-
tical interest and political involvement, Hyman switches the
social category he is using for analysis from sex to social
1
6
class. The socio-economic differences in Remmers' study
closely parallel adult findings, according to Hyman, although
the sex differences do not. The explanation for this abrupt
shift is contained in an assertion made earlier in the study:
The socialization of children into politics
can be established equally well from the study
of sex differences or class differences in the
political behavior of children. Since regular-
ities in the political behavior of adults have
been established in most of the usual social
categories, it serves us equally well there-
fore in demonstrating that there are earlier
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developmental stages to use interchangeably
Interchangeability presumably works for Hyman because he
is not interested in establishing what the differential social-
ization process is for either of these social categories,
merely that there are beginnings of political differences that
can be shown for either of these groups in pre-adult life,
which to him, is sufficient empirical evidence that politics
does not merely acquire importance in adulthood. The switch
to social class, at this point in the discussion, seems to
occur, at least in part, because social class differences on
political issues which are believed to be related to political
ideology and party preferences are more clearly upheld by
Remmers' study than sex differences. To state the claim more
boldly, on questions which Hyman assumes directly test poli-
tical involvement and political interest, the empirical evi-
dence he has at hand does not confirm that significant dif-
ferences exist between boys and girls.
Summing up to this point, Hyman has not demonstrated very
satisfactorily that political differences between girls and
boys exist. Two of Hyman' s indicators, the direct questions
relating to political interest and involvement and ego-ideal
have little empirical substantiation. The operationalization
of the concept of ego-ideal and the operationalization of the
concept of political interest are both open to skepticism.
More importantly, how any of Hyman' s indicators are linked to
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adult political participation is left to t-hL t e reader to discern
Even if we grant that poUtlcal differences
maieg
and females have been clearly
^^ ^
qUeSti0nabU C°nClUSi0n
evidence provided, we are
still left to question why Hyman assumes ^ ^politics has taken place and how this learn,™cm rning occurred. The
evidence presented thus far seems „just as congruent with an
explanation hased on a natural predisposition toward politics
by males. How politics is learned is unfortunately never
clearly laid out for us. We can, however, set out some fun-
damental assumptions that Hyman has about political socializa-
tion that are implicit in his study and further question how
this process is hypothesized to differ for girls.
At least initially the learning process outlined seems to
be similar for all the groups to be socialized in the society.
Socialization is presented as a gradual developmental process
which occurs throughout the lifetime of the individual. But,
within the life cycle, childhood is viewed as the most funda-
mental period in which socialization occurs. Hyman avers
that survey evidence indicates that, by the age of 16, the
individual's political orientations are well-formed and not
very disparate from the orientations of individuals in their
twenties. 18 Thus, he exhorts researchers to concentrate on the
study of childhood as the primary period of political social-
ization. His emphasis on childhood as the primary period for
political socialization also seems to be dependent upon a
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fundamental assumption that he makes: that what is learned
early is learned well and persists over time. 19 This state-
ment contains two assumptions which are found in many poli-
tical socialization studies. First, it is assumed that poli-
tically relevant content is transmitted to the individual
early in life. This has been labeled the transmission prin-
ciple. While the transmission principle assumes that poli-
tics is transmitted from one generation to another, the process
by which this occurs is rarely delineated. This is particu-
larly true of Hyman who sets out the conditions for empirical
verification that transmission occurs by positing the follow-
ing methodology:
When children and their parents are measuredindependently and agreements in political
tl
& |st?!?lished . it supports the inference 01that the family transmits politics to the child. 21
This is about as close as we get to an understanding of how,
in Hyman' s framework, political learning takes place. Par-
ents transmit political learning to their children; how re-
mains a mystery.
The second assumption that Hyman makes about learning is
that learning that takes place in childhood is somehow learned
better and is more enduring than learning that occurs later in
life. This has been labelled the primacy principle. 22 Again,
while this is a fundamental assumption in Hyman
' s framework,
it is never subjected to investigation nor are we given rea-
sons for believing that this fundamental assertion is correct.
This principle is particularly important from the standpoint
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of making policy recommendations that could lead to an in-
crease in women's political participation; the implication is
that if individuals do not learn to be political as children
the probability that they will be political as adults is low.
If this is an accurate assessment, then any policy recommenda-
tions concerned with increasing women's political participa-
tion would have to focus on their childhoods.
The fact that Hyman sees the family as the transmitter
of political views to children and the fact that he sees
childhood, the major period of life when children are under
care of their parents, as the major period of political social-
ization leads to his assessment that parents are the major
political socialization agents. We have seen that he posits
that the process of political socialization can be substan-
tiated by examining the correlations between the parents'
political views and their children's political views.
Initially, Hyman attempts to provide evidence that par-
ents transmit both their party identifications and their
ideology to their children through socialization. When he
examines the evidence found in other studies, however, he dis-
covers that parents appear to be more successful at trans-
mitting their party identifications to their children than
23their ideologies. What this means is that greater correla-
tions exist between parents' and childrens' party identifica-
tions than between parents' and childrens' opinions about poli-
tical issues, Hyman' s operationalism of ideology.
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Since Hyman hypothesized that both of ^u D these correlations
would be significant, he posits an ad hoc emanation for why
the correlations with regard to party identification were
higher. In this explanation, Hyman recognizes that it is dif-
ficult to assert that a child is learning a set of specific
political behaviors or positions on ideological issues since
hrs/her actual participation in politics won't occur until
adult life when the issues that are present may differ signifi-
cantly from the political issues faced by his/her parents. He
hypothesizes that party identification, on the other hand, can
be retained from childhood to adulthood and can serve, in
adulthood, as an organizing principle for handling the new
issues which arise on which specific socialization has not
occurred. In this analysis, Hyman assigns party identifica-
tion the status of a psychological structure which will
mediate the individual's responses to political issues and
events in adulthood. This is even more clearly brought out
when he discusses the types of events that could lead one to
change one's party identification. Here he refers to party
identification as a "stable psychological phenomenon. 25 The
fact that Hyman has granted party identification this psycho-
logical structural status means that if he is correct, party
identification will be fairly impervious to erosion or change,
although Hyman doesn't totally rule out the possibility that
change can occur under extraordinary circumstances.
Hyman does recognize that the family is not necessarily
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a monolithic unit in the process Qf poUticai sociaiization
which is how he has presented it thus far
. ^^
'
states that each parent can and may act as an independent
agent in the political sociali Zation process, whether or not
the parents are in agreement or disagreement about politics
While this appears to be a reasonable set of assumptions, its
uniqueness rests on the fact that, in later studies, many
researchers assume that the influence of the family can be
equated with the influence of the father, who is often pres-
ented as the primary familial agent of political socializa-
tion. Hyman states that the existing evidence at this point
in time is too scanty and inconsistent to aver that one parent
is more important than the other in political socialization.
In fact, the transmission of parental party identifica-
tion to the child could be said to be more successfully achieved
with female offspring than with males, according to the research
data presented by Hyman. 26 This might lead him to conclude
that parents are more successful in the political socializa-
tion of their daughters then their sons, given Hyman 's analysis
that transmission is substantiated by correlation, though Hy-
man does not state this conclusion.
Rather, Hyman cautions that the girls' reliance on paren-
tal models may have negative consequences for girls; this
dependence on her parents as models for emulation could stifle
the political development of the girl unless she is in a very
active political family, particularly one in which other
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m-bers besides the father are politically active." Boys
on the other hand, are presented as being open to influence
from a variety of possible models so that if their familial
-dels are not particularly political their opportunities to
be politically socialized by other agents are greater. What
Hyman is asserting as an assumption here is that the male sex
role and female sex role have some differences that may pose
difficulties for the adequate political socialization of the
girls. The male sex role, in his opinion, permits greater
independence, which on the one hand accounts for the atten-
uation of parental influence on the political behavior of the
boys and at the same time provides them with opportunities to
orient themselves to models outside the family. 28 The female
sex role keeps the girls more closely tied to the home and
their families so that if girls are not located in a political
family the opportunity for them to be politically socialized
toward active political participation will be constrained. 29
Once again, these are ad hoc explanations with regard to
girls' political socialization, explanations which contain
unexamined and unsubstantiated assumptions about the relation-
ships between girls and their parents. These ad hoc explan-
ations arise at a point in his study where it might be stated
that girls more clearly exhibited the statistical relationship
that was expected to substantiate the existence of political
socialization, i.e., there was a higher correlation between
the party identification of girls and the party identification
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of their parents than between the party identificatiQn Qf boyg
and their parents.
Although Hyman doesn't tell no i-w uL i± us that he expected the
correlation to be reversed, i.e., boys' party identifications
to be .ore highly correlated with the party identification of
their parents, 1 suspect that this was his acting hypothesis,
and faced with statistics which supported the opposite re-
lationship, he needed to be able to suggest some explanation
which would account for this result and still account for the
fact that males were more political than females.
The material presented in Hyman that discusses the fam-
ily as an agent of political socialization makes no attempt
to suggest how parents behave as agents. We don't know if
parents recognize their roles as agents of political social-
ization or whether they are unconscious actors in what appears
to be an unconscious process.
Hyman does state that some families may present no ex-
plicit political socialization. Since he has also posited
that political socialization is a gradual process, he leaves
open the possibility that additional agents and events can
have influence on the individual's political behavior. Other
agencies are viewed as influencing the formation of political
ideas, the development of political interest and the acquisi-
tion of specific knowledge about political processes. What
he is recognizing here is that the cognitive content of the
16 year old is substantially more developed than that of the
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5 year old. In fact, Hyman turns again to some of the stu-
dies already discussed to show that there is a gradual develop
ment for boys in the strength of some precursors of political
participation over time. He cites a 1936 study to show that
boys tend to discuss news increasingly as they get older; for
girls, discussion of news remains consistently at a low
level. 0 Similarly with regard to choice of ego-ideals, "the
patterning of ideals among boys in the direction of political
figures shows a strong increase with age, but for girls the
patterns remain relatively fixed and apolitical despite in-
creasing age." 31 A 1930 study which also noted a progressive
rise in the identification of boys with public figures with
age also leads Hyman to conclude that "the choice of parents
(as ego-ideals) wanes for boys whereas the idealization of
parents remains more stable among girls with age." 32 Thus,
boys seem to increase their interest and involvement with
politics throughout the pre-adult years whereas girls seem to
maintain a low level of interest and involvement so the gap
between boys and girls should increase over time.
Hyman leaves us with a clear understanding that while
the political socialization process is gradual and developmen-
tal for boys, girls do not develop in the same way. In fact,
we are not quite sure that there is much political development
at all for girls. If the gap between boys and girls in poli-
tical socialization increases with age, the possibility of
girls ever achieving an equal level of political socialization
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is cut off. if we had . better understand . ng Qf ^
develop.ental process proposed here occurred, we might be
able to posit changes that could include girls in this
developmental process; instead, we are left with the impress-
ion that girls are fated to remain hopelessly underdeveloped
politically.
Throughout my summary and analysis of Hyman's presenta-
tion of political socialization as learning, I have returned
several times to the fact that Hyman never explains, even in
a speculative manner, how political socialization takes place.
One possible explanation for his lack of attention to this as
an issue is that he is basically unconcerned with the how of
the political socialization process. Perhaps, he would even
relegate that particular task of delineating how socializa-
tion occurs to the social psychologists, as Dawson and Prewitt
do when they warn that:
Political scholars should guard against lettingtheir intellectual energies and research resourcesbe drained into social-psychological queries, how-
ever important they may be. The payoff in politi-
cal socialization theory is not with the questionposed as individual learning. More important arequestions about the consequences
-
^ political
socialization for society ~33
It is clear that Hyman agrees that one of the primary reasons
for studying political socialization is to understand its
consequences for the society rather than the individual. He
states that if individuals didn't learn their political be-
havior early and well and persist in it, not only might there
ystem
e our
be no observed statistical regularities about the political
behavior of social groups, there might even be chaos in the
Political system.^ Perhaps u ^ tM<^ ^ ^
of the political socialization process on the political s
rather than its effects on the individual that frustrat
understanding the differences in that process for boys and
girls. While Hyman intrigues us with the possibility that
differential political behavior for women may be learned, he
fails to illuminate this process for us in a meaningful way,
primarily because of his reluctance to address the question of
how the learning occurs.
One of the most critical unanswered questions about the
learning process regards the nature of the relationship be-
tween the learner and the person from whom he/she learns. The
parent is defined as a transmitter but whether the transmission
is intentional on the part of the model is unclear. Neither is
it clear whether the modeling is conscious or unconscious.
The significance of these questions relates to the fact
that frequently Hyman seems to place the responsibility for
the results of their political socialization squarely on the
shoulders of the girls. This surfaced most clearly in the
evaluation of the statistical data on the precursors of ego-
ideal and political interest. By not making it clear how ego-
ideals come to be selected, Hyman makes it appear that girls
could reverse their process of political socialization by
choosing appropriate political ego-ideals. Similarly, in the
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data on political interest, the girls' choice of (a)political
reading material was seen to have a bearing on their girlhood
political interest and, subsequently, their adult political
interest. Again, if girls would choQse fco ^^ pollt±cal
materials, they might be able to reverse their political
socialization. If this choice is unconscious rather than con-
scious on the part of girls, then we must question whether the
process can be reversed by such a simple method.
Furthermore, since we don't understand what responsi-
bility the model has in this process, it is difficult to
evaluate how the interaction process would need to be altered
if the outcomes of women's political socialization process,
as Hyman sees them, were to be reversed. The one example we
have with regard to the constraints of the interaction process
between political socialization agents and the individuals
being socialized involves parents and daughters. Hyman saw
parents restricting the freedom of their daughters, keeping
them more tightly bound to the home and suggested this could
be a detriment to the political socialization of girls, who
were less exposed to additional models to emulate.
Looking at the implications of these explanations, it is
difficult to clearly outline policies that would help to in-
crease women's political participation. We might state that
if these explanations are correct, general policy goals that
stimulate the political interest of girls should be encouraged.
Similarly, the explanations suggest that girls should be
encouraged to choose political ego-ideals and that girls
should be given more latitude and freedom outside of the home
to expose them to additional political models.
While Hyman's work may fail to illuminate how women's
political socialization process transpires and fail to con-
vince us that the observations about political differences
between boys and girls are necessarily meaningful or linked
to their subsequent adult political behavior, nonetheless,
the study is important in an evaluation of socialization stud-
ies because it was the first study attempting to explain the
acquisition of political ideas as part of the social learning
process. While Hyman spoke of socialization as social learn-
ing, he did so in a broad sense rather than applying the
psychological theory of social learning to the study of poli-
tics. A similar usage was applied by Fred Greenstein in his
survey research study of New Haven, Connecticut school child-
ren.
Overall, Greenstein' s study found very few significant
political differences between boys and girls; he still de-
voted a chapter of Children and Politics to reviewing the ob-
served differences in adult male and female political behav-
ior, providing childhood data to reinforce some of these con-
clusions, and also providing us with new hypotheses about
the process of socialization for girls.
One of the first variables that Greenstein looked at
was political information: his hypothesis was that boys would
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be more politically informed than girls, since men, as he
notes, are more politically informed than women. 36 The
operationalization of this concept was a series of questions
that asked for the names of the mayor, governor, and presi-
dent, descriptions of their duties and descriptions of the
legislative bodies at every level of government. 37 Greenstein
does not provide us with a table of statistical results. He
merely states that "the amount of political information held
by this group of school children was infinitesimal." 38 Even
so, he concludes that at all grade levels boys are judged to
be significantly better informed about politics than girls.
How one establishes significance when dealing with infinitesi-
mal knowledge is not clarified. Presumably, whatever low
level of knowledge existed resided with the boys. Some re-
searchers might have decided, given the low levels of knowl-
edge, conclusions about significance were unwarranted. At
the very least, we must question whether the empirical evi-
dence cited lends support to the hypothesis that is advanced.
My judgment is that it is questionable statistical evidence.
Greenstein clearly needs this statistical difference
between boys and girls to be significant, for it is a statis-
tical observation that bolsters another hypothesis in his
framework: "Differences in interest precede differences in
39information." Having already presented "evidence" that
boys are better informed about politics than girls, Green-
stein proceeds to show boys' greater interest in politics,
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which as he sees it. is a nriori,
. necessary although .q_
sufficient condition for seeking out political information.
Given their interest in politics, boys will seek out poll-
tical information.
Political interest was operationalized as giving
-poli-
tical" responses to questions such as "Can you think of a
news story which made you happy? angry?" . "Name a .famous
person you want to be like"; and "If you could change the
world in any way you wanted, what change would you make?" 40
Boys were considered to be more political than girls in
responses to the first and second question which is reminiscent
of Hyman's "ego-ideal" category.
Unfortunately, the coding of "political" responses to
these questions is not well reported. We are informed in a
footnote that responses to the news story question were coded
following a broad use of political. 41 Greenstein also tells
us that the most frequently cited political news stories con-
cerned satellite competition between the United States and
/ 9
the Soviet Union. Political responses to the question, "If
you could change the world in any way you wanted, what change
would you make?", are not cited, but Greenstein tells us that
girls were more likely not to respond at all to this question
or, when they did respond, to suggest a distinctly non-poli-
tical change such as "get rid of all of the criminals and bad
4- 3people." Now, perhaps it is out of political context to
suggest that such an answer might have been coded as political
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in the late 50'
s or the early 60' s when Greenstein was con-
ducting this research, but clearly In today's context It
is difficult to see why this is necessarily a less political
response than the boys' interest ^ „ = n • „
'
J-ncere in satellite competition
for which we might suggest alternative bases for interest,
such as science or fantasy, rather than politics. Thus, the
statistical evidence for boys' greater political interest is
also questionable.
Greenstein, at this point, takes these "proven" relation-
ships, that boys are more interested and more involved with
politics and constructs an ad hoc explanation for these poli-
tical behaviors which is rooted in assumptions borrowed from
psychologists. His general explanation is that girls and boys
behave in politically different ways because they learn dif-
ferent non-political behaviors which lead to differences in
political behaviors.
The non-political differences of interest to Greenstein
are psychological differences between males and females that
Greenstein believes affect the development of political dif-
ferences. Greenstein notes three differences, that he be-
lieves have been verified by psychologists, that he feels have
contributed to males being more involved in politics.
First Greenstein notes that males tend to exhibit aggres-
sive and dominant behavior more frequently than females ; accord-
ing to the psychologists he is citing, this difference emerges
early and is observable at all age levels. ^ Greenstein
102
maintains that this psychological observation may have a
bearing on the issue positions of men and women. Here he
claims this observation may account for women's tendency to
be more pacifist, which he cites as a finding of previous
research. He also states that this psychological differ-
ence between men and women may have a bearing on participa-
tion, as well. * mile he doesn , fc expucate statsment>
presumably the more aggressive individual, i.e., the male,
would participate more fully or more frequently.
The second observation that is brought in from psychology
is that women have a more absorbing interest in persons and
personal relations. Here, Greenstein connects this difference
to women being more likely to be candidate-oriented, another
observation which is not directly tested in his own data but
is a restatement of data from the American Voter47 a re-
statement which misrepresents the evidence presented there.
Greenstein implies that women are more candidate-oriented than
men and implies that men were more issue-oriented. The Camp-
bell study found that generally issues were not very signifi-
cant to voters in the 1952 election, male or female, and that
women were slightly more candidate-oriented than men. 48
His third observation from psychology is more directly
relevant to the general statement he has presented that boys
have more interest in politics and. subsequently acquire more
political information. He discusses non-political interest
differences that have been observed among girls and boys:
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their differential interest in toys and reading material
Boys, he reminds us, ehoose toys that reflect male activ-
ities outside of the home: soldiers, fire engines, steam
shovels while girls choose toys symbolic of home and feminin-
ity. Girls read stories about home and school while boys
read violent or outdoor adventure, sports, travel, explora-
tion and war. Boys prefer history and social science courses
while' girls prefer English and foreign languages. How do
these non-political differences relate to political differen-
ces between males and females?
It is only a short step from the variationsbetween the sexes in their interest in socialstudies and their civic grades to the greaterpolitical information of young boys Thestep is slightly but not much longer fromreading stories about the Wild West, ratherthan stories about home life, to interest in
BoS'nf£ neWS rath6r than Haven newsoth of these steps seem to be related tothe general non-political division of laborbetween the sexes in American society and to
fe^f 17 ^ar?in§ ° f tMs divi sion as mani-ested mthe 5 year old boy's insistence on
?ifyi
ng
iV
lth
?
t0y soldier or fire engine andthe girl's selection of the doll. 51
What Greenstein is emphasizing here is that boys and girls
develop differently in terms pf non-political behaviors and
that many of these non-political behaviors have a direct link-
age to later acquisition of political behaviors The poli-
tical differences for males and females are also contingent
upon the development of different sex identities which, accord-
ing to Greenstein, are developed "through differential
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opportunities, rewards and punishments which vary by. . , axen sex andby identification with one or mnrtanother Parent. Among other
things, this learning process •8 P SS ass°ciates girls with theimmediate environment and boys xrtrh m,° S Wlt the wider environment
Political responses, developing as thev Hn i .F-"-ng y do, relatively latem childhood, fall infn fh* emto the framework of already present non-
political orientations." 52
What Greenstein seems to surest Wo i <-ugge here is that sex role
socialistic, precedes and defines the possible limits for
the later political socialist^. Girls are at a political
disadvantage because of their sex-role socialization, which
to some extent, must precede and define the limits of their
political socialization.
Thus, even though there were relatively minor political
deferences between boys and girls in his study, Greenstein
is pessimistic about whether these sex differences can be
obliterated:
?heor^f
n^ta CaSt Parti^r doubt ont eories which suggest that political sex
on th^CeS WiU dif aPPe*r in the near future
Sinlv fiST^ 1?? that SUCh differences derive?wiy adult exP eri-ences . An adequatetheory must account for the psychological
underpinnings of political sex differences
h
U
^
e
^
to° ^ terms of sex roles in the societyow they develop and what maintains them. 53
Y '
Again, as with Hyman, we see the postulation of the persistence
of political socialization differences on the assumption that
what is learned in childhood becomes psychologically embedded
and, therefore, is particularly difficult to change.
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sex
While one might sueepqt f-v>o+- ,u6 gges that alternative models of
role socialization might facilitate changing the political
differences between males and females in this model of explan-
ation, and that while this might be a difficult task, it is
still „ithin the realm of possibility; Greenstein , s under _
-
standing (explanation) of the linkage between sex role social-
ization and political socialization becomes less clear in the
following passage:
chiidipn'n?
lth
^
Sh n0t
° f deeP ^terest toWu l" lth^ S6X ' iS ^°re "sonant withtne natura enthusiasms of boys. Other nsv-etiological bases also will be found. For ex-
^ need to conform to cultural defini-tions of masculinity is often bulwarked by
bv
W
^f feellnSS- This need is complementedy the severe penalties which departure from
al de flnitio^s may bring. Women whofind it especially threatening not to be "femin-ine and who see politics as a male function
will be drawn into the political arena only atthe cost of great psychic discomfort . 54
Here the psychological bases of the sex roles, as Greenstein
presents them, take on a quality of deterministic imperative.
To deviate from the learning of one's sex role promises dire
consequences that might better be avoided. There is almost
a threat here that natural order would be disturbed if men
and women were to become politically more similar. Better to
leave life as it is and not disturb the natural balance.
The more "natural" interest in politics by boys seems to
be reinforced, in Greenstein' s explanatory statement, by
societal insistence on differential sex role and psychological
internalization of these roles by males and females. For
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women, the penalty for entry into politics, inappropriate
for their sex role, would appear to be psychological dis-
tress. The exact nature* <~>f t-u^ iure of the learning process is no more
clearly substantiated in Greenstein than it was in Hyman
although there are hints that political socialization is
linked to sex role socialization and that the sex role social-
ization of males includes an orientation toward the political
arena
Thus, attempts to modify the political socialization
process for girls that Greenstein has outlined would necessar-
ily have to address the fact that sex role socialization pre-
cedes and delimits politics socialization. Policy recommenda-
tions would need to place some emphasis on the process of sex
role socialization, a process which is only briefly commented
on but not fully developed by Greenstein.
Again, the role of the parents, as agents of sex role
socialization and political socialization is unclear. Do
girls and boys choose the toys Greenstein sees as a precusor
of political interest or do parents choose the toys for these
children? Who is responsible for choosing reading materials?
Do sex role socialization and political socialization agents
discourage children from choosing in ways that are inappro-
priate for their sex? None of these questions are answered
by Greenstein.
Furthermore, there is in Greenstein' s brief explanation
of girls' political socialization the implication that one
107
should not attempt to alter the process, to attempt to make
girls more political. There is the threat that, in some way,
this might disturb the psychological balance of the girl. It
is in this statement that Greenstein seems most contradictory
If he truly believes that political behavior is learned, then
he should be able to maintain that what is learned is alt,:er-
able. .Here, again, it is the prior sex role socialization
that he believes may be threatened and this sex role social-
ization seems almost "natural" rather than learned.
This question of the relationship between sex role social-
ization and political socialization is a significant one if
one goal of examining the socialization studies is to make
policy recommendations that could lead to an increase in
women's political activity. Are sex role socialization and
political socialization separate entities or is sex role
socialization a subset of sex role socialization? While
Hyman seemed to opt for separate entities, Greenstein sub-
sumes political socialization under sex role socialization
or, at least, suggests that sex role socialization establishes
the contours in which political socialization develops.
In the final study to be evaluated in this section,
Children in the Political System
,
published in 1969 by David
Easton and Jack Dennis, the question of how political social-
ization interfaces with sex role socialization is also signi-
ficant, although they approach this question from the stand-
point of the political system rather than the individual.
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Easton and Dennis contend that political socialization
is particularly related to the persistence of political sys-
tems and the legitimation of political authorities. There-
fore, their interest in understanding sex differences in poli-
tical learning is concerned neither with m,. „clul n the consequent effect
on the individual nor possible effects on policies or voting
decisions. 55 Instead, they focus on the role of sex differ-
ences in maintaining the stability of the political system:
Sex enters the analysis for us only as it
or thl\ r* lative depth of the commitmente type of response that is made. (i e
i?ies)5?°
1 SyStem and Political author!
According to the authors, all of the data they gathered in-
dicated small but pervasive sex differences. 57 Thus, again
there is a questionable empirical foundation for the assumption
of differences between women's and men's political socializa-
tion.
As we have seen in other studies, the process of how
political socialization occurs, i.e., how political learning
takes place, is not clear but there are two aspects of this
process that Easton and Dennis purport they are particularly
interested in. They suggest that as the child matures in age,
he/she will develop politically in two ways: 1. They hypoth-
esize that the child becomes increasingly politicized in elemen-
tary school, as revealed in his/her recognition of government.
As part of this development, which they label as politiciza-
tion, the child learns to distinguish between public and
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private authorities and
, at least> ^ ^greater weight t0 public authQrities ^ ^^ _
nxtive image of government also is hypothesized to develop
durlng this same time frame with the early dominance of per-
sonalization in the cognitive image of government gradually
superseded by an institutional image. 58
What Easton and Dennis are proposing with these hypoth-
eses is that the results of political socialization in early
years should be 1) an increase in the child's understanding of
government and 2) the adoption of the notion that government
is a set of institutions rather than men or particular individ-
uals. Since Easton and Dennis have already informed us that
sex differences are relevant in their study, „e expect their
findings to indicate that girls will Ug behind boys ifl their
development of an understanding of government and will tend
to retain a cognitive image of government that involves person-
alization of governmental authority rather than shifting toward
institutionalization.
The operationalization of the first hypothesis, that the
child becomes increasingly politicized in elementary school,
was a question that asked the respondents in the sample, 2nd-
8th graders, if they understood the meaning of the word govern-
ment. Girls, at every level in the survey, were more likely
to say that they did not understand the meaning of the word
government than boys were. The difference was greatest in the
younger age groups. 59 Easton and Dennis interpret this finding
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to mean that "the young male has a higher probability of be-
coming^politically sensitized fro, the beginning of the age
span." This is construed as giv . ng a defin . te ^
political development by invoking the primacy principle:
sensitx2ed
m
to
e
;
Ukely t0 have b<^iz government early is then It,a position to develop deeper and more lastineorientations of other kinds toward°the 'goverl-
rooted
1
oart
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r
^
lm
" 3pt S? become a ^«er-
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the 5'0unS man s conceptual andattitudinal framework. 62
The boy's earlier understanding of government presumably
presents a handicap to girls that is difficult for them to
overcome although, as the data in this study demonstrates,
68%- 917, of girls in the grades surveyed indicate they do under-
stand the meaning of the word government while 7370-9170 of the
boys understand the meaning. 63 Since the majority of both
boys and girls indicate they understand the term, Easton and
Dennis's generalization which seems to place all girls behind
all boys in development is excessive. Crucially, from a
purely methodological standpoint, the fact that no follow-up
question ascertained whether, in fact, the respondents did
understand the meaning of the term government, leads one to
wonder how accurate the results are for the data presumed to
be measured here.
Clearly Easton and Dennis believe that the understanding
of the word government is a pre-requisite for advancing in
other precursors of politics, such as political interest,
Ill
political involvement, etc.; but they neither make these
connections clear, nor do they provide evidence to support
these connections.
To test the hypothesis that children are increasingly
able to distinguish between public and private authorities
as they progress through elementary school, Easton and Dennis
presented the respondents with the following question:
?hf
e
<^
re S°me P e°P le
-
^ich ones work fort e government? Does the wor£for the government
In this way, the children were asked to identify whether the
milkman, the policeman, the soldier, the judge, the postman,,
and the teacher were public or private employees.
Easton and Dennis's interpretation of the data obtained
from this question indicates that the sex differences they
find are small, fairly consistent, and suggest a slightly
faster rate of politicization for boys. 65 The differences are
clearly small; they are less clearly consistent if the end
conclusion is that boys are better able to distinguish which
individuals are publically employed and which individuals are
privately employed. The data for the fifth through eighth
graders shows that girls and boys are equally able to dis-
tinguish the soldier and the judge as public employees; boys
are slightly more able to identify the milkman as a private
employee while girls are slightly more able to distinguish
the policeman as a public employee. 66 From grade 2 through
grade 8, boys are consistently more able to identify the
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postman as a public employee while the girls are C
_2I^ ^more able to identify the teacher as a public employee "
Between second and fifth grade, the data do suggest that boys
are more aware that the soldier and postman are public employ-
ees and slightly more aware that the milkman and policeman
are private and public employees, respectively." While Easton
and Dennis maintain they have substantiated a faster rate of
politicization for boys than girls, their own data suggests
that by eighth grade, girls have pretty much caught up with
boys in this area. The advantages of earlier politicization
are again assumed, but we have no way to assess how meaning-
ful earlier development is in terms of a lasting effect on
the system's persistence, which is the authors' concern, or
on the politicization of the individual, which is my concern.
The assumption that this early learning will lead boys to
develop deeper and more lasting orientations of other kinds
toward government may be assumed, 69 but this is not validated
in the data. Instead, we have a picture of girls developing
a little more slowly but apparently in the same direction as
boys in terms of this criterion.
In order to ascertain whether the girls' cognitive image
of government changes from a personalized image to an institu-
tionalized image at the same rate as boys, Easton and Dennis
asked three questions. First, they gave students a list and
asked them to select the two choices from this list that they
believed best symbolized the government of the United States.
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The possible items for selection were policeman, George Wash-
ington, Uncle Sam, voting, the Supreme Court, Congress, the
Capital, the flag, the Statue of Liberty and President Kennedy
In second grade, the two most often selected responses were
President Kennedy and George Washington, for both the boys and
the girls. Among eighth graders, the most popular choices for
both boys and girls were Congress and voting, with President
Kennedy the third most often selected response for the girls;
boys were fairly evenly split between the Statue of Liberty/
the Supreme Court, Uncle Sam and President Kennedy as the
third most often selected response. Easton and Dennis' inter-
pretation of these data stresses the fact that roughly twice
as many girls as boys (29% to 16%) still pick the current
president as an important symbol of government in grade 8. 70
Their post factum interpretation of the data concludes:
In this sense, girls remain political "primi-tives (relative to the direction of aggregatedevelopment) on the average two or three yearslonger than boys, if we can oroject from ourfigures. Indeed the tendency for personaliza-
tion of authority persists into adolescence (agethirteen or fourteen), for a significant pro-
portion of females, whereas for males the ten-dency has declined considerably . 71
Similarly, boys' greater likelihood of choosing Congress
as most representative of the United States government, a dif-
ference which is sharpest in fourth, fifth and seventh grade,
where it is a 7-8% difference, is evaluated as showing that
boys have a more impersonal approach to government.
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The significance of this movement toward an impersonal
institutional interpretation is, that as Easton and Dennis
have set out their crifpna ~ •n teri , this is a sign of political matur-
ity. In their framework, one must make this movement from a
personal to an impersonal understanding of the functioning of
government. Since girls are seen as less likely to do this,
they are labeled political "primitives".
Congress, in this analysis, represents the mature insti-
tutionalized cognitive image of government while the president
is depicted as the immature personalized cognitive image of
government. Children in this study were asked to identify the
chief lawmaker in the country to test whether the development
of this political maturity occurred faster in boys than in
girls. The younger children chose the President as the chief
lawmaker. As grade level increased, both boys and girls were
more likely to pick Congress as the chief lawmaker, although
the percentage of girls who do so is usually smaller, albeit
not always significantly smaller, at each grade level. The
interesting aspect of this statistic is that by fifth grade,
well over 50% of both boys and girls have learned that Congress
is the chief lawmaker in the country. By eighth grade, 85% of
both sexes identify Congress as fulfilling this function. Most
students have clearly incorporated the notion that Easton and
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Dennis expect to find with political maturity, that the Con-
gress should he identified as the chief lawmaker in the United
States
Similarly, responses to the question, "Who does the most
to run the country?" depict a gradual shift from the President
to the Congress over grade levels, although, in this case, in
every grade, the majority of hoys and girls cite the President
as doing the most to run the country. From grade 5 on, girls
are more likely than hoys to state that the President does the
most to run the country. Easton and Dennis see this as a less
politically mature understanding of the American political
system by girls, recalling here that political maturity should
lead one toward emphasizing impersonal institutions. Girls
seeing the President as more important in the running of the
country is considered evidence that girls personalize politics
more than boys.
The understanding of political maturity that is presented
here seems highly problematic. The authors have introduced
their own political bias when viewing Congress as more impor-
tant than the President in the running of the American poli-
tical system. Secondly, they assume that an acceptance of
the President as the key figure in running the country relies
on an acceptance of the presentation of the personal image of
the man who is President rather than an understanding that
regardless who holds the office, the institutional power of
the Presidency is substantial. They also ignore the extent
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to which the President of the cQuntry tends ^ dQrainate
-dia presentations of politics and political activi ty in
the United States Peri,,.,. haps, the greater wonder is that so
children have learned the traditional view of the separa-
as the chief legislator.
As was true with Hyman and Greenstein, Easton and Dennis
have done little to advance our knowledge of how girls are
politically socialized in a different manner from boys. Yet
they have presented us with a model of girls who seem poll-
'
tically deficient, political
"primitives" as they capsulized
them, always trailing behind boys in development of political
understanding. Since the process that allows for this uneven
development is so unclear, we are hardpressed to make sugges-
tions about how changes in female political socialization might
be wrought within this framework. Girls are left with their
deficiencies with no obvious avenues of escape. The early
development of political differences is seen as a barrier to
future political development, depending on one's sex. Only
at the end of this analysis do girls receive a suggestion of
future possibility when Easton and Dennis note that the minor
differences in their study may reflect a lessening of politico-
cultural sexual differentiation. Sex typing was, in fact,
transmitted from adults to children less than the authors
73
expected. In other words, Easton and Dennis fully anticipa-
ted more substantial sex differences than they actually
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uncovered. When these differences fail t0 Serialize as
^pleteX, as thev expect, the lack of these differences Is
reinterpreted to suggest thar n,« it the learning of politically
relevant sex differences is lessening.
The most important consequence of the socialization stu-
dies reviewed thus far is that the image of Apolitical woman
presented to us in thp vn*"f*i« u vm e oting behavior studies is now comple-
mented by an image of (a)political girl. Girls are pre-
sented as less interested in politics, less knowledgeable about
politics, less politically mature, more interested in the per-
sonal images of politicians than in political issues. The
foundation of women's lower participation is thus seen to
lie in women's childhood experiences rather than in adulthood.
This picture of (Apolitical girl is constructed on an
evidential foundation that is statistically unsound, yet the
observations are frequently asserted by later studies as fact
just as occurred with the statistical observations in the
voting behavior.
While no clear theory of political socialization emerges,
frequently the authors reviewed here borrowed, without criti-
cal examination, assumptions from psychology regarding the
psychological characteristics of girls and boys. Whether or
not these assumptions are well-substantiated empirically in
psychology is not a concern of these authors. They assume
that the observations are well-founded and can be applied to
political socialization. From these studies, no clear theory
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gh x?e can
* politic* socialization can be foraulated aithou ^ _
- that an of the authors belleve fchat ^ ig fundamen _
tal explanation for th e conM'nm-fti uity of regular behavior
patterns
.
The authors evaluated here havp a t- in n e at least three major
assumptions they agree upon: x ^ poUticai sociaiization
xs the major expla„at ion for differences in
2. that the process of politic.! socialization occurs in child-
hood; 3. that the results of political socialization are dif.
ficult to overcome later in life, if „7e look even more
we can see that within each of these assumptions there are
suggestions of policy consequences
. For example, the age at
which political soc ialization occurs is an .mportant question
if one wants to address the question of what policy changes
need to be made for women to participate more fully in politics.
While all the authors agree that political socialization
occurs in childhood, the question of exactly when in child-
hood seems unclear. None of the authors specifically answer
this question, although Hyman seemed to indicate that the
process was complete by age 16. Easton and Hess's concentra-
tion on studying grades 2-8 established the idea that they
locate political socialization in the elementary school and
junior high years of the child. Greenstein also looks basic-
ally at elementary school age children. Thus, it would seem
that policy recommendations based on the assumptions of this
study would need to concentrate on the pre-adolescent period
119
if change was to be proved. Further^, since all these
authors believe that attitudes and beliefs established in
childhood political socialization are difficult to extinguish
in adulthood, there is even more reason to assume that mean-
ingful p0 l icy recordations would concentrate on this time
period.
An additional question with regard to the age of politi-
cal socialization is related to understanding how political
socialization and sex role socialization are interrelated.
It seems unlikely that these processes can be neatly separated,
that is, it is difficult to imagine that agents of socializa-
tion allot ages 0-6 for sex role socialization and then take
up the task of political socialization. It seems more likely
that both tasks proceed over the same time periods and that
girl's sex role socialization does have a bearing on her
political socialization.
Now, this question is particularly important with regard
to assessment of the policy implications of these political
socialization studies. If girl's sex role socialization es-
tablishes limits for her political socialization, then poli-
cies that attempt to modify her political socialization with-
out regard for her sex role socialization would be doomed to
failure.
The most difficult assessment to make with regard to
how the political socialization process could be changed so
that more women xv-ould participate in politics, assuming that
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this explanation is an accurate one> is ^ ^ ^^^^^
this change. For the most Mate ^ ^ ^
demanding how the process of political socialization pro-
cess works and, in particular, how women are differentially
socialized, is to have very llttle idea of ^ tQ
a. the process. We must be able to understand how women
learn that politics is a male perquisite not just that they
learn it to address this question. As Part of this process
the relationship between the learner and the agent(s) of poli-
tical socialization must be made more explicit.
As we have seen, one of the most important inconsisten-
cies in each of these studies is that the authors seem ambiv-
alent about who should be held responsible for the political
socialization that occurs. While explanations that see poli-
tical socialization as part of a general learning process, even
though this process is not made explicit, might assign respon-
sibility for what is learned to the teacher(s) or agent(s) of
political socialization, these studies frequently place this
responsibility on the learners instead. Girls appear to have
learning deficiencies when it comes to political socialization
and, somehow, girls will have to overcome these learning defi-
ciencies in order to be adequately politically socialized.
If the political socialization studies thus far examined
have provided the correct explanation for women's adult poli-
tical behavior even though their empirical base is weak and
their theory is not well-elaborated, the outlook for increasing
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women's political participation seeras^^ ^ ^
further understand political socialization as a process Per-
haps, a more explicit theory of socialization will enhance
these prospects. This is the focus of the succeeding chapter
» -hich attests by political scientists to attach a partic-
ular theory of socialization, social learning theory, to the
study of politics are examined.
CHAPTER V
SOCIALIZATION STUDIES AND SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY
In the early socialization studies we saw that political
scientists attempting to develop a theory of political be-
havior explained the observed differences in political be-
havior between men and women by positing that behavioral dif-
ferences were learned. They
,
then
,
turned their ^
the study of childhood political behavior looking for substan-
tiation that these behaviors were learned. Failing to provide
a clear theoretical framework, these researchers often re-
sorted to ad hoc explanations for girls' political behavior,
explanations that told us more about the assumptions of the
researchers than about the reasons why girls learned a differ-
ent set of behaviors.
As socialization studies proliferated in political sci-
ence, political scientists made increasing attempts to ex-
plicitly adapt specific psychological and sociological the-
ories of social learning to the study of politics. One of
the most popular psychological theories that researchers
attempted to adopt was social learning theory, a behavioral
theory of psychological behavior. The advantage of adopting
social learning theory to a behavioral study of politics
seemed to be that there was already significant data in psy-
chology to support the theoretical assumptions. Using this
as an explanatory theory offered the possibility that deductive
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hypotheses could be generated and tested.
In psychology, social learning theory is a developed
set of assumptions on which hypotheses have been stated ard
tested. Most political scientists ,ho adopt social learning
theory state that they are incorporating that theory as pos-
tulated by Millard and Bollard 1 and later modified by Bandura
and Walters. 2 Its adaptation to the study of politics has
ignored the richness of the theory concentrating instead on
a few of the key assumptions that seemed relevant to the study
of political socialization. In the following summary of the
major assumptions of social learning theory, I rely heavily
on Herbert Hirsch'
s interpretation of social learning theory
in p^^^ ^ Politicization. 3 Hirsch, in turn, relies most
heavily on Millard and Dollard and Bandura and Walters.
The most fundamental assumption of social learning theo-
rists is that the individual arrives in society as a tabula
rasa. In the process of political socialization, the indiv-
idual is molded into political citizenry by political social-
ization agents.
The early learning process of the child, in its simplest
form, is based on trial and error. A situation, also labeled
a cue, arises to which the individual makes a response. The
response will be rewarded, punished or ignored by significant
others: parents, teachers, peers, etc. Responses that are
rewarded are said to be positively reinforced. The expecta-
tion is that positively rewarded responses will be used the
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next time a similar situation occurs 5 Ro. Responses that meet
with punishment or are ignored are said tn kd o be negatively re-inforced; should a similar situation arise it-, is assumed
that the individual will not use i-h*C U the Previous response but
will try a new response. 6
In the early learning experiences of an .
^
her dependency on others, social stimuli acquire positive or
negative reinforcing values because they are initially asso-
ciated with a variety of primary reinforcers, such as food
water or the removal of aversive conditions such as physical
discomfort. 7 Gradually the infant-±y
,
Ln rant will come to value not
only these primary reinforcers but also secondary reinforcers
such as attention, approval, affection, praise, criticism,
and tangible rewards such as money, honors, medals, and grades
By the time the child has passed through infancy, most of the
occurrences that regulate behavior will imply social conse .
quences rather than direct rewards or punishments. Just as
the possibility of receiving praise or affection might moti-
vate an individual to respond in a way that will secure re-
wards, the possibility that praise or affection might be with-
held could lead the individual to an alternative response.
The individual being socialized is presumed to act in a util-
itarian fashion, maximizing the amount of praise or affection
obtained as much as possible. Gradually, the individual may
develop a standard of behavior that he/she self-reinforces. 9
Millard and Dollard postulated that imitation is the
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»ajor type of response behavior for individuals
. As , ^
cept, imitation has several usages which often^ ^ ^
fxcult to determine the preclse meaning ^ g ^
rxst. Three subtypes of Citation were outlined by Millard
and Dollard but only two of theS e subtypes seen, to have been
adapted to the study of politioal socialization, Matched-
dependent behavior" and "copying".
In
"matched-dependent behavior", the leader or social-
ization agent is able to read the relevant environmental cues
while the follower is not. In this situation, the follower
is perceived to be dependent upon the socialization agent to
indicate appropriate action in particular situations. 10 The
socialization agent is actively attempting to get the follower
to approximate the appropriate behavior and positively rewards
the individual when this behavior is attained.
In copying, the leader or model for the behavior is less
aware or perhaps unaware, at least initially, that his/her be-
havior is being imitated. Hirsch states that "the copier
must slowly bring his response to approximate that of the
model and must know, when he has done so, that his act is an
acceptable reproduction of the model act." 11 This seems more
likely to occur after a child has developed a generalized con-
cept that rewards will accrue for imitation. He/she can
initiate the imitation and, if it is positively reinforced,
will incorporate the behavior into his/her repertoire of
positive responses.
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In addition to these two sub- types imir •L , imitation is fre-
;
entl
;
used to refer
-— tional learning
, a modifica _
of social learning theory attributed ^^
3lterS
-
HirSCH
— "optional learning depends
upon the Earner's being expose. t0 real . llfe models who per-form intentionally or unwittingly patterns of ^
can be imitated by others " 12 t„ -uy cn . in other wordSi individuals
watch the responses of significant others to particular situ-
ations and the manner in whi ch these responses are received
In this way
,
the individual can accumulate a repertoire of
possible responses to situations he/she has wf rntic u n yet to experience
himself/herself.
Social learning theorists maintain that most learning
takes place on a vicarious basis through observations of other
persons and environmental contingencies rather than direct
reinforcements of the person's own behavior. 13 Symbolic
mediation can also affect learning; verbal or written in-
structions can communicate expected consequences of behavior
and convey information about the rewarding or punishing power
of objects, providing a shortcut to direct or observational
i • 14learning. In this way, individuals might learn entire
patterns of behavior by watching others or responding to ver-
bal messages. Observational learning should speed up the
process of socialization for individuals since not all learn-
ing will need to occur through trial and error. The observa-
tion of how parents and peers react in certain situations may
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Provide the child wlth adequate lnformatiQn abQut appropriate
S°Cletal reSP0nS6S
°
r the ™°8e of responses that are accept-
able in particular situations.
Frequently, imitation and observational learning are
used interchangeably to suesest- i-h^ -u • j. .,e / ggest that the individual is learn-
ing through the observation of the behavior of significant
others without explicit awareness that either the observed
or the observer are aware of the process. Sometimes, this
process is also referred to as "modeling". Occasionally,
imitation is even associated with identification, a concept
which was attributed to the Freudian framework in my evalua-
tion of the early socialization studies. Identification is
a process where the individual tries to be another person,
internalizing the model's attitudes as well as imitating the
model's behavior. 15 These variations need to be kept in mind
as we examine the explanations of women's political behavior
in the social learning theory socialization studies.
In the application of social learning theory to the study
of political socialization, there is an assumption that poli-
tics is learned in the same fundamental way as other learning
occurs. Political responses can be viewed as acquired res-
ponse patterns according to Hess and Torney 16 and Hirsch. 17
Identifiable agents of socialization act as resource mediators
for political information providing the individual with models
for imitation. Imitation and observational learning lead to
the acquisition of political beliefs.
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Kenneth Langton posits the following sooial learning
theory scenario for the rhilH'o • . .c d s acquisition of his political
party identification:
hi«
hf^ Seeking Parenta l attention may hear
Rpn„M •
a"nou"cing proudly that he is aepublican, his father and his fath!>?'= rt^uwere Republicans, and any honest and ^
x'heS n0t be a^thinS buffRepubUcanTh child responds by announcing proudly that
attent?on
e
fS
bUCan mi
^ ^receiving
In Langton 's example, the father puts out cues regarding
his own party identification and the superiority of the Re-
publican party, in general. The child, who appears to be
male, responds to the cue with the announcement that he is
a Republican, an imitation of his father's behavior and re-
ceives positive reinforcement for this position. Langton
recognizes that the child, at least initially, will have
little understanding of the father's reasons for identifica-
tion with a particular party; he is merely imitating his be-
havior. Presumably, as the child matures, he may incorporate
some of his father's beliefs about the Republican party as
well as his party label. Langton 's example can be viewed as
an example of observational learning in the political social-
ization process.
H.T. Reynolds outlined the following example of a girl
being politically socialized also using social learning theory
as his model of explanation:
Sally Rae and her family are watching TV.
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The six o'clock news shows Senator Sanho™a Democrat making a speech to the Veterans
foil£%im?£-a t S&y " sit l! U ^doesn'timpulsively savs ^ddenly and almost
I'd vote for him/' ^r fatheff
'
dIi'pq "
c
Qnt.„ i TT v r ner rowns and re-fi-xes, oanborn He q a hum " tu 7*" c
dropped and Sally, no? being " interesttTany"way, goes upstairs to finish sewing dress?
Two days later while watching TV with her fannlv
^thLg^ 111 8665 Senat° r S^orn £ut shfsfy^7 '
SeLt^r'sInbo^rS STtS^?W "W'-
too honest," Sally says
doesn't look
triefbufmosr n"^' 8 right ' h°ne^ Sa^n
right."
Democrats just can't run things
Sally asks if Sanborn is a Democrat.
of
e
th;m
he
b! 5
Dem
?
crft all right. And like mostr e , he doesn't know what he's doing."
The next day Sally tells her older brother thatshe doesn't like Democrats.
siid
e
:ird:y
."'
Sis
'
that ' s the smartest^
Sally Rae is beginning to dislike Democrats. 19
Sally's initial response to the cue situation of seeing
Senator Sanborn meets with scoffing from her father, which is
interpreted as a punishment since it constitutes a withholding
of her father's approval or praise, which Sally is assumed to
value. Two cues later, Sally ventures another response; this
one receives reinforcement from her father. Additionally, it
provides her with a political generalization that applies to
Democrats as a category, that Democrats are incompetent. Sally
receives additional reinforcement for her newly incorporated
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judgment about Democrats from her brother. Since she has
twice been reinforced by significant others, H.T. Reynoi ds
assumes that Sally Rae is developing a party identification
which will lead her to vote for non-Democratic candidates
The contrast between Reynolds' and Langton's examples
of Political socialization is that while Langton seems to
locate the learning of one's political party identification
in childhood, Reynolds locates it in adolescence. This dis-
crepancy between political socialization theorists about what
age children acquire their political attitudes hinges on a
number of factors. Some of the theorists will argue, as we
have seen previously in Hyman's, Greenstein's and Easton's
and Dennis's accounts, that early learning is particularly
difficult to extinguish; in social learning theory terms,
this is explained by the fact that it is learned under con-
ditions of partial reinforcement. 20 Similarly, it is argued
that "...early learning interferes with and limits later
learning." Yet, no social learning theorist can totally
shut out the possibility that learning will continue through-
out the individual's lifetime because new learning is always
possible as the individual is exposed to new models for
emulation and because socialization continues to be depen-
dent on reinforcement contingencies; that is, throughout
their lives, individuals must continue to receive rewards for
particular behavior or at some point they will stop behaving
in a particular way.
While those who stress that early childhood is the
primary period of political socialization maintain that if
political socialization occurs early enough, it is more re-
sistant to change, those who stress adolescence as the major
period of political socialization point out that this age
group has greater cognitive ability to assess complex poli-
tical concepts than young children do.
The other major distinction that occurs is that those
who locate political socialization at a later age must take
into account that sex role socialization is already well devel-
oped. Usually, these theorists are more likely to see poli-
tical socialization as a subset of sex role socialization,
where sex role socialization has a great impact on the poli-
tical socialization that occurs.
Looking back at the Sally Rae example we can see that
Reynolds incorporates several of the ad hoc explanations re-
garding women's political behavior in his assumptions about
Sally Rae and the way she views the world. He also gives us
clues about her sex role socialization, which clearly pre-
ceded her political socialization.
First, Reynolds presents Sally's initial response to
Sanborn as a personal one where she comments on his good
looks as a basis for casting her vote. Here we have the
voting behavior view of women making voting decisions on the
basis of the candidate's appeal, being candidate-oriented as
Campbell et. al. state.
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When Sally's father responds negatively to Sanborn
Sally quickly exits to pursue the ferine pursuit of sewing
a dress, a olear indicator that her sex role is well-entrench-
ed. In the same sentence, Reynolds indicates that Sally was
disinterested in the news anyway. We aren't too surprised tofmd that Sally Rae is disinterested because this was a fun-
damental assumption about women in the voting behavior studies
and girls in the early socialization studies.
Reynold's example leaves us with a great deal of curios-
ity. Presumably, Sally Rae learned the aspects of her sex
role socialization in basically the same way that, at age 14,
she is learning her political party identification. We are
'
left to wonder whether her brother's political socialization
process would be described similarly or whether his sex role
socialization would have led to earlier political socialize-
tion.
Since the process of socialization would begin at birth,
it is logical that the first available models for imitation
are the members of one's family. Parents are seen as the
most available models for imitation in both the sex role
socialization and the political socialization of boys and
girls
.
Psychologists who posit social learning theory as an
explanation of psychological behavior maintain that in sex
role socialization, girls model their same-sex parents, their
mothers, while boys model their same-sex parents, their
2 2fathers. in this framework, the child m'n
,
-ne n i will acquire his/her
appropriate sex-role through the learning process. As the
child imitates the behavior of particular models, he/she
will be reinforced for imitating the proper behaviors for
his/her gender. While boys and girls may start out by imita-
ting their mothers, fathers and siblings, through the systems
of rewards and punishments appropriate sex behaviors will be
positively reinforced while inappropriate sex behaviors will
be ignored or punished. Over time, the child develops a gen-
eralized distinction of male and female which results not only
from his/her own experience but also from observation of male
and female models and the behaviors they perform in certain
situations. While children may begin to perform sex-appro-
priate behaviors because they are more often rewarded and less
often criticized for imitating same-sex models, gradually they
learn that the social environment holds similar expectations
and imposes similar reinforcement contingencies on them and
others of their sex. 23 Once children attain gender constancy,
they will attend even more to same-sex models than previously. 24
This explanation of sex role learning stresses that
girls are more likely to imitate female role models while
boys are more likely to imitate male role models. Thus, if
one assumes that an individual's political socialization is
intimately connected with one's sex role socialization, one
would assume that the mother is the most important political
socialization agent for girls while the father is more
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important for boys.
Frequently, however, political scientists who utilize
social learning theory suggest that the father is the major
political socialization agent in the family. In this explan.
ation, the father is portrayed as the most political person
in the family and, therefore, presents the clearest model for
political imitation. If one assumes that political sociali-
zation is a separate process from soc . alizat . oni this
would mean that the father could be a political role model for
both the male and female child. But if political socializa-
tion is a subset of sex-role socialization, then a persistent
tension is created here. If the father is the most political
person, the fact that the father is also male could reinforce
the notion that politics is more sex-appropriate for males
and, therefore, should not be imitated by females. If this
is the case, then if females attempt to imitate such behavior,
they would not receive positive reinforcement. This tension
is illustrated by Langton and Jennings:
Men are more visible politically at the mass
and leadership level and politics is generally
assumed to be sex-appropriate for men, whereasdoubts prevail regarding women in politics
Therefore within the family, the father willprobably have more influence on the children's
political values than the mother. 25
On the one hand, they seem to posit that fathers will
have a more significant impact on the political socialization
of their children, male or female, but since at the same time
they are suggesting that politics is more congruent with a
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-le sex-role, they set up a contradictory situation for
females becoming more political.
A second hypothesis which provides a different basis
for seeing the father as the most important political social-
ization agent in the family rests on observations by social
psychologists that children are more likely to imitate the
resource-controller or the most powerful adult in the family.
2
While one might posit that either the mother or the father
could be the resource-controller in the family, usually poli-
tical socialization theorists assume that the father will p lay
this role if he is in residence in the family. The resource-
controller is assumed to be imitated as a model because of
his greater rewarding power and this rewarding power is pos-
ited to be more significant than the sex of the observer in
imitation. 27 Thus, girls would behave in ways that were ac-
tively rewarded by their fathers; if their fathers rewarded
their political behaviors, they would be more political, and
if their fathers discouraged or negatively reinforced poli-
tical behavior, they would be less likely to be political.
These questions of whether girls and boys basically
learn their political roles from their mothers or fathers
and how this process is related to their more general sex-
role socialization are important ones for establishing pat-
terns of change in the future. Therefore, it makes sense to
determine what evidence exists to evaluate the relative in-
fluence of the mother and father in the political socialization
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process
.
Three studies which have a direct bearing on these
-sues are Herbert Hirsch's Povertv and Politicization
(1971), Kenneth Langton and M. Kent Jenni^^^; and
Fathers and the Development of Political Orientations »
and M. Kent Jennings and Richard Niemi The Political Charac-
ter
.
£f Adolescencp (1974)
All of these studies start with the assumption that the
father is the most important political socialization agent
In Langton and Jennings the father's perceived dominance usu-
ally is based on the fact that he is the major resource-con-
troller in the family. Langton and Jennings maintain thafc ^
the process of political socialization, the child not only
imitates the resource-controller but, through the process
learns to identify with the imitated model, ultimately inter-
nalizing his (or her) political attitudes as well as imita-
ting his political behavior. 28
Previously we noted that Langton and Jennings also ob-
served politics was male-appropriate behavior rather than
female-appropriate behavior in American society. Their study
expresses concern about the political socialization of male
children who are raised in maternal households, where the
mother is controller of the resources and, consequently, will
be the most significant political socialization agent. Their
concern is that the maternal family structure might have nega-
tive effects on the male children who lack appropriate male
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-dels with „hom to interact and identify. Langton and
Jennings hypothesize that, in this environment, male child-
ren may not learn sex-appropriate role behavior since appro-
priate political behavior is clearly presented as a subset
of appropriate sex- role behavior for males, the authors con-
tend that boys can only sufficiently learn this behavior if
they have appropriate (father) models to imitate. They fur-
ther predict that there will be little effect on girls with
this type of family structure presumably because the mother
is viewed as the female child's appropriate model for sex
role/political role imitation. That the mother may not
present a political model for girls does not seem to be an
issue for the authors.
One of the empirical tests that Langton and Jennings
construct to examine the effects of maternal structure on the
political socialization of boys is asking boys about their
level of political interest. The hypothesis is that boys
from patriarchal nuclear families will show greater political
interest than boys from maternal families. 29
In both the working class and middle class maternal fam-
ilies, male children were found, as predicted, to have less
interest in politics than male students from nuclear fam-
ilies where two parents were present. 30 In upperclass mater-
nal families, boys were as interested in politics as boys
from nuclear families. On the other hand, we are told that
political interest for girls is unaffected by the family
:er-
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structure, maternal or nuclear. 3* Though ^^
tie for signifioanoe is cited to support this conclusion
we are not presented with any data that would elucidate for
us the political interest of
.the girls in this study We
don't know if their political interest is generally similar
to that of the boys in the study or if their political int,
est is at a high level or a low level. All we are told is
that it is unaffected by the family structure.
There is an explanation provided by the authors for the
lower political interest of boys in maternal families. This
explanation again rests on the assumed politicalness of the
father. In nuclear families, male respondents state they
look to their fathers for political advice more frequently than
they look to their mothers: 69% are cited as preferring their
fathers as a source of political advice. 33 Boys located in
maternal families are said to be deprived of the possibility
of turning to their fathers for advice as Langton and Jennings
believe they would if located in nuclear families. There-
fore, they conclude that the father's absence removes a power-
ful political stimulus for the male child. 34 Presumably, the
father's presence to give political advice would stimulate
the son's political interest, although no linkage between
political advice and political interest is specified.
Even when both the mother and father are present, how-
ever, Langton and Jennings suggest that families may have
different internal structures based on who is perceived as
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the controller of resources. Therefore, they classify nu.dear families with regard to their internal power struc-
tures as mother-dominated, father-dominated or equally dom-
mated. Setting aside the question of whether this classifi-
cation is empirically valid, the results when correlated with
political interest and political activity indicate that moth-
er-dominated families produce male children who are less poli-
tically interested and less likely to engage in political
activity than male children in father- dominated families al-
though this relationship weakens and reverses itself among
the highly educated families. 35 Mother-dominance or father-
dominance is again stated to have little impact on the fe-
male child, although since we have no direct comparisons of
either the political interest or political activity of the
male versus female respondents in this study, we are in no
position to evaluate political interest and political activity
levels for girls. Even though family structure is asserted
to have little effect on the political development of girls,
one could still ask whether any family structure is sufficient-
ly attentive to the political socialization of girls.
But the focus of Langton and Jennings is the inadequacy
of mothers as political socialization agents for the male
chili- This inadequacy is summed up in pejorative terms
when Langton and Jennings note that "...maternal dominance
has a debilitating effect upon male offspring -- this was
particularly true of the least educated." 36 Furthermore,
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these debilitating effects are depicted as persisting over
time by using the questionable technique of presenting data
that compares the responses of eighth graders and twelfth
graders from maternal households and finds both groups
exhibit less political interest.
A contrasting portrait of boys' political development
is drawn from paternal- dominant households:
Boys appear to thrive politically in a patri-archal environminTTrit least in £he Xowerclasses--while there is little evidence thatthe conjugal power structure has a politicallyrelevant effect upon female offspring 37 7
At least on face value, Langton and Jennings have pre-
sented a compelling argument for paternal-dominated house-
holds. If boys thrive in them and the political socializa-
tion of girls is unaffected by then, then the logical conclu-
sion would be to promote such households.
However, from my perspective, a critical question re-
mains unanswered: Do girls thrive politically in any of the
identified household structures? If, in fact, girls' poli-
tical interest and propensity toward political activity is
low in any or all of these family structures, than research-
ers must address the question of how to facilitate changes
within these structures. Langton and Jennings, however, side-
step this issue altogether by avoiding evaluation of the poli-
tical socialization of girls.
Herbert Hirsch also begins with the key assumptions that
the father is the most important agent of political
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socialization in the family and that the father's authority
as an agent of political socialization is predicted on his
control of resources in the family. Hirsch admits that
this cultural norm can vary. While it may be most typical
in the dominant U.S. culture for the father to be the re-
source controller and thus the major political socialization
agent, Hirsch suggests that in subcultures in the United
States, the female may be the more important political social-
ization agent because she is the primary resource controller
in the family. Such a situation may exist in Appalachia where
Hirsch sets up his study.
Hirsch compares the relative impact of mothers and fath-
ers on the political socialization of the child by looking at
three key variables. First, he asks the respondents to rank
various agents with regard to their preference of these agents
as sources of political information. While both parents
are ranked behind the media with respect to this question,
mothers rank higher as political information transmitters than
fathers. 38
Second, Hirsch asks the respondents to state their party
preference and the party preferences of their mothers and
fathers. There is a higher level of agreement between the
party identification of the mother and the child (83%) than
the father and the child (30%). 39
Third, he asks the respondents to list their preferred
sources of voting advice. Here fathers are the preferred
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source with mothers second. Girls are slightly more likely
to prefer their mothers as sources while boys are slightly
more likely to prefer their fathers but not significantly
so.
40
Qualifications emerge when Hirsch looks more closely at
his sample by classifying the respondents in terms of wheth
the father is absent or present in the home. He discover
that when the father is absent from the home, (1) the child
ranks him lower as an agent of information transmission (2)
the child is less likely to agree with the party identifica-
tion of the father and (3) the mother is the child's preferred
source of voting advice. 41 All of these observations make
common sense if one begins with the assumption previously out-
lined by Hirsch that the resource controller will be the
primary model for imitation. If the father isn't available,
he is less likely to be important as an agent of political
socialization. When the father is absent, the mother ranks
significantly higher than the father as an agent of informa-
tion transmission, political party preference and voting
advice while when the father is present, the rankings of the
/ o
two parents are the same. Thus, Hirsch concludes:
Indeed father absence appears to be the most
important reason for the child's ranking the
mother higher as an agent of socialization. A
model that normally produces cues is absent
and the child must turn to another. 43
From the perspective of social learning theory, with its
concentration on observational learning as a fundamental
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explanation of political socialization, it makes sense that
more of the respondents will model the mother's political
behavior if the father is absent. But Hirsch leaves us with
the impression that children more naturally model the male
parent with regard to politics and, only in his absence, turn
toward the mother, even though, when both models are avail-
able, they appear to be equally significant in this study.
When one returns to the central notion that the choice of the
model for imitation is hypothesized to be based on resources
control, Hirsch would need to make some modification here.
If both parents are equally in control of resources, there
seems to be no solid justification for assuming either will
be more significant as a political socialization agent unless
one goes outside of the framework of this explanation. If
the primary method of learning is observation of the avail-
able models, then it makes sense that both mother and father
will be modelled if they are available, and if one is absent,
the other will fill this gap.
What we have witnessed in both Langton and Jenning's
research and Hirsch *s research is an inconsistent use of the
explanations they are adopting from psychology. The assump-
tions that the primary political socialization agent would
be the controller of resources in a family and that this re-
source controller might, in some families, be female appeared
to be reasonable assumptions. But, by insisting as these
authors do, that the father be seen as the primary agent of
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political socialization and as the primary controller of
resources, these authors undercut the statistical observa-
tions in their studies which seemed to provide some empir-
ical support for their initial hypotheses.
In The Political Character of Adolescence
. M. Kent
Jennings and Richard G. Niemi also discover the importance of
mothers as political socializes, even in nuclear households.
While the authors predict that the father, as primary re-
source controller in the family, will be the most signifi-
cant political socialization agent for both male and female
children, their statistical evidence indicates that children
are more likely to reflect their mothers' political orienta-
tion than their fathers', particularly if fathers and mothers
are in disagreement.^
Jennings and Niemi assume that high correlations be-
tween the parent's and child's political orientations reflect
the existence of observational learning, i.e., the child has
observed and modelled the behavior of the parent. Niemi and
Jennings specifically state they they believe their research
technique of "...comparing parent and offspring responses to
the same stimuli in the interview situation is essentially
a test for "matching behavior" or observational learning.
The greater the match or congruency, the greater the grounds
for inferring that the students have learned through the
observation of their parents." 45 The existence of a high
correlation between the political beliefs of the parent and
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the child constitutes prima facie evidence in this framework
for the transference of these beliefs from the parent to the
child. While this is a restatement of the transmission prin-
ciple that emerged in Hyman
' s work, it now includes, at
least, a theoretical explanation of how the learning occurred,
i.e., the child observes and imitates the behavior of the
parent. Nonetheless, the empirical data needed to support
this assumption continue to rely on inference rather than
direct observation.
In this study the mother appears to be the most impor-
tant observational model. In fact, Jennings and Niemi sug-
gest:
If one could imagine a world inhabited onlyby grandmothers, mothers, daughters and girl-friends, the prospects for political continuity
would be greater than they are now. One is
tempted to say that among primary groups the
bearers of political culture are more often
female than male. ^6
Political continuity here seems to indicate the relative
strength of the political socialization agent. An effective
agent should be able to secure the continuity of his/her
political ideas. At least in terms of their evidence, the
authors judge women to be more effective at this transmission.
The question then becomes why should women be more ef-
fective in this role. While Jennings and Niemi never approach
this question directly, they provide us with some insight to
their thinking when they suggest that women's influence as
political socialization agents may have peaked and now is
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declining:
from
f
?£p
m° thers are increasingly awaythe home may signal a renewal of thefather s impact or of the influence of thenon-family agents. It would indeed be ironicif the greater politicization
, freedom andgeneral liberation of women resulted in thereduction of their influence on the politicalorientations of the growing child. 47
?
Niemi and Jennings here directly associate women's
greater role in the political socialization of her children
with her primary responsibility for childcare, assuming that
she is more available to her children in the home than the
father and, therefore, is more available as a model for imi-
tation and also as an agent to reinforce nascent political
behavior. Yet, at the same time, Niemi and Jennings argue
that women are currently undergoing greater politicization
which may undermine their roles as the most important famil-
ial agent of political socialization. Although the manner
in which this politicization is occurring is not made ex-
plicit, the process takes women out of the household, prob-
ably into the job market, and, therefore, may mean that women
have less time for interaction with her children which could
cut into her ability to act as effectively as a political
socialization agent. Therefore, women's influence on her
children could be waning.
However, even women's current influence as an agent of
political socialization for her children is made suspect when
the authors reintroduce men as agents of their wives' poli-
tical socialization:
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Evidence supports the view of considerable
a?^ i2atl°n °Lwives by their husbandsrter marriage. 4o
Evidence here refers to studies that show that more wives
than husbands change their party preferences after marriage.
The explanation for this statistical observation rests on a
view of the husband's political dominance and his ability
to politically socialize his wife. Fathers are thus rein-
troduced into the political socialization equation. Now, "
their role is to socialize the wives who, in turn, direct
the political socialization of the children. While this
explanation may have some logical basis if one is looking
at cases where husbands and wives are in political agreement,
Niemi and Jennings' data regarding children following their
mothers more frequently when fathers and mothers disagree
certainly cannot be explained in a similar fashion. In that
case, the mother must be seen as operating as an independent
agent of political socialization.
If the roles of men and women in the process of political
socialization are different, so is the effect of political
socialization on boys and girls. Niemi and Jennings seem to
suggest that political socialization is influenced by sex
role or gender socialization that either occurs prior to
political socialization or is concurrent with it and having
a profound effect on the way that the political socialization
process proceeds:
Being born a boy or girl almost predetermines
a different pattern of socialization which
:es in
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results in differences on political issues. 49
While no coherent set of hypotheses is presented by the
authors to authenticate how this process occurs, there are
several passages in the study that indicate different
the process for boys and girls, most of which introduce
assumptions about girls and boys that do not emanate from
the social learning theory paradigm they indicate they are
following
.
The statistical observation about girls that is being
explained is that girls even more than boys in this study
reflect the party identifications of their parents, partic-
ularly their mothers. Thus, one might argue that parents
are more successful political socialization agents for their
daughters than their sons, and, given our earlier under-
standing that mothers are slightly more effective socializa-
tion agents, one could argue that mothers are the most success
ful political socialization agents for their daughters. The
effectiveness of the family in the socialization process of
girls might be congratulated.
But, it is at this point that the authors begin to bring
in perceived differences between girls and boys that suggest
that there is something wrong with the way that girls are
politically socialized:
Even in adolescence girls remain more home
centered than do boys. They have less freedom
than boys, less often have jobs, depend more
on the family for advice and entertainment and
think and plan more about their own future
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B°yS are less family oriented than
If these observations about boys and girls are correct, it
makes sense that girls are more influenced by their families
than boys. But the lesser freedom and greater home-centered-
ness of girls carries an implicit devaluation of the way that
girls are politically socialized.
sur™m^!!neraVefleCt ,the imaS e ° f immediately
to lo^ kaSentS t0 \ far Srea ter degree than 7boys. They seem to have somewhat less auton-
iS'tES^J? 1688 S^---g and reprocess-
Here the lesser autonomy of the girls is seen as a barrier
preventing girls from being as exposed to other political
ideas besides those of their parents as boys are. Presumably,
it is these ideas which are synthesized and reprocessed,
neither of which processes are more fully explained. But
synthesizing and reprocessing appear to be higher level ac-
tivities than the imitation and observational learning pro-
cesses on which girls rely. Compliance with one's socializa-
tion agents, particularly one's parents, seems to be less
virtuous if it is achieved by girls, and, yet, to make this
judgment, Niemi and Jennings reject the central thesis of
their theoretical framework, that socialization occurs primar-
ily through observational learning. They introduce unexplained
concepts in which males are hypothetically superior.
What this amounts to is another use of post factum inter-
pretations. Discontent with the findings of their study which
stated a commitment to social learning theory explanation,
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the authors introduce ad hoc explanations for which no data
is supplied. The only justification for this action, as far
as I can see, is that their results were not as anticipated.
Fathers were .not the primary socialization agents; boys were
not as similar to their parents as girls.
In a similar manner, Niemi and Jennings proceed to judge
girls as more sensitive to the values of the people immedi-
ately surrounding them. Presumably, this also plays a role
in their more readily assimilating the party identification
of their parents. This sensitivity also appears to be an
aspect of their sex role socialization influencing their poli-
tical socialization:
The psycho-cultural conditioning of girls-
seems to lead to a greater stress on harmony
and like-mindedness with one's intimates. 52
Again, while the authors would undoubtedly maintain that
this explanation, post factum or hypothetical as it is, is
not meant to denigrate, one is left with the uncomfortable
feeling that harmony and likemindedness are psychological
characteristics that are not up to snuff and, yet, observa-
tional learning as explanation depends on the continuity of
likemindedness for verification of its theory.
At the very least, Niemi and Jennings owe us some ex-
planation for how the concepts they have introduced fit into
social learning theory. Otherwise, the theory is replete
with unexamined contradictions. Their empirical work would
seem to indicate that observational learning as an
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explanation for political socialization, is more successful
for female than male children although the theory presents
reasons for presuming that political socialization will be
more effective for boys then girls. The introduction of
concepts that are outside of the theoretical framework to
account for the discrepancies between the research results
of this study and the expected research results suggests that
the authors were aware of the cracks in their theoretical ex-
planation and attempted to make repairs which unfortunately
leaves us wondering about the credibility of the theory.
At the very least, Niemi and Jennings owe us some ex-
planation for how the concepts they have introduced fit into
their social learning theory adaptation. Otherwise, I in-
sist that, within their perspective, the high correlations be-
tween parents' and their daughters' party identification should
be interpreted to mean that the political socialization pro-
cess they predict is occurring, that is, observational learn-
ing is more successful for girls than boys. And if this is
the case and there are still observed statistical regularities
in political behavior that show men to be more political than
women, some other explanation for adult political differences
would need to be developed.
Niemi and Jennings' assumptions about the sex role and
political socialization of girls are demystified when we
realize that the interpretations they present derive from a
different perspective; their assumptions can be traced to a
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theory of sex role socialization advanced by David Lynn,
which has been used by a number of other political sociali-
zation studies as well. Niemi and Jennings never credit
Lynn as the source of their observations, but the language
used in their explanations is so similar to that of Lynn
that 1 assume they either read Lynn directly or used inter-
pretations of Lynn presented by other political socialization
theorists
.
David Lynn's explanation of the process of sex role
socialization differs from the explanation of social learning
theory that has already been presented. Lynn posits that
both the content of the sex role that is learned and the
Process hy which each male and female child learns his/her
sex role differs. The ramifications of this distinction can
be spelled out more clearly by summarizing the sex role social,
ization Lynn postulates for each child.
Lynn depicts the average American family much as we have
seen it depicted previously. The father as principal bread-
winner works outside of the home and is rarely available to
his children during the working hours. The mother's principal
job is to provide responsible childcare. Lynn utilizes this
distinction between the mother and father in terms of their
availability to the child to claim that the mother is obvious-
ly the most important socialization agent for both the male
and female child.
As infants, then, both male and female children are
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hypothesized to identify with their mothers. His use of
the term identification refers to the internalization of
personality characteristics and unconscious reactions. 53
Mother identification thus means that the child will first
identify with and, then, internalize the personality charac-
teristics of the mother. 54
Obviously, for the girl, the mother is an appropriate
same sex model. Thus, the girl's identification with her
mother can lead to her appropriate sex role identification.
The availability of her mother as an appropriate role model
means that the task of the girl learning her appropriate sex
role identification, i.e., the internalization of personality
characteristics and unconscious reactions, appropriate to
one's sex, will be easier for the girl. As Lynn states,
"Much incidental learning takes place from the girl's contact
with her mother which she can apply directly to her life." 55
For boys, however, the mother is not an appropriate sex
role model. Thus, Lynn says, the boy must shift his initial
identification with his mother to an identification with the
masculine sex role. If the mother is not an appropriate
model and the father is unavailable for emulation, the boy
must learn his sex role identification in a different fashion,
according to Lynn.
Lynn hypothesizes that despite the shortage of male
models, a somewhat stereotyped and conventional masculine
role is spelled out for the boy by his mother and his female
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teachers. 56 These women will reward him for male-appropri-
ate behavior and punish him for signs of female-appropriate
behavior. In this manner, he will come to an understanding
of his appropriate sex role. The content of the male sex
role thus appears to be a stereotyped view of masculinity, as
perceived by females, while the content of the female sex
role in this process is akin to the individual girl's mother's
adoption of the role.
But, the content, according to Lynn, is less signifi-
cant than the manner by which the learning occurs. For the
task of achieving these separate kinds of identifications re-
quires separate methods of learning. Lynn argues that these
separate identification tasks parallel two separate kinds of
learning tasks: problem solving and learning a lesson. 57
In order to solve a problem, Lynn states that a learner
must first explore the situation and find the goal before
he can develop a solution. This is the learning task associ-
ated with the development of masculine role identification.
Finding the goal of his sex role identification constitutes
a major problem boys have to solve. When the boy begins to
be aware that he does not belong in the same sex category as
his mother, he must then attempt to discern what is the
proper content for his sex role identification. 5 ^
This learning task is further complicated for the boy
by the fact that the desired behavior for the male child is
rarely defined positively as something he should do or be
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but rather is defined negatively as something he should not
do or be. 59 it is from largely negative admonitions, pri-
marily made by women, that the boy must learn to set the
masculine role as a goal. In order to successfully achieve
this goal, the boy purportedly restructures the admonitions
in order to abstract the principles defining the masculine
60role. The boy thus learns an abstraction of the masculine
role
.
On the other hand, for the girl, the learning task is
said to more closely parallel that of learning a lesson. The
distinction Lynn makes here is that when one learns a lesson,
the problem-solving phase can be omitted or at least mini-
mized. The learner, instead, can memorize and repeat what
has been memorized at a later date. For the girl, Lynn says
the lesson of female sex role identification is mother iden-
tification. The girl seldom has to address the question of
what the goal of her sex role identification is. By looking
at her mother, she can see the goal. Thus, she learns a
concrete role and does not encounter the necessity of restruc-
turing and abstracting principles in the task of her sex role
identification.
Recapitulating, each sex acquires a separate method of
learning in the process of sex role identification that is
subsequently applied to learning tasks in general. Since the
girl's learning method is purported to primarily involve a)
a personal relationship and b) imitation rather than
156
restructuring the field, the girl is expected to learn other
aspects of socialization in a similar manner. This is seen
as the learning method she will be best at. The boy's learn-
ing method, on the other hand, is purported to primarily
involve a) defining the goal b) restructuring the field and
c) abstracting principles, and this is seen as the principal
way in which boys will learn.
Lynn, himself, seems to believe that these different
learning processes have long run implications for continued
differences in development between boys and girls. Using
the assumptions he has given, he generates additional hy-
potheses about how the content of male and female sex roles
will differ. As a result of learning her sex role in a close
personal relationship with her mother, the girl is portrayed
as more likely to acquire the need for affiliation as a second-
ary drive than the boy is. Thus, Lynn expects that females
will tend to demonstrate a greater need for affiliation than
i 61 .males. As a consequence of learning her sex role as a
lesson, females tend to be more dependent than males on the
external context of a perceptual situation and hesitate to
deviate from the given. Since learning the lesson of her
sex role does not provide the girl with the opportunity of
developing problem- solving skills, Lynn predicts that males
will tend to surpass females in problem-solving skills.
^
Whether Lynn himself judges the socialization process
of males to be superior to that of females may in fact be
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irrelevant. He does seem to indioate that the task of social-
ization is easier for girls in the earlier stages and more
ambivalent, less well-defined and, thus, more problematic in
the later years. But the researchers in political science
who adapt this model usually present their assessment of
the process in such a way that there is an implicit if not
explicit evaluation that the socialization process better
suits males to the pursuit of politics than it does females.
Politics, conceptualized as abstract activity, requires the
ability of thinking in an abstract manner. Politics as
activity requires the ability to engage in problem-solving
and actively or aggressively attack the problems at hand.
Since women's opportunities to acquire these abilities is un-
necessary in their socialization process, they will remain
hampered all their lives in their abilities to transcend their
socialization process.
The upshot of Lynn's revision of social learning theory
is that girls seem to remain within the social learning
theory paradigm while boys move outside of it in order to
construct their sexual social identities. Women are de-
picted as relatively passive in their socialization process
absorbing what is presented to them as their sexual social
roles. Men are forced to take action, to take into their own
hands the creation of their sexual social identity. In the
greater freedom of males to create, the boundaries of what
is allowed or disallowed may also be substantially enlarged;
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more content and more variation in content may also be allowed
in the formative years.
Looking back at Niemi and Jennings ' interpretation of
the political socialization process, I think it is quite clear
that the concepts they use are those of David Lynn.
In The Development of Political Attitudes in Children
,
Hess and Judith Torney also make a direct attempt to incor-
porate Lynn's notions of sex role socialization into the
understanding of the development of political socialization
for boys and girls. They, at least, are explicit about it.
However, since their understanding of Lynn's model is some-
what different than mine, I include their summary of Lynn's
analysis
:
Lynn (1962), attempting to clarify the sources
of these sex differences, suggested that they
arise both from the nature of the sex role to
which the child is directly socialized and from
the process of socialization. In his formula-
tion, girls learn the feminine sex role pri-
marily by directly imitating their mothers; boyshowever must model many men, since fathers work
away from home and are less available for imita-
tion. Since women also direct the development
of masculine sex role, the boys learn a stereo-
typed rather than specific male role. To learn
the masculine sex role, the boy learns a stereo-
typed rather than specific male role. To learn
the masculine sex role requires the ability to
abstract principles of masculinity from several
different models. Lynn (1962) derived predictions
about sex differences which concur with the find-
ings of other investigations; girls have a greater
need for affiliation or social response from others,
they are more influenced by the standards of others,
and are less dependent upon internalized moral
standards; girls are less concerned with problem-
solving and with forming abstract principles."^
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In this statement, I think it can be said that Hess and
Torney have correctly summarized Lynn's understanding of the
sex role socialization of girls but they seem somewhat con-
fused about Lynn's understanding of the sex role socializa-
tion of boys. Lynn does not argue that boys model many men
and abstract their version of masculinity from these models
but rather that women direct the political socialization of
boys through a process which admonishes "incorrect " sex role
behaviors and rewards appropriate sex role behaviors. This
process is even more abstract than the one that Hess and
Torney depict.
Furthermore, in their re-statement of the hypotheses
that Lynn generated from his theory, Hess and Torney restate
some of the conclusions in such a way that girls appear to
be not only deficient in certain skills but also at fault
for their shortcomings, a conclusion which is hardly sus-
tainable within the explanatory framework. If girls are
basically passive recipients in the socialization process,
holding them responsible for the inadequacies in their social-
ization process is untenable; this would require perception
of them as active agents in this process.
Notice, for example, that Hess & Torney state that
"girls are less concerned with problem-solving and with
forming abstract principles." 65 Lack of concern is not the
question, as Lynn stated it. Rather, it is that the current
feminine learning method is not well-geared to the development
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of problem-solving skills. The difference here is substan-
tial, for while Hess & Torney seem to imply that girls need
only to become more concerned with problem- solving and with
forming abstract principles in order to overcome their de-
ficiencies, Lynn sees this as a problem that is built into
the process of their sex-role socialization. To overcome
this problem would require a change in the process, not just
a change in their desire to learn.
Hess and Torney adapt the ideas that Lynn has posited
for a differential sex role socialization to hypotheses re-
garding a differential political socialization for boys and
girls. As with the other socialization studies we have exam-
ined, the methodology remains the same. Survey questions
are directed at school age children; the responses are corre-
lated with their sex. The concern of the authors is primarily
to interpret the empirical differences they discover in the
different reactions of children to these questions.
In their interpretations of the differences they observe
between girls and boys on these survey questionnaires, Hess
and Torney rely heavily on Lynn's assertion that girls learn
their sex role socialization in a close personal relationship
with the mother which may result in girls acquiring a greater
need for affiliation. The interpretation that Hess and Torney
put on this process and its consequent effect on political
socialization is that girls are hampered by this aspect of
their socialization because it results in a personalization
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of politics. This personalization of politics by girls
comes out in several of the explanations for these empirical
political differences between boys and girls in the Hess and
Torney study.
For example, when Hess and Torney ask boys and girls
the question, "Is it all right for the government to lie to
protect America?" and boys were found more likely than girls
to answer "yes", the following explanation is offered:
Boys have a somewhat different view of intern-ational morality than do girls, answeringthat it is acceptable for the government tolie m order to protect the American peopleGirls are more likely to apply personal moralityto political actions, feeling that all lies are
wrong, while boys judge governmental actions interms of political expediency . 66
Hess and Torney even construct what they believe consti-
tutes a personification scale. Personification is measured
by choosing the President or George Washington as depicting
government, a source of national pride and the runner of
the government. 67 When girls personalize politics on this
scale more than boys, the explanations provided again rely
on interpretations of David Lynn's work:
Girls symbolize government as a personal figure
rather than as an institution. The discussion
of previous research on sex role socialization
suggests that girls are more involved with per-
sons and less able to handle abstractions than
boys . oo
This personalization of politics by girls is seen to hold at
every age level:
Significant sex differences in the personaliza-
tion of government appeared in every grade except
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the second; this differentiation between thesexes increased with age. This concept izati,is important because it indicates that girlsapproach the government with a different se? ofexpectations, expectations similar to ?hoIe the
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As may be recalled, the earlier Easton and Dennis study
also maintained that girls personalized politics more than
boys and this contributed to their political primitiveness
.
70
What the Hess and Torney study adds to this interpretation
is a psychological theory that may provide explanation for
this personalization. But, again, direct hypotheses from
this theory were not generated. Rather, Hess and Torney
apply the theory as explanation after data collection; this
data collection is heavily reliant on their "personal" inter-
pretations when it comes to the operationalization of personal-
ization and also when they judge that saying it is all right
for the government to lie to protect America is an expedient
answer which separates personal morality from international
(im)morality
.
Generally speaking, the social learning studies reviewed
here did little to contribute toward the generation of a
theory of political behavior or an explanation of the differ-
ences between men's and women's political behavior. While
the adaptation of social learning theory to the study of
politics offered the possibility of generating testable hy-
potheses, it was seldom utilized in this manner. But, more
importantly, perhaps, the authors who used social learning
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theory abandoned it as an explanatory theory whenever the
predicted consequences did not emerge, that is whenever boys
did not appear to be more politically socialized than girls
in the process or whenever women appeared to be the more
dominant political socialization agents. What I have attemp-
ted to show is that, within the assumptions of social learn-
ing theory, this abandonment seemed uncalled for because
utilizing the basic assumptions of the paradigm might have
generated the very predictions and results that are denied.
One of the primary examples of this was the role of the moth-
er in the political socialization process. Recapitulating,
if observational learning is the primary explanation for how
learning occurs and observational learning is dependent on -
a model being readily available for imitation and for reward-
ing behavior, then authors who see the mother as more frequent-
ly in the home should not be surprised if the mother is viewed
as the more important socialization agent for the child.
The attempts to maintain the father as the primary socializa-
tion agent required ad hoc explanations that always went out-
side of the framework of explanation that is social learning
theory. The authors insisted on attempting to preserve poli-
tical socialization as a male dominated process which resulted
in males being more political than females even when this
was an untenable position given their statistical results.
In order to maintain this result, they bring in assump-
tions which are not part of the social learning theory, the
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most prominent example of this being the use of David Lynn
work. Lynn's explanation of the process of sex role social-
ization, if it does have political socialization consequences
as well, presents perhaps the greatest challenge to the goal
of establishing policy alternatives since Lynn has suggested
that not only the content but also the process of sociali-
zation would need to be changed for girls. While the task of
socialization, in the early years, is easier for girls, the
results of the process seem to place girls at a perpetual
disadvantage to boys: how will they learn the problem-solving
technique as Lynn defines it? Lynn does not provide an an-
swer to this nor do Niemi and Jennings or Hess and Torney.
While Lynn does not seem to assign blame to girls for their
socialization process, the political scientists are not always
clear that unless the process of socialization is altered for
girls, they will continually be at a disadvantage. If
Lynn's theory is correct, then intervention in the early
stages of the girl's life would be necessary to increase
the opportunities for political socialization. Perhaps,
even the removal of the girl from the mother's care would
be indicated.
However, since political socialization researchers do
not address the question of whether women ought to be poli-
tical, they also don't address the question of how, given
their explanation would this be achieved. While this
"ought" question would be deemed evaluation and, therefore,
;rs
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should not be inoluded in the "neutral" behavioral framework,
I note that there was research which expressed concern over
whether boys were receiving proper political socialization,
i.e., the research of Langton and Jennings and that of Hirsch
Nowhere in the socialization literature by male researche:
did such a question arise for females. I note also that
these studies, there was a policy implication; the authors
promoted male- dominated families as the best political social-
ization environment for male children. No best political
socialization environment for girls appears anywhere in this
literature
.
I am not attempting to maintain that social learning
theory is the explanatory theory for political socialization
or that political socialization is even necessarily the
explanation for differential political behavior. What I am
arguing is that those authors who applied social learning
theory to the study of political socialization did little
to advance our knowledge of this process. I am also arguing
that the results found in most of these studies suggested
that girls were politically socialized to almost the same
extent as boys. These results might have been interpreted
as a sign that political socialization was not as significant
for the understanding of political behavior as the authors
here presume.
In fact, this is the starting point of the behavioral
researchers who utilize situational factors as more important
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in the explanation of women's political behavior. These
authors will look back at the results of the socialization
studies and argue that the empirical observations do not
confirm that the differences in male and female political
behavior are explained by reference to socialization. The
situational explanation is the focus of the next chapter.
CHAPTER VI
SITUATIONAL EXPLANATIONS
While the attempts to explain women's political be-
havior in terms of a differential political socialization
process focus our attention on the periods of childhood and
adolescence as the relevant times in the individual's life
for learning particular political behaviors, there is another
behavioral explanation for women's political behavior that
focuses our attention on the adult situations of men and
women suggesting that the critical factors that affect
their different political participation are found in their
adult lives rather than their pre-adult lives. This explan-
ation is usually referred to as the situational or structur-
al explanation.
The seeds of the situational argument were encountered
earlier in this work when we looked at the voting participa-
tion studies. Both the works of Lipset and his associates
and Campbell and his associates suggested that motherhood
limited women's political participation. In 1960, Lipset
gave a concise statement about women's lower political par-
ticipation in Political Man which summarizes the ideas of
the situational argument:
The position of the married woman illustrates
the problem of available time or dispensabil-
ity as a determinant of political activity.
The stern demands on a housewife and mother
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mean that she has little opportunity or needto gam politically relevant experiencesWomen must thus be expected to have less
' con-cern with politics and in almost every countrythey do vote less than men.l y
,
According to this argument, the demands of being house-
wife and mother leave women with little time to pursue poli-
tical activity. There is also an underlying assumption that
there is little need for women to concern themselves with
politics, presumably because the realm of the household does
not intersect with the political realm: the interests of
the private household are not political interests nor do
political interests have impact on the household. The
effects, according to this early research, of woman's situ-
ation as housewife and mother are that women tend to be less
interested in politics and less likely to participate in
politics
.
Fuller descriptions of the situational explanation pro-
ceed in a similar vein. Tedin, Brady and Vedlitz who attempt
a synthesis of the socialization and situational argument
describe the situational model of explanation in the
following manner:
The situational model argues that sex related
differences in political expressiveness are not
the result of norms learned in childhood but are
a function of adult situational factors which
are sex related. Women are less politically
expressive because the environment of the house-
wife or the menial sort of employment available
to most women does not encourage participation
in politics or provide stimulation to gather and
discuss politically relevant information. On
the other hand, men—particularly middle class
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men— have political concerns related to theirwork and usually are in environments that arerelatively politically stimulating . 2
6
The constraints of woman's adult life are again related to
her roles as mother and houseworker although Tedin and
associates do acknowledge women's participation in the
economic sphere outside of the home as well if only to ack-
nowledge that women's work in the economic sphere is not
equivalent to men's, that the jobs women perform are more
menial and that the environment of these jobs does not stim-
ulate political participation. While many men might be
surprised to hear that their job environments stimulate poli-
tical concerns, Tedin et al. assume that this is true, par-
ticularly for middle class men, who are probably their
greatest concern.
While situational explanations focus on the significance
of women's roles as wife and mother as constraints on her
political behavior, behavioral researchers who refer to their
explanations as structural rather than situational generally
emphasize that women's roles as wife and mother are only two
aspects of the structure of her adult life which may provide
external constraints to women's political participation.
Additional structural components that will be presented focus
on the constraints that can be found in current political
party structures, women's experience of sex discrimination
in party politics and political institutions and the possibil-
ith that the occupational structure for women may not provide
ex-
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them with similar opportunities for participation or
similar access to political participation.
In short, in contrast to the political socialization
planations, situational and structural explanations focus our
attention on external constraints to women's political par-
ticipation rather than internal constraints. As Susan Gluck
Mezey puts it:
Briefly socialization theorists tell us
that women do not want to become poli-
tically active because of internal restraints
while situational and structural theorists
tell us that they cannot due to external re-
straints
.
J
This belief that women's political behavior is externally
constrained leads situational and structural researchers
to focus on different questions with regard to women's
political behavior.
While the early voting behavior studies utilized the
constraints of women's roles as housewives and mothers to
explain women's lower rate of turnout, the claim that these
roles have much effect on voting turnout is discredited by
recent research which concludes that in terms of voting,
women's political participation equals or nearly equals
that of men.^1" The authors who utilize the situational or
structural explanation today do not focus attention on
women's voting behavior. Rather, they are more concerned
with the question of why so few women seek political office,
particularly at the higher levels. Thus, their research
tends to focus on an even more select group of women, those
ce
.
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women who have sought and, in many cases, achieved political
office. The assumption of these researchers is that through
study of these "political women," they may be able to iso-
late the critical factors required to attain political offi
Perhaps, in this sense, the researchers who espouse the "situ-
ational" or "structural" explanations for women's political
behavior are truly different than most of the researchers
that we have thus far examined because they are not content
for the majority of women to be apolitical. They want to see
more women in active political roles. They want to increase
political participation, that is, the participation of women
as officeholders, as members of the political elite. This
concentration on women who have held political office means
that the samples that are being used are always small and
will often be composed of women with similar class and educa-
tional backgrounds. Researchers look at each aspect of the
situational explanation. They attempt to verify that mother-
hood, wifehood, occupational inadequacies and political party
structures mitigate against women achieving political office.
I want to look at the evidence presented for each of these
claims to see if the explanation is built on more solid ground
than that of the voting behavior studies or the socialization
studies. In many cases, we will see the reoccurence of ad
hoc explanations or interpretations of the data presented
that may tell us more about the assumptions of the researchers
than they tell us about the reasons motivating women's
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political behavior.
Most of the researchers using the situational explan-
ation set up behavioral studies of women who have held poli-
tical office, that is, they identify those women who have
held political office and ask them survey questions, cate-
gorizing their responses and sometimes, comparing the exper-
iences of these women to those of men in similar positions.
Several of these researchers have attempted to directly test
whether the socialization explanation is a better explanatory
theory of women's political behavior than the situational ex-
planation. Two examples of these studies are those conducted
by Orum and associates 5 and the study conducted by Volgy and
Volgy. 6
Essentially, Orum and his associates attempted to
replicate earlier political socialization studies of school
children in a large survey conducted in Illinois in 1974.
When they discovered that there were essentially no signif-
icant differences between boys and girls in response to
their political questions, they suggested that the data gave
support to a counter explanation, the situational or struc-
tural explanation, suggesting that fewer women than men go
into public life because they are confined to their homes
as wives and mothers whereas men are more active as a result
of their jobs outside of the home. 7 While it seems unnecessary
to fully outline Orum and his associates' study, particularly
since this work suggests there were many inconsistencies and
not many significant differences between boys and girls
in the previous socialization studies, an important point
to consider is that the advancement of the situational
argument in this study is once again an ad hoc explana-
tion, a suggested or hypothesized explanation, rather than
an empirically verified explanation.
Volgy and Volgy in their re- examination of political
socialization as an explanation for women's lesser political
behavior also found that it was not a very satisfactory ex-
planation. The authors begin with a set of assumptions about
past research which points the way toward their ultimate con-
clusion. First, they are suspicious of previous research
results because they maintain that "if differences in sex
roles are due to varying socialization experiences leading
to the development of different norms and roles for men and
women then there should be considerable variation in the
degree to which men and women are socialized into such
roles.*' 8
One of the major disagreements Volgy and Volgy have
with the political socialization explanation is its em-
phatic insistence that not only is women's political sex
role different than that of men's but also it is unalter-
9ably different. They are presenting an image of women as
thinking beings who may be able to overcome past socializa-
tion experiences merely by changing their understanding of
themselves and acting on this new understanding.
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They hypothesize that the women's movement has provided
women with the several opportunities:
"a) to take an active rather than a passiverole m events outside the house b) to per-ceive themselves in a more positive waythereby giving themselves increased self-
assurance and greater confidence to evalu-
ate
_
critically the world around them c) tobegin to perceive other women in a morepositive and less competitive way, allowing
ments
t
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Volgy and Volgy's data also show little support for
the socialization explanation; that is, they find few signif-
icant differences between the male and female respondents
in the study. They state, in fact, that the situational
explanation would seem to be more in line with their data.
But even in behavioral explanation, the disproof of one
hypothetical explanation is merely that. It may tell us
that we need to look for other explanations, but it does not
tell us that one explanation is any more persuasive than any
other. Thus, their conclusion that the situational argument
is more likely to depict the reasons for women's lesser
political involvement seems precipitous at the least.
While much of the research discussed in this chapter
focuses on studies reported in journal articles, there is
one full-length study which utilizes the situational ex-
planation and articulates the various dimensions of this
argument so well that it can serve as an organizing frame-
work to relate the findings of the smaller studies. The
study in question was conducted by Jeanne Kirkpatrick;
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the results were interpreted in her book, Political Woman. 11
In Kirkpatrick's study of male and female state legis-
lators, she portrays the major focus of the situational re-
searcher when she states that "the most important and inter-
esting question about women's political behavior is why so
few seek and wield power." 12 m Kirkpatrick, the wielders
of power are located in the decision-making bodies of govern-
mental institutions at the more centralized seats of govern-
ment in the state and national capitals. Until women as-
pire to, seek, and hold power at this level where they are
most unrepresented, she will characterize them as less poli-
tical than men, no matter how important their roles are in
other political arenas:
Women are numerous enough at the lowest level
or politics--in the precincts, at the party
picnics, getting out the vote, doing the
telephoning, collecting the dollars--but
remarkably scarce at the upper levels where
decisions are made that affect the life of
the community, state, nation. 13
While I do not agree with Kirkpatrick's assumption
that all of the important politics conducted in the United
States are carried out in the state and national legisla-
tures, I will set that disagreement aside to look at the
findings of her study which utilized survey research tech-
niques .
Kirkpatrick notes from the outset that she fully ex-
pects that the situational analysis which she calls the
sex-role explanation will be more pertinent to her study,
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although she recognizes that socialization undergirds sex-
roles. The women legislators in her study, she notes, did
not internalize the expectation that women would eschew
public service and public careers in favor of purely pri-
vate, family-centered goals. 14 Thus, for Kirkpatrick, the
relevant objective of socialization with regard to women is
teaching them that politics is sex-appropriate for men rath-
er than for women. Since her respondents don't appear to
have learned this, she discounts the value of the socializa-
tion explanation for understanding women's political behavior;
the observation that these women have not incorporated such
a notion of politics into their psyches seems to suggest to
her that, at least, for a number of women, the socialization
explanation is insufficient.
At the same time, when Kirkpatrick compares the poli-
tical behavior of male and female legislators, she finds
that the situational or sex-roles explanation is significant
in elaborating many distinctions between them. Noting that
the legislators share more similarities than differences in
their political backgrounds, she isolates the factors that
make them different:
"...the legislators in this study turn out
to be remarkably similar in many aspects of
their lives most relevant to politics. The
same social experiences seem to contribute to
the development of politically active males
and females. Observable differences between
them apparently derive more from social roles
than inherent dispositions . "15
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One way in which male and female legislators were seen
to differ was in their ability to put themselves forth as
political candidates. While a few women recruited them-
selves for office, others needed to be asked. Here, to
explain the difference between the women who were able to
recruit themselves and those who were not, Kirkpatrick re-
lies, first, on the socialization explanation in her ad hoc
speculations
:
"The explanation probably lies deep in feminine
socialization It may be that girls learn thatto put oneself forward is aggressive and thatis to be unfeminine. Through years of waitingto be asked--women learn to stand back and let
others
#
(principally males) take the initiativeiraditional socialization and roles habituate
women to taking initiative only within quite
restricted circumstances, circumstances de-termined by others. "16
But, then, women's situation as an adult woman is reintro-
duced in an additional ad hoc explanation:
Traditionally, the role of wife and mother
involves a woman more in adapting than
deciding: where she will live and on what
budget are determined by her husband's career;
how she will spend the early childrearing
years is determined by the multiple needs and
desires of her children. 17
Each of these constraints is seen both to inhibit woman's
choosing to pursue a political career and being able to do
this with the same degree of ease as the male legislator.
The male legislator can count on the acquiescence of his
wife who presumably is bound by the same role expectations
as these women legislators and willingly follows her hus-
band in his career.
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At the same time, Kirkpatrick is suggesting that the
mindset promoted by the observance of these role patterns
mitigates against women being able to make individual, long-
range plans if they have a husband and family. Women are
less likely to put themselves forth as candidates because
they have fewer experiences of putting themselves first in
any situation. 18
However, Kirkpatrick 1 s sample of women legislators
is obviously composed of untraditional women since in her
analysis of sex roles men are seen as the major breadwinners
and women are seen as the major child-rearers. While she
acknowledges that these women are untraditional, that they
spend a great deal of time away from their homes campaign-
ing, making speeches, and attending legislative sessions,
Kirkpatrick maintains that these women are traditional in
their view of their fulfillment of their sex roles, that
they maintain a view of their primary roles as wives and
mothers and ascribe to these ideals of what women should
be. Thus, she proclaims that these women legislators are
remarkable because they are able to harmonize their poli-
tical roles with conventional women's roles.
In this study, Kirkpatrick does not believe it is
necessary for women to choose between their traditional
sex roles and political careers which demand that they be-
have more as she portrays men. These women, apparently,
have both:
179
Refusing to choose between "women's" rolesand participation in the "man's" world ofpolitics, they have worked out successful
combinations
.
2 0
The questions that immediately come to mind are what do
these successful combinations look like and are they repli-
cable, that is, can a majority of women in the society choose
the options presented here.
One of the first requirements for successfully combining
women's traditional sex-roles with a political career,
according to this study, is a cooperative or, at least, non-
obstructive husband. Kirkpatrick arranges the husbands of
the women legislators into four categories: participant
husbands who play an active role in their wives' political
careers; helpful husbands
,
who, though not personally ac-
tive in politics, are willing to shoulder an extra burden
at home; acquiescent husbands who approve their wives' ac-
tivity but remain uninvolved; and j ealous husbands who dis-
approve of their wives' involvement and would like to end
21it. While the majority of the husbands are categorized
as acquiescent, only one of the categories available sees
the potential for conflict between wife and husband over
the woman's appropriate role choices. Not too surprisingly,
only two women in this sample had jealous husbands and these
22marriages seemed extremely shaky. Clearly, a first require-
ment for achieving political office would be a cooperative
husband.
But the husband may also provide additional support for
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his wife by fulfilling the requirements of his traditional
sex role. Consider the following scenario that Kirkpatrick
outlines to suggest that women 1 s traditional roles may pro-
vide her with advantages as well as disadvantages in pursuing
a political career:
Since breadwinning is conventionally assignedto the male, his wife is frequently freed fromthe necessity of remunerative employment Beingtree not to work for money gives a woman more
control over the disposition of her own time--
once the children are on their own a large part
or the day. In deciding whether or not to runtor the legislature, for example, a woman finan-
cially supported by her husband need not be con-
cerned about loss of income from other pursuits
or about the low salaries of state legislators
The significance of this freedom to spend time in
nonremunerative activities is frequently under-
estimated in these times when attention is
focused on women's disadvantages. A woman
supported by her husband need not balance
her commitment to political or civic activ-
ity against the need for increased income.
She need not justify the decision to devote
large blocs of time to nonremunerative activ-
ities. In the legislature she is freed from
the necessity of juggling economic and legis -
lative roles - -oT supporting a family while
developing a political career
. Given the fact
that being a state legislator is a part-time,
low-paid job in most states, women probably
provide the best source of high talent to fill
the jobs. That so few women take advantage of
this freedom to build a career in public service
testifies to the power of cultural constraints . ^3
Presumably, in this scenario, Kirkpatrick is presenting women
who no longer have child care responsibilities but neither
do they have financial responsibilities for themselves or
their families. The picture that Kirkpatrick paints is one
inhabited by a class of women who are financially dependent
on their husbands, husbands who have a sufficient income
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to support themselves, their wives, and their children.
Given the high percentage of women employed outside of the
house, Kirkpatrick' s suggestion that the reason so few wo-
men choose to follow this path to the state legislatures is
because of cultural constraints, i.e., socialization and sex-
role expectations, seems to miss the point. The path that
the women legislators in her study have taken is not readily
replicable because her perception of women's lives sees
only the lives of an elite group of women.
A second requirement for combining a political career
with marriage appears to be that the women involved have
"unusual amounts of empathy, flexibility and self
-know-
ledge" which the women in Kirkpatrick
' s study apparent-
ly possessed. Kirkpatrick emphasized the importance of
these attributes in the following way:
Empathy enables the woman to see the situation
from another's point of view; to understand the
husband's need for reassurance of the continued
centrality of the marriage in her life; to pro-
tect him from the threatening aspects of her job;
to provide compensation and appreciation to
spouse and children; to maximize or minimize
their roles in her career depending on which is
most appropriate. Being able to see herself as
a husband with a wife in politics makes for more
accommodation, fewer demands, more appreciation.
Desirable or undesirable as these attitudes may
be (as measured against equalitarian norms) they
are highly functional in helping to sustain
marriage and a political career. Flexibility is
an equally important characteristic of this style
of role management. The ability to doff one de-
manding role and enter another and to do so with-
out anxiety and trauma is required of all poli-
ticians, but is especially vital to women. The
flexibility required of her is greater than that
of the legislator/ lawyer/husband/ father because
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the roles of wife and mother involve less assertion
others. Greater empathy is needed because the rolerequirements are more disparate. Self-knowledge isneeded because it helps to keep priorities clefrand to guide one through complex choices 25
'
While similar attributes in husbands might provide the basis
for the ideal marriage as well as the possibility of combining
marriage and a political career, Kirkpatrick seems to connect
these attributes to women's traditional sex-roles
; she seems
to expect that more women than men possess these personal •
qualities as a result of constantly assessing the tensions
that may exist between the fulfillment of women's traditional
sex-roles and the fulfillment of other personal goals. Wo-
men, then, have the responsibility for resolving this tension
for themselves and for their husbands and their families.
Successful combinations of fulfilling traditional sex-
roles and having a political career must also deal with the
requirements of mothering. In Kirkpatrick
' s study, over
half of the women legislators bypassed potential conflicts
between mother roles and legislator roles by running for
office only after their children were grown. 26
Those women who chose to run for office while they had
children at home relied on other women, not their husbands,
to supplement their mothering role. These women either had
cooperative women relatives who filled in for them with their
children or they had the financial resources to hire accept-
27
able mother surrogates. All of these women also had to
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confront, from time to time, some guilt about not devoting
all of their energy to the fulfillment of sex-role expecta-
tions. As Kirkpatrick states, even when the women legis-
lators are satisfied that they have provided an adequate
mother surrogate, they still have to justify their choice
of alloting only some of their time to their traditional
sex roles:
whprw^r' the^. must confront the question ofhether they are justified in leaving the child—a question which may be difficult in a culture
where mothering is considered a full-time occupa-tion, where theories of childrearing take a dim
view or absentee parenthood. 28
Of course, as Kirkpatrick has presented sex-roles, it is
absent motherhood rather than absent parenthood that is
taken a dim view of in this culture. Thus, similar con-
cerns do not arise for the male legislators.
Kirkpatrick* s women legislators were also different
from her male legislators in that they were less likely to
have pursued typical male occupations prior to their entry
into politics. The access from particular male occupations
such as law and business into political careers were thus
unavailable for most of the women in this study. Instead,
there appeared to be a female route into politics which
started with volunteer service. While volunteer roles allow-
ed women to acquire skills to be successful political can-
didates, these roles, Kirkpatrick maintained, were more con-
sonant with the traditional women's roles:
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Thus, an additional prescription for women who desire
political careers but want to maintain their traditional
roles is to acquire the skills necessary to make the tr<
ition to politics by first participating in volunteer organ-
izations
.
Here it seems necessary to ask how woman's partic-
ipation in voluntary organizations creates fewer tensions
with regard to her traditional sex-roles. One of the an-
swers to this question is that women's involvement with
voluntary organizations is often seen as a secondary prior-
ity; if conflict occurs between this involvement and her
first priorities to her husband and children, the secondary
priority will be dropped or set aside. A second answer,
I believe, involves geographic proximity, that although the
women may be away from home at meetings, a phone call can
bring them quickly home to deal with family emergencies.
But, there is also a possible contradiction here; some-
times the commitment of time and energy to voluntary service
may be as substantial as that required for political service.
Perhaps the differences here are illusory rather than real.
Consider, for example, the findings of a study conducted
30by Marcia Lee. Lee did a survey analysis of active poli-
tical participants in Westchester County, New York State.
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Lee's study brings out the reasons that the respondents
give to explain their actions. In her survey, the poli-
tically active women committed more time to politics and
indicated more interest in politics than men. Yet, these
women, as many of the women in Kirkpatrick' s study, were
still reluctant to seek public office. The reasons cited
for this reluctance focused on their child-care responsibil-
ities and how they would be perceived by other men and women
if they ran for political office. 31 The first concern is an
obvious aspect of the situational explanation, and, in this
study, where that explanation is directly tested, it seems
to be upheld as one dimension of potential women candidates'
concerns. The importance of the child care responsibility
as a limiting factor to the decision made by these women is
illustrated statistically by the fact that only 5.3% of
the women who had sought political office had children at
home while 26.1% of the women without children at home had
run for office
.
The second concern with regard to how their running
for office would be perceived is also related to how these
respondents interpreted their appropriate sex roles. Most
of these women perceived running for office as something
that did not fit in with the traditional female role and
believed that others would prefer to see them in some other
activity besides politics.
But, the most interesting aspect of the findings in
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Lee's study, in my opinion, is the fact that a significant
number of these women were already spending 20-40 hours per
week on politics. 34 It certainly isn't clear to me how
running for political office would have taken a significantly
greater amount of time away from their families. What I
believe is depicted in Lee's study is a portrait of woman
who can justify her political activity and be very active
politically as long as she continues to define her political
activity as an avocation peripheral to the central concerns
fostered by her traditional sex-role. This keeps her poli-
tical activity within the acceptable limits of voluntary
service which Kirkpatrick maintained converged with women's
traditional sex-role. To run for office would be to assert
that politics was not just voluntary activity but was a
career goal.
Studies of women's activity in political parties also
suggest that women are able to pursue political interest
and make substantial time commitments to political activity
as long as this activity is seen as voluntary or is somehow
classified as women's work. In two studies which focused
on the activities of men and women in political parties,
while the authors noted that women were putting significantly
more time into party activities, they devalued the time
that women were spending in political activity by suggesting
that women and men understand that just as there are appro-
priate sex-roles for men and women in the larger society, so
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are there appropriate sex-role activities for men and women
to follow within the party structure.
Constantini and Craik35 initiated the idea that various
jobs in political parties can be characterized as male or
female jobs. Using Parsonian language, these authors sug-
gest that the jobs in political parties can be classified as
instrumental or expressive. By maintaining that women more
often perform the expressive functions, the authors conclude
that political party work experience is not as useful toward
moving women toward political office because it is the in-
strumental tasks which are more significant for political
officeholders to possess. 36
While the logic of the explanation as presented is
appealing since it would seem to present a rationale for
why women devote more time to party affairs but don't run
for political office as frequently as men, a closer look
at this explanation shows that its persuasiveness breaks
down when the manner by which tasks are assigned to the in-
strumental or expressive categories is scrutinized. A
preconceived notion that the tasks that women do are ex-
pressive and the tasks that men do are instrumental seems
to be the major determining objective in the classification
scheme
.
3 ^
The male authors of this study identify the male tasks
as most important to the party. How the party members might
weight the importance of these tasks is not considered. To
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illustrate, attending meetings, telephoning and making
arrangements for political events and putting out the mail
were all identified as female, expressive functions, whereas
recruiting new members, raising money and giving speeches
were seen as instrumental male functions. 38 While the
authors may accurately depict the breakdown of the party
work and who performs the various jobs, they are less
convincing with regard to the absolute necessity that any
of these functions is necessarily seen as more important to
the party to such an extent that the party will reward the
performers of those functions with nominations for elective
office
.
The parallel between the expressive functions of women
in the party and in larger society is illustrated by the
following quotation:
"the male party leader, like the husband, is
more likely to specialize in the instrumental
tunctions.
. .those concerned with.
. .external
affairs. The female party leader, like the
wife, tends to specialize in expressive func-
tions ... those concerned with internal affairs." 39
In a study that built on the distinctions elaborated
by Constantini and Craik, Fowlkes, Perkins and Rinehart40
studied Georgia party leaders where they report similar
divisions of labor between men and women in the party
structure and a similar heavy time commitment by female
party members; these women are also less likely to ex-
press interest in running for electoral office. 41 This is
seen by the authors as a lack of personal ambition rather
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than a lack of the requisite skills. Again, however, one
needs to ask whether what is happening in these illustra-
tions is that women, as long as they can define their poli-
tical work as voluntary, no matter what amount of time they
are putting into it, or as long as they can see their work
within the political parties as appropriate women's work,
feel more comfortable with the politically active role
they are taking. To run for office would, however, mean
confronting the fact that one was very politically active
and also make that active role highly visible to those
around you.
If women are as politically active in political party
activities as these studies and additional studies illus-
42trate, then situational theorists who stress the tiline
constraints of the motherhood role have an argument with
shaky foundations, for these women present evidence that
these time constraints can be or are overcome in certain
situations. While no data are contained in these studies
that directly test whether these women perceive themselves
as constrained by the roles of wife and mother, other situ-
ational studies do attempt to verify the significance of
these variables.
Cornelia Flora and Naomi Lynn found that motherhood
had significant impact on women's political participation
and their sense of political efficacy. Mothers were more
likely to perceive themselves as politically inefficacious
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and to participate in politics less than women who were not
mothers, but both of these findings were mitigated if the
mothers had husbands who were supportive with child-care,
if the mothers were involved in adult interaction networks,
voluntary service or job networks which took them outside
the home. They suggest motherhood need not be deibilitating
with regard to political participation; what was required
was a tempering or modification of the traditional sex-role
played out in the isolation of the home.
Susan Gluck Mezey set up a study of Hawaiian men and
women political officeseekers which had as a primary goal
to ascertain whether there was evidence that a woman's fam-
ily created obstacles to the pursuit of a political career. 44
The women in this study were less often married, than the
men, had fewer children than their male counterparts, were
older and said they devoted less time to political work than
the men. The women who were married stressed the signifi-
cance of their husband's approval of their political activ-
ity claiming that they would not engage in political activ-
ity without their husband's support. 45 Thus, Mezey 's study
also supports the contention that women's roles as wives
and mothers have an impact on their political activity.
In a study by Merritt, women also were found to seek
office only when their children were older while males did
not appear to be hampered by the ages or numbers of child-
ren they had at home.
191
Frequently, situational studies discover that women
are more likely to run for and be elected to lower level
political offices than higher level offices. From the situ-
ational perspective, this phenomenon is generally explained
by pointing out the less competitive nature of running for
such offices, their lesser importance, and the perception
that these local offices are more compatible with women's
traditional concerns. Similarly, fewer adjustments by the
women officeholder's family and husband are hypothesized as
an additional reason why women are more likely to choose loca
political careers.
Several studies have examined local officeholders com-
paring men and women who are in these positions or, in
some cases, aspire to these positions. One of the findings
of these studies seems to be a confirmation of the fact that
women officeholders at the local level often are able to
combine their political activity and family life without
feeling conflict between their political roles and their
traditional sex-roles. For example, Susan Gluck Mezey
studied Connecticut women local officeholders and found
that these women did not seem to need the support from their
family and their husband which she saw in her other research
where women were seeking state or national offices. Mezey
hypothesizes that local office holding is not as disruptive
of the officeholder's family life and doesn't require as many
adjustments by the officeholder's family. 47
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Trudy Heffron Bers who studied men and women on local
boards of education found that there were very few dif-
ferences between the men and women in these positions with
regard to age, number of children, or age of children. 48
This suggests that in school board politics, where women's
political participation in terms of serving in elective
office in the United States is the highest, presents few
adjustments between the woman's political role and her
traditional roles.
In an article on the recruitment of women to suburban
city councils, Sharyne Merritt notes that women who hold
city council offices but aspire to higher level political
offices feel more conflict than women who do not aspire to
higher political offices. This conflict centers on being
able to fulfill their roles in the family and satisfy their
own desires for achievement. While most of the women, then,
seem to be able to integrate their family lives and their
local political careers as councilwomen
, the idea of recon-
ciling higher level political office with family responsibil-
ities does not seem as plausible. 4^
Women who are interested in pursuing political careers
at higher levels may also encounter other structural barriers
that mitigate against them seeking political office. In
the case of partisan elections, the support of the political
party may be a necessary condition for gaining nomination
or for obtaining financial support.
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Clarke and Romberg, for example, use the situational
argument to illustrate what they perceive to be women's
disadvantages with regard to political participation within
existent political party structures:
The contention is that women are deprived of
narti
UE\ tlme ^ are able t0 allocate to
,
work because the burden of homemaking
childbearing and childrearing fall upon themmore heavily than their spoule. Because ofthis, women may have to forego joining aparty or else postpone the event until theirchildren no longer need their more-or-less con-stant attention. 50
For the same reasons, as compared to men, womenhave less time to devote to organization affairs-may need to drop out of their parties frequently
and for longer periods; and may not have the
opportunity to hold as many party positions, par-ticularly high level positions. 51
Explicit in these statements is the idea that women's roles
as wife and mother place limitations on her ability to take
a continual active role in political parties. Implicit in
these statements is the idea that men's lives allow them
the opportunities to actively and continuously pursue poli-
tical activity in their leisure time, a leisure that is
presumably provided by the support of their wives who are
occupied with the care of the children.
Clark and Romberg imply that women will be less likely
to be offered the opportunity to run for political office as
a result of their inability to participate as fully or as
early in their lives as men can in political party activities.
The underlying assumption here is that this party activity is
a precondition for recruitment to stand for political office,
-s assess
particularly higher political office. Whether thi,
ment is an accurate analysis of how individuals currently
attain political candidacy is open to dispute. But, for
my purposes, the important point here is that it is women-
life activities that are seen as needing to be malleable,
not the political party structure. However, many of the
assumptions that Clarke and Romberg present here seem to
be disputed by other works; that is, women do seem to be
active in political parties and, in fact, often contribute
more of their time to this activity. Additional elements
about the party structure may be more significant in terms
of whether women become party nominees.
Recalling the discussions of Constantini and Craik
and Fowlkes, Perkins, and Rinehart 52 regarding the divis-
ion of labor in political parties, it is undoubtedly im-
portant to suggest that whether women's work in political
party organizations is really expressive or instrumental,
the party membership's perception of the importance of the
work that women do in political parties may be significant
in terms of whether women are encouraged to run for politic
office or not.
Both of these studies mentioned that the women party
members had lower political aspirations than their male
counterparts, attributing this to the personalities or
personal choices of the women involved Constantini and
Craik suggested that the personal motivations for men and
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women becoming involved in party affairs differed. Women
party leaders, according to these authors, are motivated
by Public-regardingness" while men - s parfcy activ _
ity is motivated by self-regardingness
. The meaning of this
distinction, according to Constantini and Craik, is that,
for women, service to the political party is service to the
public good and, thus, is an end in itself, whereas men see
their party activity as promoting certain personal career
goals they have established for themselves. In effect, their
party work may be directed toward achieving political office
careers
.
Some authors have suggested that political party struc-
tures pose even more pertinent barriers to women interested
in political careers and running for political office than
any of the studies cited thus far. One study, which drew
primarily on the related experiences of women who had fought
for and, in most cases, achieved high elective offices at
the state or national level was written by Susan and Martin
Tolchin. Political party structures, according to the
Tolchins, do not encourage women to run for political office.
Political parties, in their book, are depicted as "stag
parties" to emphasize the unwillingness of most political
parties to endorse women as political candidates except in
throwaway districts, that is, districts in which the candidate
sponsored by the party is perceived as having little opportun-
ity to succeed. These "stag parties" are dominated by male
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leadership, convened at times most suitable for male member-
ship, and supposedly relegate the "shitwork" to their women
members. Women party members are more likely to be active
in the party but aren't encouraged to seek political offices-
women who achieved political office encountered discrimin-
ation from male party leaders or male officeholders. Susan
Welch in a study of women's recruitment to politics also
suggested that discrimination was an important factor in
women not seeking office. 56
In Marcia Manning Lee's study of Westchester County
political leaders, over half (58.6%) the women in the sur-
vey felt that women would have problems different from men
if they were to seek public office. 74% of these 58.6%
said that women not being accepted by men would be the main
difficulty. 57 These women believe that men would prefer for
women to participate in politics in ways other than running
for office. 58
One of the difficulties with determining whether sex
discrimination is an external structure constraining women's
political activity is the fact that many of these studies
rely on survey questions that elicit the women's opinions.
Some interpretations would suggest that these responses may
merely categorize the way that the woman believes that dis-
crimination exists but does not necessarily prove the
existence of discrimination. The difficulties here are
illustrated by Susan Gluck Mezey in her study of Hawaiian
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officeholders. 69% of the women in this study, when asked
to mention the disadvantages of being a woman in office,
pointed to sexism and bias against them by males in office. 5
The men in the study, however, interpreted the women's
experience differently. According to the men, "the prob-
lems of women officeholders stemmed from their own in-
adequacies: emotionalism and weakness, demands for extra
privileges, and interest in minutiae and trivia." 60 Thus,
men frequently deny the perceived existence of sex discrim-
ination as a structural problem.
In Mezey's study, sex discrimination was perceived by
women as an external constraint on their ability to be poli-
tical leaders, but the lack of agreement by men and women
over the existence of discrimination suggests that addition-
al observations of outside trained observers would be
necessary to persuade both men and women that this is a
structural factor. The evidence presented by the Tolchins
lends some support to this thesis. In the Tolchins' book,
women politicians were relating their personal experiences
of discrimination by male party leaders and male colleagues.
Bella Abzug, for example, relates an incident when the party
leadership moved a crucial party meeting and failed to
notify her
.
Similarly, Irene Diamond's study of New England women
state legislators also indicated that these women believed
they had encountered male hostility and sex discrimination,
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and these factors limited their aspirations to seek higher
Political offices. « Diamond noted that Connecticut women
legislators were, at the time of her study, excluded from
the male-only Hawaiian Room where the male legislators ate
lunch and discussed political issues. 63 This was obviously
an external structural barrier that placed clear dis-
tinctions between the male and female legislators.
A further structural problem which may discourage
women from seeking higher political office is the accumu-
lation of the substantial amounts of money necessary to
finance a political campaign. While the level of money
needed for local candidacies is still personally manage-
able, state-wide offices and national offices increasingly
require substantial financial resources. Witness the
1980 and 1982 elections where it was not uncommon in con-
tested elections for the candidates to spend millions of
dollars
.
Tolchin and Tolchin verified the difficulties of the
women candidates in their study being able to raise cam-
64paign money. These women were less likely to have the
personal income to finance expensive campaigns. The
large campaign donors, the political parties, labor unions,
and business organizations were less willing to contribute
support to women candidates. While these factors obviously
present significant difficulties for grass roots candidates
whether they are male or female, the structural deterrence
which the need for substantial campaign money presents
cannot be ignored.
A further dimension of the situational argument is to
suggest that women have not been channeled into the proper
occupational categories to assure themselves of a proper
foundation/base for political action. Susan Welch attrib-
utes the fact that women do not pursue occupations that
directly feed into political careers to their sex role soci
ization, although she maintains that this merely defines a
situational barrier to women who want to seek political
office
:
Traditionally, women have been socializedinto other occupations, that is, occupa-
luZLt ? C are^°? as likely to lead towardrunning for political office. This does notmean that they have less time and energy thanmen but rather that they are socialized topursue occupations that do not have direct
connections to political office. 65
In Diamond's study of New England legislators, she
noted that more men (16%) than women (7%) identified their
job as a factor in their initial interest in a political
career. To explain this difference she notes the situation-
al argument that the occupations that women most frequently
hold in the labor sector, service and clerical jobs, do not
facilitate movement into public office in the way that
certain male jobs, such as business and law, do. 66
While the assumption that certain occupations are
"feeder hierarchies" for political careers is widely held
in political science, there is insufficent evidence of its
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importance documented in the situational studies to make
a judgment about its significance. However, if this is a
factor in explaining fewer women seeking and holding poli-
tical offices, the policy implication of this constraint
would indicate the need to persuade more women to enter the
appropriate occupations, which might return us, as Susan
Welch suggested, to policy changes that are directed at the
socialization process. Alternatively, it might suggest
that women must, as they did in Kirkpatrick
' s study,
develop alternative routes to political office that are
congruent with other aspects of women's adult roles.
In my examination of the situational or structural
studies, I have often felt that the questions being asked
and the observations presented were more solidly based than
the observations presented in the voting studies and the
socialization studies.
Many of the findings presented in the situational or
structural studies appear more compelling because of the
emphasis that was placed on actually eliciting the opinions
of the women in these studies with regard to their own
understanding of the reasons why they were less likely to
seek political office. The perceptions of the participants
are a logical beginning point for research. Yet, it is also
always appropriate to question whether the perceptions of
the participants are an accurate assessment of the external
limitations. I am not maintaining that this is an either/or
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situation or that, frequently, these relationships aren't
complexly related; 1 assume that external structures and
internal structures may be difficult for both the observer
and the participant in the study to isolate. In fact, I
would argue that this is one of the reasons that the situa-
tional researchers assert that the adult situation of wo-
men is more important to understanding why women don't run
for political office but frequently fall back on the social-
ization explanation when they encounter data that doesn't
quite fit the situational explanation.
Consider, for example, the importance of women's roles
as housewives and mothers as constraints, according to the
situational theorists, limiting women's pursuit of political
offices. While there is much evidence in these studies
confirming that the women respondents feel this is a con-
straint, it is still difficult to determine whether this
constraint is merely an aspect of women's adult social roles
because the distinction between women as housewife being
constrained in her adult life by the roles involved and woman
as girl constrained by the socialization process to primarily
aspire to become a mother, to see this as the primary role
for women in American society to achieve, is difficult to
isolate. It is true that it is only as an adult that women
get to actually experience the constraints of motherhood and
the duties of the housewife. But if the woman as child and
later as woman is unable to conceptualize herself in any
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other role but that of mother, it is hard to know if the
reai damage is done in ohildhood or adulthood and hard
to prescribe a potential cure.
The situational theorists were less likely to invoke
ad hoc explanations than the behavioralists previously
examined. This, I suggest, is a result of the fact that
they were more likely to be asking their respondents
specific questions which did not need additional inter-
pretation. If directly asked, how does your husband view
your political activity, it seems obvious that the respon-
dents will be giving their understanding of the husband's
role which does not necessarily require interpretation by
the researchers. On the other hand, the questions that the
researchers ask may frame the types of responses that they
receive
.
It also seems relevant to point out that the research
using situational or structural explanation was more fre-
quently conducted by women researchers. This is true both
in the sense that women researchers seldom seem to focus on
the political socialization explanation and that more women
than men seem to be actively doing research on the situa-
tional question. Perhaps this is insignificant, but it may
reflect an intuitive belief by these women that the situa-
tional explanation is a better beginning point for research
in this area.
From a policy perspective, the situational or structural
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theorists present a number of areas in which women's adult
lives will need significant changes if women are going to
seek and wield power through elective offices. One can
envision here that changes in the structure of child care
relationships, changes in the occupations women pursue,
changes in political party organizational structures and
changes in the financing of elections might be necessary to
attain this goal. As in the socialization studies and voting
studies, the researchers stop short of asserting necessary
policy changes. In part, this is a consequence of the fact
that most of these researchers believe that the situational
barriers can be overcome by individual women who choose
to confront the difficulties. The opinion that this is a
viable alternative is bolstered by the fact that a number
of women have overcome the barriers
The most significant difficulty with the situational
explanation, from a policy perspective, revolves around the
fact that the women who have achieved political office have
done so by finding individual solutions to their perceived
situational or structural problems but these individual
solutions are not replicable on a large-scale basis, be-
cause most of the women in the American society do not have
access to these solutions, nor is it possible to imagine
that the solutions could be made more readily available
without a massive restructuring of American society. While
a few more middle class and upper class women, with childcare
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support and financial support and the best wishes of their
husbands, might be able to seek and wield political power,
this model offers little advice to the majority of women
in the middle class and working class, whose lives are
unrepresented in these studies. These women, combining the
roles of wife, mother, and workers, may have even greater
structural constraints to their political participation,
particularly in terms of running for elective office.
If the situational theorists have a more accurate ex-
planation of the reasons for women's limited political par-
ticipation, then to imagine increasing the access of more
women, from a variety of social classes, to political office
might require a massive restructuring of society, not only
in terms of political relationships but also in terms of
social relationships. This question is insufficiently ad-
dressed in the situational studies.
This brings to the surface a difficulty with the be-
havioral research reviewed throughout the entire disserta-
tion. The focus on political activity, narrowly defined
as voting, political party activity and running for elec-
tive office in the studies may give us an inadequate pic-
ture of the political activity of women. In one of the
few studies which features working class women as political
participants, Kathleen McCourt presents working class
women organizing to protect their neighborhoods against the
building of an expressway and attempting to reverse the
ese
ime
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racial changeover of their neighborhoods. For many of th
women, political activity may have been a once-in-a-lifet
event. While these women confronted the traditional insti-
tutions of government, they used tactics that are seldom
considered as legitimate political behavior in the United
States. In fact, political scientists even have a separ-
ate term for this political behavior, labeling it protest
politics
.
Nor do the behavioral studies deal with political
activity directed against other institutions of power be-
sides governmental institutions, such as businesses. The
political activity of women in unions or the political rele-
vance of large-scale boycotts, such as the meat boycott
upheld primarily by women, is unexamined
In many cases, we also witnessed a hierarchical order-
ing of the value of individual political activity which
placed more value on political activity that was conducted
in the more central loci of political institutions. Thus,
national office-seeking was ranked higher then state office-
seeking. While there is a certain rationale to this rank-
ordering in that more decisions, many of which have more
widespread impact, are made at the higher levels of decision
making, there is also a devaluing of the policy decisions
made at the local levels where women are more numerous.
In the same way, women's activity in political parties
was frequently devalued with regard to its worth. One
206
begins to wonder if there isn't a belief by researchers
that if women perform an activity, it can't be political,
or, if the activity is clearly political, even in their
definition, and women are performing it, it must be less
important
.
While I have suggested throughout this paper that
women's relationship to politics and the explanations for
this relationship are not well supported by statistical
evidence and that the explanations advanced to account for
women's political behavior are often ad hoc, nonetheless,
interest in the question of why women and men behave in
politically different ways, which is a belief many people
in the society subscribe to, is evident in the popular media
as well as in political science research. The epilogue
which follows will examine this interest, suggesting that
many of the ill-founded ideas about women's political be-
havior are advanced in the popular media and that popular
journalists also have created some additional ad hoc ex-
planations to interpret the statistical data gathered from
public opinion and election polls.
.e
is
' s
CHAPTER VII
EPILOGUE
The previous chapters in this dissertation explore
the development of political behavior research in the poli-
tical science discipline and the explanations that have been
advanced to account for women's political behavior. In each
chapter we have seen that these explanations have possibli
policy implications. When we approach these explanatic
with the question, what would be required to change women
political behavior if the explanations are presumed to be
correct, various answers emerged, some of which required
instituting different patterns of political socialization,
others which seemed to require greater flexibility in the
adult roles of women.
The question of explaining women's political behavior
has, since this dissertation was initiated, come to the fore
again, not as an academic question but as a practical ques-
tion that engages the popular press and political analysts
whose job it is to find the persuasive techniques that will
send the voter to the polls to cast a ballot for the candidate
who is his/her client. The development of practical and
popular interest in women's political behavior was stimulated
by the gathering of statistical data using behavioral tech-
niques similar to those of the early voting studies although
more sophisticated in survey sampling. The relevant data is
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again election statistics and issue questions asked by
pollsters who have come to play an extremely significant
role in election campaigns.
The event that precipitated the rebirth of interest in
women's political behavior was the 1980 election when poll-
sters discerned what they perceived to be a new trend in
the voting patterns of men and women which emerged during
the Carter/Reagan election. Since this election numerous
articles have appeared which examine the "gender gap," a catch-
phrase coined to capture the phenomenon of men and women dis-
agreeing about political issues and political candidates.
Reviewing some of the articles that have appeared with
regard to the gender gap, I see the re-emergence of many of
the assumptions that have dominated political science research
with regard to women and politics. The departure point for
most of these articles is that politics has characteristically
been male behavior and that male political behavior is the
standard against which women's political behavior should be
measured, ideas which Bourque and Grossholtz criticized in
their article, "Politics as Unnatural Practice." 1 The dif-
ference is that, on this occasion, it is popular journalists
and pollsters who are expounding these views.
The policy implications of the "gender gap" seem more
immediate as the professional campaign organizers scurry to
utilize their understandings of women's political behavior to
secure the votes of women for their candidates. Thus, I want
.e ex-
.s con-
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to use this epilogue to examine the explanations currently
found in the popular media, to see how unsubstantiated
assumptions about women and polities are resurfacing in the
current articles and how new twists are given to these old
explanations
.
An understanding of the gender gap and the possibl
Planations for its existence must begin with the election
data from 1980. This data was collected from exit poll,
ducted by New York Times/CBS News and ABC/Time magazine.
Exit polls are the latest device for gathering instant statis-
tical data on how particular groups of people vote in an
election. Individuals leaving selected polling places are
asked for whom they voted. Data regarding the voter's sex,
ethnic background, political party identification, educational
background, religion, age, family income, regional location
and whether they perceive themselves as liberals, conserva-
tives or moderates are recorded. Each person is also asked
to respond to several issue questions such as whether the
United States should be more forceful dealing with the Soviet
Union even if this would increase the probability of war. 2
The significance of the 1980 election with regard to
women's political behavior was that this was the first presi-
dential election to elicit significantly different behavior
from men and women. In previous presidential elections, the
difference between the percentages of women voting for a
particular candidate and men voting for a particular candidate
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had never been greater than 6%. 3
In the 1980 election, however, while Reagan won the
vote of women by one or two percent, he received 17% more
of the male vote than Carter did. The statistical break-
down provided by the exit polls shows that women, who re-
presented 49% of all voters in the 1980 election, cast 45%
of their votes for Carter, 46%-47% of their votes for Reagan,
and 7% of their votes for Anderson. 4 Men, on the other hand,
cast 37% of their votes for Carter, 54% for Reagan and 7% for
Anderson.
It is important to keep these statistics firmly in mind
because frequently subsequent reports of them paint a false
impression, the impression that if only women had voted in
the election, Reagan would not have been elected. Consider,
for example, the report of the New Republic :
Women voted against Reagan in exactly the
same proportion that men voted for him-
54%. 5
New Republic cites as its data source for this observation
the New York Times /CBS News exit poll. To understand how
they arrived at their statistic which leads us to the con-
clusion that 54% of American women voted for Carter (because
we quickly forget third and fourth candidacies), we discover
that they have lumped together all the votes women cast for
other candidates and presented them as votes against Reagan.
The lack of validity in this statistic can be amply illustra-
ted if we use a similar technique with regard to women's vote
and Carter. One could state just as (in) correct ly that 55%
of women voted against Carter. While women's opposition to
Reagan is a favored interpretation of the 1980 election data,
it seems initially to lack statistical validity unless one
assumes that the standard for political behavior is that of
the male and only deviation from male behavior needs further
examination. Such an assumption seems implicit both in the
New Republic article and in the initial analysis of the exit
poll data by Adam Clymer, a New York Times reporter. Clymer
seems to suggest that if only women had followed the male
pattern, Reagan's victory would have been an even greater
mandate than Reagan was able to claim:
Mr. Reagan's long-standing difficulties in
persuading women to vote for him, the Time s/CBS News Poll also showed, held down his per-
centages again Tuesday. Those problems were
strongest among women at either end of the
education scale, those with less than a high
school education and those who graduated from
college. The poll suggested that both fear
about the war and his opposition to the equal
rights amendment handicapped Mr. Reagan's bid
for their support.
6
Although Time magazine interpreted virtually the same data--
the ABC exit poll data showed that 47% of women voters voted
for Reagan and 45% of women voters voted for Carter while
the percentages for men were the same as in the New York
Times / CBS exit poll--as indicating that Reagan didn't have
his usual difficulties with women, 7 it is the Clymer inter-
pretation that has been more widely accepted.
Women's opposition to Reagan for President is then seen
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as the opening edge to understanding the existence of the
gender gap. Gloria Steinem, for example, credits this
opposition with opening political parties' eyes to the ex-
istence of women as a potential political source:
Belated and incomplete as this year's well-publidzed discovery of the women's votelias been, we owe an odd debt to current
right-wing control of the Republican party
nn^w£7 and R°nald Rea§an himself.
P
Notj£til there was a whopping 20-point dirTe~rencebetween women[s
,
an|^^cEoi|e^I RiijiK^in 1980 did we begin to be^disTov^rid-^-
Prl?^ UntU that disap^?oval of the "ReaganPresidency continued to grow did we get tobe regarded as a hot item. 8 6
Unlike most of the popular analysts, Steinem appears to
believe that women have always had differing reasons for
voting than men. She implies that even in elections where
men and women have voted in similar directions, the reasons
behind women's votes may have differed. She cites previous
issue differences between men and women as substantiation
for this view. Thus, Steinem indicates that there may be
separate patterns of male and female political behavior that
have merely become more discernible at the present point in
time
.
Yet, Steinem has also exaggerated the opposition of
women to Reagan in the 1980 election, at least from a statis-
tical point of view. In this article, the reporting of the
statistics leaves the distinct impression that women had little
responsibility for the election of Reagan to the presidency.
There are additional uses of the exit poll data which are
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just as misleading in their interpretation, but the point
that really needs to be made is that what is frequently at
the base of such misinterpretations is a continuing notion
that male political behavior is normal political behavior
against which women's political behavior is always con-
trasted.
From the standpoint of a statistician, the abnormal
distribution of votes in the 1980 election might have been
perceived as that of males because men clearly divided their
votes by larger percentages than would have been predicted
by previous election data, party identification data, or even
pre-election data. In the 1982 election data, which overall
indicated a lessening of the gender gap with regard to dif-
ferences between men's and women's support of Democratic can-
didates, the lessening of the gap seems to be a result of men
returning to Democratic support. This fact, I believe, lends
credence to the idea that it was men who exhibited unusual
political behavior in 1980.
While interpretations of the 1980 election data did
stimulate reinterest in the political differences between men
and women in the popular journals, it is only as these arti-
cles attempt to articulate the differences and account for
them that the underlying assumptions in the concept "gender
gap" become clearer. Increasingly, references to the gender
gap suggest that political party differences underlie can-
didate preference differences for men and women and that
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these political party differences are a result of issue
differences between men and women.
Now, one might logically assume that issue differences
between men and women would center around what might be con-
sidered traditional women's issues such as abortion and the
equal rights amendment. In fact, in the 1980 election, the
equal rights amendment issue seemed to have some impact on
the way that women cast their votes. Those women who favored
the equal rights amendment, representing 22% of all voters in
the 1980 election, strongly favored Carter over Reagan,
casting 54% of their votes for Carter, 32% for Reagan and
11% for Anderson. Conversely, women who were opposed to the
equal rights amendment were 15% of all voters in the 1980
election, and these women strongly favored Reagan casting
66% of their votes for Reagan, 29% of their votes for Carter
and 4% of their votes for Anderson. 9
However, according to the pollsters and the popular
journals, it is not the traditional women's issues which
generate significant differences between men and women, for
men appear to be equally supportive of these issues in the
polls. To understand the type of issues that generate
significantly different responses from men and women, it
is expedient to review the findings of an article on these
differences that appeared in the April/May issue of Public
Opinion
,
an article that seems to have been widely read by
both political parties.
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Public Opinion reviewed the data that they had collect-
ed from 1948 until the 1980s in an attempt to delineate the
basic issue differences between men and women. The authors
summarized their findings by grouping their statistics into
four time periods: 1948-1952; 1960-1964; the early seventies
and the late seventies through the eighties. 10
In the 1948-1952 time period, Public Opinion concluded
that (1) public opinion differences between the sexes were
very modest, (2) the biggest differences in responses be-
tween men and women in this time period occurred with regard
to expressed levels of political information and interest.
Women, at this time, tended to more frequently state a lack
of interest in politics or to say that they had no opinion
with regard to political issue questions, (3) the one dimen-
sion where men's and women's attitudes did differ consistent-
ly, although not by a large margin, was on questions involv-
ing the use of force. For example, in 1949, women(25%) were
slightly more likely to say that the United States should
never use the atomic bomb first than men (21%) . Women were
also slightly more likely than men to suggest that the atom
bomb should be outlawed completely; 6% of women and 4% of
men were in favor of this. 11
In the 1960-1964 time period, the pattern of male/female
responses to political issues was similar to that of 1948-52.
No consistent differences between men's and women's responses
to issue questions emerged except with regard to questions
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dealing with the use of force and the possibility of war.
For example, when asked about their concern with regard to
the United States becoming involved in another war, women were
more concerned about this issue than men: 25% of women
responded that they were pretty worried about the probability
of another war as compared to 17% of men, 51% of women said
they were somewhat worried about the possibility of war
compared to 41% of men, and only 24% of women said that they
were not worried at all as compared to 42% of men. 12
In the early seventies, 1971 and 1972, the differences
already cited continued to hold, but, by the late 1970s, a
different pattern seemed to emerge, according to Public
Opinion. While, on some questions, there were still no sig-
nificant differences, in other areas significant and consis-
tent differences began to emerge. The two general headings
that Public Opinion categorizes these issues under are the
"risk dimension" and the "compassion dimension."
Issues that were classified as part of the "compassion
dimension" involved questions such as whether one favored the
full employment bill - in 1977, 70% of women as compared to
61% of men favored this legislation; 13 whether one agreed
that the government should work to substantially reduce the
income gap between the rich and the poor - 73% of women as
compared to 61% of men favored this and whether spending for
social security should be increased - 56% of women as compared
to 43% of men favored this issue. All of these differences
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are about 10% or higher although only in the case of social
security is there a difference in the direction of the
opinion, since less than a majority of men were in favor of
increasing social security.
The "risk dimension" was said to be measured by ques-
tions which usually involved policy considerations that
presented conflicting goal choices. For example, when asked
whether they would be in favor of relaxing the environmental
protection laws if it will help improve the economy, 58% men
in contrast to 48% women favored this. 15 A similar question
which asked whether environmental standards should be relaxed
to allow industries to convert to the use of coal elicited a
favorable response from 51% of men but only 35% of women. 16
Labeling this a "risk dimension" seems to imply that women
are less likely than men to be willing to take the risk of
increasing environmental pollution for economic considerations
The Public Opinion article also maintains that the
previously noted differences between men and women over the
use of force increase in the late seventies and early eighties
Women, for example, registered disapproval to the reinstitu-
tion of the draft; 61% of women as compared to 48% of men
were opposed to this. 1 ^ Women trailed men in support of
increasing spending in the military budget; 68% of women as
18
compared to 81% of men favored the increase.
The major conclusion of the Public Op inion article is
that there are a variety of significant political issue
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differences that are emerging and becoming more sustained
between men and women, i.e., in the idiom of the popular
Press, a gender gap has developed, but this gender gap is
reflected on issues other than those of traditional women's
issues, that is, those issues that address the interests of
women or matters that affect women differently or more
directly than men such as the equal rights amendment or
abortion. The Public Opinion article stresses that men and
women have not differed significantly in their support for
various women's issues since the 1950s. What they mean by
this is that the responses of men and women to these issues
tend to be within 4 percentage points of each other and tend
to be similar in direction. Put more simply, at least in
response to hypothetical questions, men tend to be about as
supportive of women's issues as women.
As usual, however, this discussion of gender gap dif-
ferences does not merely revolve around statistically tabu-
lated responses. There are attempts to account for the gender
gap differences that are noted. The explanations again pro-
vide us with hypothetical reasons for women's political be-
havior.
The authors of the Public Op inion article do not directly
interpret the statistical results they have provided, although
it could be argued that in labeling certain issues as com-
passion, as opposition to force, or as unwillingness to
engage in risks, they have presented a fairly traditional view
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of women. But the primary interpretation of this data is
presented in edited synopses of the responses of two women,
Betty Friedan and Midge Decter, who were asked to interpret
the data by responding to questions such as "why do the
differences between men and women appear to be more pro-
nounced than they did twenty years ago," "why are there
negligible differences between men and women on women's
issues," and "will these trends continue?" 19
Since Friedan and Decter are usually identified as
ideological opponents, Friedan as a feminist, Decter as an
opponent of the women's movement, the perspectives they bring
to bear on the data might be anticipated as divergent. In
fact, there are both similarities and differences in their
interpretations
.
Both. Friedan and Decter seem to accept the assumption
that men have been dominant in the political domain. Friedan
states this specifically, interpreting the current issue dif-
ferences between men and women as a change from women's
former behavior of following men on issues of politics. At
one point, she states:
Women used to follow men. At first they
simply voted like their husbands; men charted
2 nthe high ground politically and women followed.
The new data suggest to her that women are no longer following
men but beginning to think for themselves and express their
own thoughts with regard to issues:
The data are fascinating. What we're
seeing is that women don't necessarily
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follow men. When women begin to movetoward real equality and a full sense oftheir own personhood, they don't follow
men at all; they speak with their own
voices . 21
Both Friedan and Decter link the issue differences found
between men and women to what they perceive as women's great-
er concern for life. Both women see this concern for pre-
serving life as resulting from the life experiences of women,
although Decter believes these life experiences merely rein-
force a greater natural inclination women have with regard
to life.
Friedan articulates how this greater concern for pre-
serving life is reflected in women's current issue options:
Women, more than men, have been concerned
with life, and this, has given them
superior values and a better sense of what's
needed for the survival of the species and
human evolution. .. issues having to do with
children, the elderly, families, the sick,
the quality of life, and our actual survival
are more basic to women. 22
Friedan believes it is this concern that is reflected in
questions such as those that are labeled the "comparison
dimension" in the Public Op inion article as well as those
issues that are grouped into the "risk dimension." She
reinterprets the "risk dimension" in the following way:
Women's concern for the pollution of the
environment and the hazards of nuclear
radiation does not indicate conservatism
or unwillingness to take risks, as you imply.
It means that women have more sense about
life and no-win ventures that are lethal to
life. 23
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Decter sees what she classifies as women's historic
"dovish" inclination as a natural response from women whose
daily lives she characterizes by stating that "women spend
most of their waking hours trying to prevent various forms
of harm from coming to those she looks after. It's a
natural inclination." 24
Decter also believes that women have a natural inclin-
ation to be more liberal. While she does not explain pre-
cisely what she means by liberal, Decter does say that liberal
values are virtually identical with what she considers to be
the natural values of women: compassion and nurturance
.
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Presumably liberals seek public policies that are compassion-
ate and nurturing.
Both Friedan and Decter believe that the women's move-
ment is, in some sense, responsible for the current gender
gap, although their assessment of the movement's role dif-
fers. Friedan thinks that as a result of the women's movement,
women have acquired the confidence and self-respect to assert
their own political values:
Women now have enough self-respect
, in-
dependence and sense of their own person-
hood to assert their values politically
instead of keeping quiet, figuring that
men are always right. 2°
From Decter' s perspective, the women's movement seems
to have several linkages to the current "gender gap" dif-
ferences. The role she most clearly identifies is the role
of reinforcing liberal values of compassion and nurturance.
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To her, this is an ironic, rather than intended, consequence
of the women's movement:
The change in women's attitudes over thepast decade has had much to do with the
women's movement itself. The ideology ofthe movement, which has had a profound in-
fluence on women's opinions, was far moreliberal/ left than people generally under-
stood. The women's movement used the so-
called women's issues as a platform from whichto critique our society from a liberal view.There is some irony in the result. The lib-
eral values and the traditional feminine vir-
tues
- nurturance and compassion - are virtuallyidentical. Thus, by accepting a liberal women's
program, women have become politically influenced
to take more traditionally feminine attitudes.
In other words, the movement has made them more
feminine ideologically . 27
However, unlike Friedan, Decter does not believe that
the women's movement left a positive imprint on women's
personality. She believes that women in contemporary society
are lacking in personal security and happiness even though
one of the questions in the Public Opinion article elicited
responses from women that indicated that they were personally
self-confident and happy. But Decter, noting that women are
less confident than men about the future of the society, sees
this expression of lack of confidence as a symbol of women's
28personal insecurity. Women are really personally insecure
but are unable to express this to pollsters. Her evidence
for this assertion is personal observation:
Women are saying that they feel better
about the way their lives are going be-
cause they've been told to feel better
about it. There are all kinds of con-
clusions to be drawn but not by polling
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them but by looking at them, by observingtheir conduct. There is evidence thatthey are not nearly as cheerful as they
going if thGir 0Wn lives «e
7
Thus, while they are unable to express this personal
insecurity, which seems to derive from the confusion about
appropriate sex roles that Decter sees as a result of the
ideology of the women's movement, women are able to express
this personal insecurity indirectly, in Decter' s interpre-
tation, by expressing insecurity over the future of the
country. Decter seems to infer that this insecurity is un-
justified although one might argue that it is a rational ex-
tension of her idea that women are more concerned with the
preservation of life than men
;
that women express greater
concern about the future of the country, particularly in a
society whose political context is a nuclear dominated world.
Men also seem to be suffering from personal insecurity
as a result of the women's movement, according to Decter.
She maintains that the reason that men support women's rights
issues in the polls is because they are lying either out of
a sense of fear or out of a sense of courtesy to women, not
because they see these rights as fair or just. 30 Rather,
the suggestion is that these ideas have been socially imposed
on men but are not ideas that will be acceptable to men over
time. Rather than resisting these ideas, as men naturally
should, according to Decter, they are currently immobilized:
Men have completely collapsed, without the
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slightest show of resistance under a maiorl.eague assault on them. They've collapsedsocially, intellectually, and policicaUy 31
Thus, at the present time, men lack the self-confidence to
express their own opinions just as women do, in Decter's
explanation.
Yet, both Decter and Friedan seem to be convinced that
the gender gap phenomenon is a temporary, culturally pro-
duced anomaly to the more usual situation where men and wo-
men are basically similar in their political attitudes. So
both predict that this gap will close. While the reasons
that underlie this belief for each woman remain unclear in
this article, Friedan' s expectation of the closing of the
gap seems to assume that men will come to accept the impor-
tance of human priorities as an important element of poli-
tics. Thus, her version of the gap closing envisions men
being persuaded to the position she states is currently
held by women, presumably because she sees an inherent
rationality to this position. Men, in this scenario, will
catch up to women.
Decter, on the other hand, forecasts an end to the
gender gap because she believes it is unnatural. In this
context, I assume that her understanding of what is natural
is that men are more naturally concerned with politics and
that it is natural for women to defer to men in this area.
To return to this natural condition, both men and women who
are currently under the sway of the ideology of the women's
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movement will see their natural Interests and return to the
condition of men setting the pace In politics and women
following
.
While articles such as the Public Opinion article might
ordinarily have little policy impact, this article may have
had a certain amount of influence on the organization of the
election campaigns in the 1982 elections. The article
was accepted by both political parties whose major poll-
sters were already interested in the phenomenon of the
gender gap. If the Public Opinion article is correct in
its assessment of the issues that are most important to
women, a possible policy implication in terms of campaign
strategy is that appeals may be made to women voters on
the issues that are perceived to be most of concern to them
but not necessarily on traditional women's issues.
Richard Wirthlin is currently President Reagan's poll-
ster and also was the pollster for many prominent Republicans
in the 1982 elections. Wirthlin was one of the first to
note the gender gap in relation to the way that men and
women feel about Reagan's handling of the Presidency since
his election and to argue that the lower support of women
for Reagan might present difficulties for Republicans seeking
election or reelection in 1982 and the future. 32
In Wirthlin' s opinion, the campaign strategies of the
Republicans should be based on an appeal to women voters
on the issue concerns identified as gender gap issues, such
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33as war and peace. m a comment to Los Angeles Times
reporter Robert Scheer, Wirthlin noted that if the economic
situation was sufficiently improved, the intent of the
Republicans was to make peace the central issue of the 1982
elections. 34 On the other hand, Wirthlin has not been con-
cerned about trying to reach women voters on traditional
women's issues although some recent political appointments
by Reagan have been given to women which may indicate Rea-
gan' s concerns in this area.
Gloria Steinem, a woman strongly identified with the
women's movement, is concerned about the emphasis that the
political parties are putting on the importance of gender
gap issues as opposed to traditional women's issues in the
campaigns of the 1982 elections. While she doesn't deny
the existence of gender gap issues, Steinem does deny that
these issues are more fundamental to women's voting behavior
than the traditional women's issues, such as the ERA and
abortion. Steinem states that the traditional women's issues,
such as the ERA and abortion, are more likely to activate wo-
men
- to actually get them out to vote. 35 Citing statistics
from an unidentified source, she notes that 65% of women(50%
of men) have stated that they would vote against any candidate
who opposed the ERA and that 68% of women (5 TL of men) have
said they would vote against any candidate who supports a
3 6ban on abortion. On the one hand, Steinem seems to be
reminding the two parties that some attention must be paid
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to furthering women's issues to be assured of women's elec-
toral support. On the other hand, Steinem also seems con-
cerned that women might increasingly accept the gender gap
interpretation of which issues are of significance to them.
In polemical language, Steinem suggests that the women-
don
' t-care-about-women
' s issues is the 1982 version of
there-is-no-women's-vote. 37 If women accept this notion,
then Steinem is concerned that there will be no one assuring
that traditional women's issues are protected. As Steinem
presents it,
Yes, women care disproportionately about
general issues, too. But the nuclear freeze
environmental protection, and the like all
affect the male half of the nation just as
much as the female half, and therefore, theyhave other sources of support. Self-determin -
ation and equality are the naturaT
~
concern s of
women in every race and group
. If women donT
make them a priority
, who will ? 35
Steinem' s prescription for women would keep traditional
women's issues at the forefront of voting decisions. Women
should, if necessary, relegate the more general interests
shared with men to men's support and concern themselves
primarily with women's issues.
Steinem also believes that the identification of the
gender gap issues as politically significant to women may
give women an opportunity to prove their political potential
and political seriousness at the ballot box. This position
is reflected in the warning she issues:
If we don't deliver in the ballot box the
opposition to supporters of anti-equality
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and militaristic policies (whatever theirparty label) that we've been promising intne polls, we will send this message topoliticians: you can proceed with impunityThe women's vote stays home. 39 y
'
Steinem clearly sees the current political situation as
one in which women, because of their perceived divergences
from men, can have a greater impact on the electoral poli-
tical system, at least in terms of casting their ballots for
candidates who support policy positions of interest to women
in terms of both the traditional women's issues and the
gender gap issues. Whether women saw her message or not,
early findings of the 1982 elections seem to indicate that
women did respond politically to both traditional women's
issues and to gender gap issues in making candidate selec-
tions
.
Since, in Steinem' s view, a woman's vote has existed
for as long as women have had the vote even though the
pollsters have interpreted its non-existence on the basis of
the lack of sustained disagreement between men and women on
political issues, she feels no need to explain its sudden
emergence; rather, she believes that pollsters and the poli-
tical parties have merely discovered what women have always
known, that men and women may vote in similar directions or
respond to issue questions with similar answers but the
underlying reasons for these actions may differ.
However, the pollsters and campaign organizers for
political candidates are currently interested in the
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motivations of women as well as their issue positions.
Many national campaigns are now being handled by sophisti-
cated marketing techniques that attempt to understand and
manipulate the psychological motivations of individual voters.
Appeals to individual voters are designed to address their
psychological motivations for voting. One popular theory
of what motivates women politically has been extrapolated
from a book by female psychologist, Carol Gilligan, In a
Different Voice.
Gilligan'
s central thesis is that women and men have
different patterns of moral development which result in
alternative approaches to moral questions. Following the
work of moral development psychologists, particularly Kohl-
berg, Gilligan accepts the interpretation of how males develop
morally but rejects Kohlberg's moral development framework
for women. Kohlberg's work concluded that women were mor-
ally not as developed as men. Gilligan rejects this con-
clusion arguing that women have their own pattern of moral
development within which they answer moral questions.
The Gilligan conception of male morality is one in which
morality is equated with fairness; and moral development is
tied to an understanding of rights and rules. 40 For women,
Gilligan says, morality is concerned with caring for others
and is linked to the development of understanding responsibil-
ities and relationships. 41 Solutions to moral dilemmas, in
the male paradigm, appear to concentrate on the resolution of
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conflicting rights, whereas solutions to moral dilemmas,
in the female paradigm, emphasize the resolution of con-
flicting responsibilities in relationships.
Richard Wirthlin believes that Gilligan's book is the
key to understanding gender gap differences although what
use he makes of this is not clear. Robert Turner, a poli-
tical columnist for the Boston Globe, spelled out the connec-
tions that he believes Gilligan's thesis provides for the
explanation of women's political behavior more fully.
Turner points out that the differences reflected in
the gender gap are-found most reliably on issues that may
express the moral concerns of women. As Turner sees it,
women are more supportive of issues such as peace, jobs,
social security and education because of their moral develop-
ment and the stress this development places on responsibili-
ties and relationships.^2
In a similar manner, Turner illustrates that Gilligan's
thesis also explains men's support of traditional women's
issues
On many women's issues, such as the ERA,
equal employment opportunity, and equal
pay for equal work, the central question
is one of equity - precisely the kind of
issue that appeals, in Gilligan's terms,
to the male sense of morality, one guided
by a desire for fairness and justice. 4-3
Ellen Goodman, also a political columnist for the Globe,
similarly ties Gilligan's thesis to an understanding of gen-
der gap differences by suggesting that women's greater
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support of the Democratic party and democratic candidates
at this point in time is linked to the fact that the Demo-
crats are perceived as the standard bearers of liberal
policies. Goodman equates liberal policies with caretaking
policies and sees women, now voting for their own values,
naturally voting for caretaking policies in line with their
moral development.
Turner doesn't reject the idea that women's rights
issues are important to women's political behavior, however,
in his acceptance of the importance of the gender gap
issues. Rather, he suggests that there are currently two
motivations operating when women make voting decisions:
self-interests and moral interests. Gilligan's analysis
suggests that the self-interests of women with regard to
politics may be easier for them to articulate now than was
possible prior to the women's movement. Although Turner
makes no mention of this, Gilligan suggests that, while, in
the past, women had trouble including self
-responsibility in
their resolution of moral dilemmas, the discussion of rights
with regard to women as a result of the women's movement has
made it easier for women to include herself as someone who
should be cared for.
If Gilligan's analysis can be tied to the differing
political responses of men and women, then Friedan and
Decter's beliefs that the gender gap differences will dis-
appear will need re-examination, for, once again, differing
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patterns of moral development that occur over an individual's
life cycle will take more effort to change than attitudes
based on short term considerations. There is the additional
question of why it is that these differences should emerge
at this moment in history.
Most of the attempts to answer the question of why
these differences have emerged at this point in time point
to the policies of the Reagan administration which has not
only made policies that might be considered caretaking a
low national priority but, in many cases, has eliminated
or severely cut back these programs. Perhaps, it is only
with the arrival of the Reagan administration that women
can see clearly that their caretaking concerns are not
widely held by the politicians in power.
While the Reagan administration provides all of us with
the opportunity to see the low priority to which caretaking
policies are assigned, there is also the danger that the
low priority of such policies can be attributed to the admin-
istration of one individual. The complicity of the Demo-
cratic leadership in cutting back the programs targeted by
the Reagan administration in the first two years of his
Presidency is ignored. Also ignored are the longstanding
policies of previous administrations, Democratic and Repub-
lican, to build a nuclear arsenal which threatens human-
ity's future. Presumably, this arsenal has been less signi-
ficant to individuals in the past because there was more
.ze
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trust that the intention of the president was not to utili:
these weapons. Yet, there is some documentation that every
President since Truman has considered the use of these
weapons on at least one occasion during his presidency. The
difficulty here, as I see it, is that the insights into the
priorities of the national government which have been made
possible by the Reagan candidacy and election to the presi-
dency may be solely attributed to Reagan's personal priori-
ties, that the disparity between the promise of American
politics and the reality of American politics may be inter-
preted as "Reaganpolitics .
"
There is, it seems to me
, a further difficulty with
the current assessment that a differential moral develop-
ment may be a crucial aspect to understanding the issue
differences that have emerged between men and women. It
remains to be seen how campaign organizers may attempt to
manipulate this explanation with regard to appeals to men
and women on issues. The question might emerge here whether
pollsters see two different but equally valid models of moral
development or whether they believe that one model is superior
in relationship to the political arena. It seems possible to
me that men may well continue to believe that the male model
of moral development is more attuned to the political arena
and is preferable to the model described by Gilligan for wo-
men. Were this the case, appeals to women as voters might
address themselves to the concerns of women but attempt to
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show women that these concerns must often be overridden by
other priorities in the political arena. So Reagan might
couch his priorities for increasing nuclear weapons in terms
of concerns for keeping peace and protecting human life.
In a similar vein, although with different consequen-
ces, I believe that women, including myself, may tend to
view Gilligan's model for women's moral development as
superior to that of men's since it focuses on the responsible
ities and relationships of individuals to one another. It
has, I would argue, an appealing human dimension. Similarly,
the appraisals of both Friedan and Decter present women in a
positive view as compassionate human beings who value the
sanctity of human life. Yet, while I value these ideas and
fully believe that they must be promoted in the political
arena where they have too typically been shunted aside, I
do not believe, as Friedan blithely does, that there is a
rational necessity for these ideas to be accepted as the
foundation for national public policy. Concern for human
life can be utilized as a justification, as it has been in
the past, for the taking of other human life. Consider the
attack on civilian lives in Hiroshima and Nagasaki ration-
alized by Truman as necessary to bring the war to a quicker
end and thereby save tens of thousands or hundreds of thou-
sands of lives.
So, at the very least, I would argue that if the con-
cerns that are being voiced by women in response to gender
:erns
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gap issues are to remain within the political arena, this
may well require significant political effort on the part
of women. While politicians may pay heed to these cone,
in order to advance their own self interests of winning poli-
tical office or maintaining political power, there is no
guarantee that there will be follow- through in terms of
actual policy impact unless sustained political pressure,
a pressure that must encompass more than periodic election
support, can be maintained.
This points to a general limitation of the gender gap
research which is shared with the research previously exam-
ined in this dissertation. Frequently, I have noted, this
previous research has proceeded from a view of women's poli-
tical behavior which sees voting as the major, if not sole,
aspect of that behavior. A similar limitation exists with
the gender gap interest. The vote, in each instance, is
presented as a weapon which can be used to punish those who
disagree with your policy goals or as a reward for those who
agree with you on issues. The vote, in this respect, is
credited with significant power, the power to assure those
who are not direct participants in the political process that
they have power over their selected representatives who will
respond to their concerns.
The limitations of the power of the voter are a thesis
in themselves. It is clear, however, that in order to move
government toward public policies desired by the people, the
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vote is frequently an insufficient means to achieve this
end. Consider the inadequacy of the vote in the Love
Canal incident, for example. Lois Gibbs
'
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account of the
attempts by Love Canal residents to move the state and
federal government to recognize their plight and to provide
the necessary funds to evacuate them from their homes seemed
to require periodic protests to convince the governments
that the citizens would continue to fight and cause elected
officials embarrassment until they achieved their goal of
permanent evacuation. The Love Canal incident appears to
me to be a useful one because it illustrates quite fully the
low priority that is assigned to a concern for human life
in politics. No level of government wanted to acknowledge
a responsibility for the health plight of these citizens.
Government officials were worried about establishing a prece-
dent that would allow private citizens to obtain federal or
state relief for these problems, probably because of their
knowledge that the example of Love Canal is only one of
thousands of possible similar situations in the United States
Throughout, the attempts by Love Canal citizens to get the
state, local and national governments to take responsibility
for their situation, the various governments attempted to
cast the problems as personal rather than political ones.
Personal problems, as we know, require personal solutions
rather than political solutions. There was an unwillingness
to understand that even if the residents of Love Canal might
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have preferred personal solutions (they would gladly have
moved out of their homes when they began to understand the
problems their community faced)
, that this was not a solu-
tion available to these citizens. Their capital was tied
up in homes which no longer had market value but continued
to have mortgage payments and property taxes that needed to
be met. In the Love Canal incident, as in many grassroots
politics incidents, it is women with no previous political
experience, who are thrust to the fore by concerns for
their family's well-being. Their lack of understanding of
politics, initially, is amply illustrated, but because of
the threat of particular issues to their family's health
or security, these women acquire the skills to deal with
politicians and the political system. They may be reluctant
politicos, but they discover ways to effect the political
ends they are seeking.
Thus, researchers that focus primarily on the behavior
of women office seekers insufficiently address the questions
which must be pursued in order to understand women's poli-
tical behavior. I would argue that if any serious attempts
are to be made to increase women's political behavior,
whether at the level of voting, running for office, or taking
part in protests, there must continue to be exploration of
the reasons why women politically behave as they do and
why there remains an idea, accepted by both men and women,
that there will be gender differences on political issues.
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I maintain that this commonly held assumption that underlay
the early voting studies, the socialization studies and the
studies of women political leaders is still a significant
belief shared by women and men. It is a notion affirmed
by Steinem who maintains these differences exist even when
men and women appear to act in similar manners and a notion
reaffirmed when polls show substantial differences with
regard to responses made by men and women to particular
issue questions.
Such a widely held common belief needs continuing
reflection that attempts to illuminate both the foundations
for this assumption and the method(s) by which it is main-
tained or altered from one generation to the next.
Ultimately, what I am asking, at this point, is what
type of research might further illuminate the reasons for
women's political behavior, whether this behavior is con-
strued as the reasons for women casting their votes in par-
ticular ways or women not voting at all, the reasons why
women do and do not seek political office or the reasons
why women might engage in behavior that is construed as
protest behavior. Throughout this dissertation I have
questioned the weaknesses of extant studies in part because
my own policy inclination would attempt to increase women's
political behavior in all dimensions, including that of
protest behavior. Moreover, I would maintain that, in many
circumstances protest behavior is a necessary alternative in
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attempts to promote certain political goals.
Given my policy inclinations, I would stress the ne-
cessity of continuing to do research on women and their poll-
tical ideas. I would particularly like to see a study of
adult women which focused on the ways in which women define
politics and the roles that they perceive for citizens, par-
ticularly women citizens, to engage in politics. Women,
I anticipate, often subscribe to definitions of politics
which are as narrow in focus as those maintained by the stud-
ies that have been reviewed in this dissertation. Others
may define politics broadly. The sample of women for
this hypothetical study would then want to include women
who define politics in a variety of ways , from a broad
to a narrow focus, women who see political participation
solely in terms of legitimate political institutions and
those who would include protest activity in their defini-
tion, women who have never engaged in political activity,
women who only occasionally engage in political activity
and those who consider themselves to be political activists.
The emphasis here is to get a clearer view of the meaning
of politics to women and the settings in which women are
most likely to participate in politics.
I see this study as a sample conducted through the
use of in-depth interviews over an extended period of time
so that historical political events which were transitory
or lasting in their impact on these ideas could be measured
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Within this study, I believe it would also be necessary
to ascertain whether Gilligan's thesis that men and women
develop morally in different ways is linked to the develop-
ment of different ideas about the meaning of political activ-
ity and the circumstances in which men and women become poll-
tically active.
On an intuitive level, I find Gilligan's analysis of
women's moral development compelling; this analysis por-
trays more accurately my perception of the way which I per-
sonally approach moral dilemmas. The model also has greater
appeal for me as a prescriptive standard because of its
greater emphasis on individual variables and its priority
of maintaining positive personal relationships.
It seems to me, then, that one might explore, in
this study whether or not differing perceptions of eval-
uating moral dilemmas are linked to differing perceptions
of what politics is or can be. Since the legitimate
political arena has been dominated by males who may have
a different pattern of moral development, it seems logical
to assume that these males, who may well judge their pat-
tern as superior to that of women, will resist attempts to
include women who cannot understand and accept the male
pattern. One expectation I would have is that women may
understand the male pattern more fully, but men may not
even perceive that there is another possible pattern. What
I am suggesting here is that those who are part of the
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dominant ideology often do not perceive alternative views
that are in existence, whereas those who are subordinate
in that ideology often can articulate the features of the
dominant ideology without fully sharing in it.
An additional expectation I have is that women who have
successfully entered the political arena at levels where
men are more typically the power holders will be more likely
to approach dilemmas from the accepted premises of the male
model and have either relegated the female model to per-
sonal life situations or are unaware of its existence or
convinced that the male model is superior.
Gilligan's ideas may also provide clearer understanding
for the active role that women have played in grass-roots
politics organizing around issues that have a direct impact
on their families and then withdrawing from political activ-
ity once their objectives were satisfied.
While this speculation could be pursued indefinitely,
the intent is to suggest that there are approaches which
might be pursued in the study of women and politics which
might provide us with more understanding of the relationships
which exist between these variables and might suggest to us
public policies which would incorporate more citizens into
the democratic polity. It is this objective that was lacking
in many of the studies that were analyzed in this disserta-
tion. Too often, the studies were interested in looking at
women's political behavior without asserting a goal of
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le
suggesting policy changes which would stimulate women'
political participation in a variety of political setting,
and, yet, the results of these studies always suggest a
range of policy alternatives that would make sense if thi
explanations in these studies were assumed to be correct
interpretations of the reasons why women participate or do
not participate in politics.
To recapitulate, the early voting behavior studies
presented a set of ideas about women and politics that pos-
tulated that the foundations of women's lesser political
participation might either be established in pre-adult
socialization or that women's lesser political behavior
could best be attributed to the preoccupations of women
with their adult roles as wives and mothers. In the exam-
ination of these explanations, political scientists tended
to focus on research that would lend support to one of
these explanations as being more important. I would suggest
that this attempt to amass evidence in support of one thesis
versus the other was a product of the behaviorist emphasis
for establishing a cause
,
preferably a single cause, that
determined women's political behavior. If such a cause
could be isolated, it would provide the possibility that
policies could be promulgated which would alter the causal
relationship
.
Thus, if early childhood socialization is really the
determining factor in women's political behavior, one could
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presumably suggest a series of policies that would attempt
to alter the political socialization that occurs in this
time period.
Similarly, if women's political behavior is primarily
determined by inherent tensions between an active political
role and her roles as wife and mother, then policies directe
at eliminating these tensions would be indicated.
While the actual policies that could be suggested might
be quite diverse, the important consideration here is that
none of these explanations is devoid of policy implications.
It makes little sense for the theorist, who believes that
socialization is the major underlying cause for women's poli
tical behavior and that this socialization occurs in early
childhood and is difficult to extinguish in adult lives, to
suggest policies to change women's political behavior which
focused on the constraints of her adult roles. If this
occurred, we would be justified in challenging his/her es-
pousal of the socialization explanation.
While the policy implications of the studies analyzed
in this work are implicit in the research interpretations
rather than explicit
,
it can still be argued that if there
was a consistent pattern to the research findings, if the
same factors were repeatedly revealed as the reasons for
women's political behavior, then, there might be a possibil-
ity for organizing around these concerns, for attempting to
promote policies that would increase women's political
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participation. While my research shows that lack of agree-
ment in the results of the studies is rife, a greater con-
cern has been that under the rubric of scientific investi-
gation, unsubstantiated views of women's relationship to
politics and explanations of this relationship have been
perpetuated. In sum, from a policy perspective, the research
completed, to this point, is an inadequate foundation for
policy decisions.
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